The Battle of Gaines Mill was the first victory of the newly organized Army of Northern Virginia, and General Robert E. Lee’s first victory as well. The only clear-cut Confederate victory of the Seven Days battles, the battle forced Lee’s opponent, General George B. McClellan, into full retreat, and saved Richmond from a fatal siege.

 

Background

The situation for the Confederacy in the early months of 1862 was not good. Reports of defeats and setbacks streamed into the capital from everywhere. In all theaters of the war, it was going badly for the Confederacy.  Between January and May of 1862, their forces had been ousted from Kentucky, Forts Henry and Donelson had been taken on the Tennessee river on February 6th and 16th respectively; the main Confederate Army in the West had been defeated at Shiloh in April, which led to the loss of Corinth; Admiral David Farragut had taken New Orleans, on April 24th, and the whole state of Missouri was secured by the Union,  although minor battles and skirmishes would continue until the end of the war. And in the Eastern Theater of the war, the huge army of the Potomac, well over 100,000 men, was moving slowly south to put the vice on Richmond and take the Confederate Capitol. Times were indeed desperate.  General George B. McClellan, the vain, cautious, handsome and intellectually brilliant commander of the Army of the Potomac had a simple task: to take Richmond. McClellan had no plans of taking the city by direct attack; he was going to conduct a siege. In his words “I will push them in upon Richmond and behind their works. Then I will bring up my heavy guns, shell the city, and carry it be assault.”  McClellan’s gifts, however, were not in tactical brilliance, or even strategy; rather, they were in organization and administration. It was these traits that had enabled him to revitalize and organize the enormous Army of the Potomac into a modern army capable of winning a war. McClellan did not forsake the Spiritual wellbeing of the army under his command. A strong Christian of the Presbyterian variety, McClellan spearheaded a vigorous campaign of Gospel preaching and revival in the Union army, but due to the dead formalism and moralism that infected much of the Northern Church, these efforts at revival were ultimately not as successful as those revivals in the Southern armies.

McClellan (left) and Lee (Right), opposing commanding generals in the Battle of Gaines Mill

Although Lincoln and Stanton wanted McClellan to attack Richmond by the most direct route, McClellan had a plan of his own. He would transport his entire army and all its supplies to the Virginia peninsula over the water, landing them at Fort Monroe. Here, he would advance the 75 miles to the Confederate capitol from the east. The advantage of this was that his army would have its flanks protected by the York and James rivers and a secure line of communications. As a strategy, it was sound, but Lincoln and Stanton were very wary of it. They were afraid of a Confederate attack on Washington and felt better with McClellan’s army between Richmond and Washington. As a soldier, McClellan knew a Rebel thrust against Washington was highly unlikely, but Politicians like Lincoln and Stanton did not know enough of military affairs to realize this. To his fury, they detached his biggest army corps, that of General Irvin McDowell, the loser at First Manassas, to defend Washington. He was also removed from his position as General in Chief of the Federal Armies and demoted to only command the Army of the Potomac.

 

McClellan, a devout Christian and conservative Democrat, had earned the ire of the Radical Republicans in Congress and in Lincoln’s cabinet, because he repudiated total war, considered slavery to be constitutionally legal, and was fighting solely for the preservation of the Old Union. The Radical Republicans of course, wanted total war, the destruction of the Old Union, and the abolition of slavery be any means necessary. They also wanted a speedy end to the war, and believed that by his caution, McClellan was acting disloyally to the Union, and might harbor Confederate sympathies. Thus, McClellan’s peninsula campaign was preceded by much infighting between him and his political superiors. McClellan had also witnessed the Radicals scapegoating of generals with whom they disagreed politically over defeats and high casualty lists, which only increased his resolve to avoid both, and had the effect of adding to his already great caution, which helps to explain some of McClellan’s actions during and after the Battle of Gaines Mill. On the Confederate side, General Joseph E. Johnston, in command of the Confederate forces gathered in defense of Richmond, quarreled with Jefferson Davis and did not communicate with him, hampering the Confederate war effort.  McClellan landed his great army in March of 1862 and started northwest up the Virginia peninsula in early April. Moving to Yorktown, he encountered the defensive positions of Confederate General John B. Magruder. Although he could have taken them by assault, McClellan prepared to besiege them; he brought up his heavy siege guns intended for the siege of Richmond, but Magruder had withdrawn the night before McClellan was to begin his bombardment. McClellan then resumed his march toward Richmond. The Confederate rear guard was attacked at Williamsburg, but the Confederate retreat toward Richmond was unhindered. Another inconclusive battle was fought on the 27th of May at Hanover Courthouse, and Johnston finally went on the offensive against McClellan on the 31rst of May. During the two-day battle, Johnston took a bullet to the arm and a shell splinter to the chest. He survived, but his position as Commander of the Rebel forces arrayed in defense of Richmond would have to be given to another.

