The following brief essay gives my overall thoughts on the battle of Gettysburg, the turning point of the war between the states and the bloodiest battle in American history and on American soil.

The first Day of the Battle of Gettysburg

Confident and fresh from the most brilliant victory of his career at Chancellorsville, General Robert E. Lee of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia planned to invade the North once again, just as he had the previous year. He believed that a Confederate victory on Northern soil would increase Confederate prestige overseas and perhaps lead to foreign recognition of the Confederacy. Such a victory would likely expel the Union from Maryland and the Union government from Washington.

Operations in Union territory would also relieve the pressure on Southern farmers, upon whose produce his army depended for sustenance. In June 1863, the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac and invaded Maryland. His army was composed of 75,000 men in three corps, following the army’s post Chancellorsville reorganization following the death of Stonewall Jackson. Troops from Jackson’s corps and from General James Longstreet’s corps were pulled to form a new third corps, III Corps under General A. P. Hill, a highly successful division commander. This time Lee’s plans were not dashed by any lost orders, as they had been the previous year, and his army marched into Pennsylvania. His adversary, Major General Joseph Hooker of the Army of the Potomac, moved sluggishly to counter him. The Army of the Potomac comprised 93,000 men in seven corps. After the thrashing at Chancellorsville, Hooker was very wary of Lee and kept a respectable distance.

President Abraham Lincoln was not impressed and with a major battle appearing imminent, he replaced Hooker with General George G, Meade, a hard fighting general who had always given a good account of his corps while under previous Union generals. Lee’s army advanced into Pennsylvania blind, because Lee’s cavalry officer, General “Jeb” Stuart, was out of touch with him, off on one of his famed rides around the Union army. Unbeknown to him, Northern troops were on a collision course with him. The confrontation occurred at the town of Gettysburg in Pennsylvania, where no fewer than 10 roads intersected. The division of Confederate General Henry Heth, on a mission to secure shoes from the town, ran into the cavalry division of Union General John Buford. Equipped with repeating carbines, Buford’s men managed to hold off the numerically superior Confederates, until Union reinforcements arrived. Both sides fed men into the battle, but the Yankees initially had it worse. Major General John Reynolds of the Army of the Potomac I Corps was slain by a Confederate sniper, and the Union troops were pushed out of Gettysburg. It was now incumbent upon the Confederates to seize the high ground beyond the town, especially Cemetery Hill and ridge. Accordingly, Lee ordered General Ewell to drive the Yankees off “if practicable.”

It was Lee’s practice to give his subordinates only general instructions, entrusting them to work out the details, and giving them a high degree of flexibility. But while Stonewall Jackson would have seen Lee’s order as an order and not a suggestion, such a command arrangement did not lend itself to his successor in command of II Corps, General Richard S. Ewell, who was indecisive and was apparently incapable of making decisions for himself. He hesitated, despite the pleas from his subordinate, General Jubal Early, and during the night of July 1rst, the Federals entrenched on Cemetery Hill and along the ridge in a fishhook shaped defensive position. The best chance of a Confederate victory in the battle was gone, and Lee would be forced to renew the fight on the morrow against an enemy acting on the defensive.

The Second Day of the Battle of Gettysburg

The rising of the sun on July 2nd, found the Union Army of the Potomac arranged in a fishhook shaped defensive position. The position, arranged by General Winfield Scott Hancock, probably the best general in the Union army, successor to the late General Reynolds, on the high ground south of Gettysburg, was approved by General Meade when he arrived on the battlefield late on the evening of the 1rst. Meade’s right flank was rested on Culp’s Hill, and the line ran along Cemetery Hill, then south on Cemetery Ridge, until it reached two other prominent hills, Little and Big Round Top.