 

Lee takes Command

The wounding of Johnston can be described as Providential. For Johnston was about to be replaced by one of the most brilliant military minds of all time, a man whose daring skill and audacity on the battlefield was to earn him a place in the history books as one of history’s greatest generals. That man was Robert E. Lee. And he would go on to save Richmond from the impending Federal siege and keep it safe for two whole years. Lee came from an aristocratic family in Virginia. His father had served with George Washington, as a general of cavalry, and Lee was driven his entire life by the call of duty and honor, never doing anything to sully his family name.  He had graduated West Point without a single mark against him, and had a background in the engineering corps. Like many of his fellow generals, North and South, he had fought in the Mexican War. He was a strong Christian of the Episcopal variety. At the eve of war, he had been offered command of the Army of the Potomac but had turned it down. Although Lee opposed secession at the time (he would come to approve wholly the South’s actions later in life), he believed that his first loyalty lay not to the United States, as much as he loved his country, but to his native state, Virginia. This was a common view at the time, before the Civil War destroyed Antebellum America, and the Federalism established by the Founding Fathers.

 

Despite being the foremost American soldier at the eve of war, his reputation had been diminished by his lackluster assignments in the new Confederate government. The culmination of this was in a desk job as military adviser to Jefferson Davis. Lee did well in this position, though he personally hated the job, planning Jackson’s brilliant Valley Campaign, and Johnston’s month-long defense at Yorktown.  Jefferson Davis now offered Lee the command of the forces to be used in defense of the capitol, and Lee accepted. The reception to Lee’s first field command was actually poor; Johnston was a Confederate hero and Lee was not expected to be able to fill his shoes. Many Southerners believed that the wounding of Johnston had been a grave blow to the interests of the South.  However, a few men did have confidence in Lee. Colonel Joseph Ives, who had known Lee in South Carolina, said of him in reply to a question posed by Major E. Porter Alexander, who would go on to be Lee’s artillery officer: “…if there is one man in either army, Confederate or Federal, head and shoulders above every other in audacity, it is General Lee! His name might be Audacity. He will make take more desperate chances, and take them quicker, than any other general in this country, North or South; and you will live to see it, too.” Ives’ words were prophetic. With these sentiments, Johnston himself was in full agreement. Although he had had differences with Lee in the past, when a friend repeated the sentiment that Johnston’s wound had been a grave blow to the South, Johnston answered: “No, Sir! The shot that struck me down is the very best that has been fired for the Southern cause yet. For I possess in no degree the confidence of our government, and now they have in my place one who does possess it, and who can accomplish what I never could have done – the concentration of our armies for the defense of the capital of the Confederacy.” On the other hand, McClellan grossly underestimated the character of his new adversary. When he heard of Lee’s appointment, McClellan, who knew both Lee and Johnston during the Mexican War, wrote: “I prefer Lee to Johnston. The former is too cautious and weak under grave responsibility – personally brave and energetic to a fault, he is yet wanting in moral firmness when pressed by heavy responsibility and is likely to be timid and irresolute in action.” Ironically, in his description of Lee, McClellan had given a good description of himself!

 

There were 50,000 Southern troops arrayed outside the capital. Their discipline, provision and food were poor, as was the general state of the army, if, indeed, it could be called that. The troops were a hodgepodge of different units, and not an army in the best sense of the word. Yet, Lee would have to hold off an enemy of two to one numerical superiority over him. Lee would have to whip these men into shape, and he set determinedly to the task. He managed to obtain better rations and uniforms for his men, and he strengthened his pool of officers, promoting men who had promise and booting incompetent men out.  Lee himself frequently inspected his men, cutting an imposing figure with his six-foot frame, while sporting his characteristic gray hair and beard. With their provision improved, the men’s morale followed. From the veterans of First Manassas, the men under John B. Magruder, and arriving reinforcements from Georgia, South Carolina and Southern Virginia, Lee organized the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee now put his new army to work building ditches, breastworks and redoubts around Richmond, stretching for eight miles from White Oak Swamp to New Bridge on the Chickahominy River.  The work, which some of the troops believed was fit only for slaves and not for soldiers, led to the men calling him “King of spades.” They grumbled about it then, but they would see the great wisdom of this in time.