The morning of July 2nd saw Lee in ill health, and thanks to Ewell’s indecision the previous day, Lee now faced the daunting prospect of dislodging an enemy that was entrenched upon high ground. Having been firmly convinced that the tactical defense was the way to go by the battle of Fredericksburg in December of the previous year, General James Longstreet, Lee’s subordinate, proposed to maneuver around Meade’s left and offer battle on ground that was favorable to the Confederates. But Lee was resolved to strike the enemy in front of him. Lee has been criticized for this, but it should be pointed out that he had won his first battlefield victory, Gaines Mill, under such conditions, a victory which goes a long way to explain his fondness for bloody offensive tactics. On the 2nd day of Chancellorsville too, the Confederates had successfully carried a formidable line of Union entrenchments. In any case, acting on the offensive put the initiative with his own army, and although Longstreet’s plan was sound, Lee’s plan would have succeeded had it been launched as intended. But it was not.

Ewell’s II Corps, ordered to demonstrate against Meade’s right flank, and attack if conditions were favorable, but the timid Ewell once again failed to make a decision for himself and only engaged in a bombardment of the Union right, sending in his troops when it was far too late for them to do any good. While Ewell demonstrated on the Union right, and General A.P. Hill demonstrated against the center, Longstreet launched the main blow against the left flank of the Union line. Longstreet was a good general, but he had his faults. Proud, ambitious, envious, and sulky, Longstreet failed to give his all when his proposals were not accepted. His heart was not in Lee’s offensive plan, and pouting over this, he dragged his feet in launching his attack. It should be pointed out that Longstreet was already notorious for tardiness, so that when he finally got his attack rolling it was 4:30 in the afternoon. Longstreet’s delay was a big Union favor. When the Army of the Potomac’s topographical engineer, General G.K. Warren, saw that Little Round Top was undefended, and seeing the enormous tactical value the hill’s possession would give its occupiers, he ordered it occupied. To gain time against the advancing Confederates, he sacrificed a regiment to the two divisions of Longstreet, who chewed it up and spat it out. Unfortunately, for the South, when they reached the hill, it was occupied by the Union troops.

Colonel Joshua Chamberlain of the 20th Maine gallantly held the hill against the repeated Confederate troops until his ammunition ran dry, then ordered his men to fix bayonets and charge, routing the startled Confederates. Without detracting from Chamberlain’s well-deserved glory, it should be pointed out that if Longstreet had dragged his feet less, he could have beaten the Yankees to Little Round Top before Warren saw its tactical value and by placing his artillery there enfiladed the Northern line along its whole length. It would have been a repeat of Chancellorsville, where the occupation of Fairview Heights permitted Confederate artillery to smash the Northern line, which under this pressure and that of repeated infantry attacks, had no choice but to fall back. Political General Daniel Sickles left a gap in the Northern line when he moved his men into the Peach Orchard, and by exploiting this gap, Longstreet could have pierced the Union line. But again, his tardiness prevented this before the Yankees closed the gap. The day ended with the Yankees still in possession of the field. Although the Confederates had swept all the way up to Cemetery Hill and Culp’s hill, they lacked the strength to hold these positions after the galling casualties they had sustained and were pushed back.

Also, it should be added that the Northern troops were learning from their previous defeats and were becoming combat skilled, whereas the Confederate troops were feeling the effects of a shortage of good officers, as many fell in combat. Nevertheless, while Lee made his mistakes, much of the blame for the South’s defeat must rest with Longstreet and Ewell. In fairness to Longstreet, it should be stressed that he was a good general. He had single-handedly saved the Confederate army at Sharpsburg and pulled off a highly successful tactical success at the Wilderness later that year that could have destroyed the Union army. But when his heart was not in the fight, he failed to give it his all, and his tardiness in launching his attack enabled his Union adversaries to recover from a near disaster. Ewell too proved incapable of filling the shoes of Stonewall Jackson. A decent subordinate, he failed when corps command was placed upon his shoulders. A.P. Hill too turned in a lackluster performance, but in his defense, it must be stressed that it was not so much his fault for he was suffering from a venereal disease.

On the Northern side, Colonel Joshua Chamberlain towers above all, and Generals Hancock and Warren put in good performances, showing good tactical sense and foresight. The stage was now set for the 3rd day of the battle of Gettysburg.

The 3rd Day of the Battle of Gettysburg

Having struck the right flank of the Union army on July 1rst, and the left flank on July 2nd, General Robert E. Lee decided that he would now strike the center of the Army of the Potomac’s line. This was a logical decision for him to make, since General Meade would have taken troops from his center to patch his flanks during Lee’s previous two attacks. Late on the evening of July 2nd, in a council of war, Meade and his generals correctly deduced that this would be Lee’s next move and prepared to meet it.

Reinforcements arrived on the field for Lee late on the evening of July 2nd. The fresh division of General Pickett, and the cavalry corps of General Jeb Stuart were on hand for Lee’s attack next day and he planned to use them in the next day’s attack. Lee’s plan involved a massive infantry attack against the Union center, composed of 15,000 men in three divisions, those of Generals Pickett, Pettigrew and Trimble. The attack would have to be made across a mile of open ground, during which time the advancing Confederates would be under Union artillery and infantry fire the entire way. Pickett’s charge has often hailed as an act of massive tactical folly, as if General Lee had failed to learn the lessons of Fredericksburg. However, such a belief neglects several crucial facts. First, Lee was well aware of the lessons of Fredericksburg. He had spent hours looking down on the bloodbath there. In addition, Lee’s background was in the engineering corps, so he certainly had a good grasp of what were and were not strong defensive positions. Second, Lee did not plan on his troops crossing a mile of open ground under the Union fire. He instead planned on a massive artillery bombardment from his cannons to cover his troops as they marched across the open, not, as popularly believed, merely to soften the Yankee line in preparation for the attack. Under the cannon fire, his troops could have marched across the open ground without being shot to pieces in the open. Finally, Lee planned to use Stuart’s cavalry to strike the rear of the Union army at the same time. General Lee’s plan went awry, however. Longstreet, once again, had no faith in the plan and dragged his feet. Meanwhile, 175 Confederate cannons were banging away at the center of the Union line.

By the time Longstreet got his troops ready to attack, the artillerymen had used up most of their ammunition, and there was not enough to cover his advance. And so, Longstreet launched the attack that has come down through history as “Pickett’s charge” though his was only one of three divisions taking part. The advancing Confederates were thinned by artillery and infantry fire, and only a small party under General Lew Armistead pierced the Union line and was repulsed. Jeb Stuart’s cavalry failed to flank the Northern line and was repulsed in savage fighting. As the attack ended, and the troops returned, General Robert E. Lee took full responsibility for the disaster, although much of the fault was not his, and the Confederate army began its retreat on the afternoon of July 1rst. The Battle of Gettysburg had ended, a clear-cut Union strategical and tactical victory that turned the war in the Eastern Theater in the Union favor. Never again would Lee have the military strength to invade the North and he was limited to the strategic defensive for the remainder of the war.

The Battle of Gettysburg was the bloodiest battle in the American history. The casualties of the Army of Northern Virginia stood at 28,000 men; those of the Army of the Potomac at 23,000. For comparison, the casualties sustained by the United States during the entire Vietnam war were 58,000. From the standpoint of the Union side, General Meade had proven himself the best Union tactician so far, (General George McClellan was probably the best general strictly speaking, but he belonged in a staff room, not the battlefield), while from the Rebel standpoint, Lee’s performance, though he displayed his usual tactical genius, nevertheless was marked by some degree of overconfidence and other errors on his part, and more significantly, by severe letdowns on the part of his generals, who it must be confessed poorly served him at the most critical hour. Longstreet would redeem his reputation in the battle of the Wilderness; Ewell would not, and Hill’s illnesses would continue to plague him throughout the war until he was killed at Petersburg.

The Union performance during the battle was largely excellent; the only significant black mark was Meade’s failure to pursue the retiring Confederate army. In his defense, his army had been severely mauled by his victory, but Lincoln the politician was not impressed, and Meade’s star fell lower when he failed to attack Lee’s formidable defensive position at Mine Run later that year, and Lincoln replaced him with Ulysses Grant, no great tactician by any means, but who had the strategic foresight to use the Union advantages in resources and manpower to grind Lee down in a war of attrition.