 

Lee also had to deal with the attitude of defeat that carried over among his senior officers from Johnston’s tenure as Commander. In his first meeting with his general officers, he found that some of them favored pulling back toward Richmond even farther. Brigadier General H.C. Whiting, a division commander, and an engineer, tried to state that McClellan’s advance was a certainty, and drew diagrams showing the Union General’s siege guns inching ever closer to Richmond.  This exasperated Lee. “Stop!” He cried, finally having had enough.  “If we go to ciphering, we shall be whipped beforehand.” Most significantly, however, Lee was in daily communication with Jefferson Davis, unlike his predecessor, who had not been in communication with Davis at all. In his very first letter, sent on the 5th of June, Lee wrote of minor problems in the command of his subordinate D.H. Hill, beginning thus: “Our position requires that you should know everything, and you must excuse my troubling you.” Thus began the beginning of an excellent working relationship between Davis and Lee. Davis did not get along with his generals, generally speaking – notably P.G.T. Beauregard and Joseph Johnston – but with Lee, he had no trouble.

 

Lee’s Strategy

Believing that the best defense is a good offense, Lee began to ponder his strategy to drive the Yankees from the gates of Richmond.   McClellan’s enormous army was straddling the Chickahominy river during this time, 125,000 strong. Almost the whole army was south of the river, hard at work with pick and shovel to construct elaborate fortifications, which McClellan planned to make use of in his planned siege of Richmond.  Only two corps, that of Generals Fitz-John Porter, and William B. Franklin, V Corps and VI Corps respectively, was on the north bank, located there to guard McClellan’s supply base at White House on the James River. Lee planned to hold the bulk of McClellan’s army south of the river with only a small force, marching north with his main body to fall upon the right flank of McClellan’s army, the two corps on the north bank of the Chickahominy. Lee planned to act in concert with Thomas J “Stonewall” Jackson during this time. As is well known, Jackson was a strong Christian and a Presbyterian Deacon, and like most geniuses, in his case military, he had his idiosyncrasies and eccentricities. Jackson was making a name for himself in the Shenandoah valley during this time. Lee reinforced him with the brigade of General Alexander Lawton and the division of H.C. Whiting. With these reinforcements, Jackson performed admirably; he defeated three separate armies in the valley and denied McClellan their reinforcements. Jackson was then to march his entire command to act in conjunction with Lee. On June 11th, Brigadier General James Ewell Brown (Jeb) Stuart, Lee’s cavalry chief and a strong Christian and personal friend of Stonewall Jackson, was ordered to conduct a reconnaissance in force of McClellan’s right wing on the north bank of the Chickahominy river and ascertain its susceptibility to a flanking maneuver.

 

The flamboyant Stuart was elated. Here was his chance for glory, which he greatly relished. With 1200 troopers he set off on a mission that was to establish him as one of Lee’s most daring, skilled, and talented subordinates. Two of Stuart’s troopers included a nephew and son of General Lee himself. Stuart started off on his mission on the 12th, dressed in his flashy thigh high boots, yellow sash, broad plumed hat and gray jacket covered with gold braid. Though only twenty-nine, his youthful face was concealed with a thick red brown beard.  Stuart did not tell his men the object of their mission; he had them ride north of Richmond as if they were en route to reinforce Jackson in the valley. Then the column turned east, substantiating the rumors that had gone through the ranks of the troopers that their mission was the scouting of McClellan’s right flank.

 

The night of the 12th, Stuart camped near Hanover Courthouse; the next day he engaged a handful of Union cavalry, then turned southeast, a route that took him behind Porter’s corps. Early that afternoon, his men fought another skirmish with Federal cavalry, which cost him the only casualty his raid would sustain, a captain named Latane, killed by a pistol shot. Then Stuart’s raiders destroyed a Union cavalry camp, took some prisoners and arrived at the Old Church crossroads. Stuart now decided on the notion he had harbored all along. To ride all the way around McClellan’s army instead of retracing his former route back. He had already discovered all the information Lee wanted. But Stuart wanted the glory and he relished it. So, ride around McClellan’s army he did, doing more damage in McClellan’s rear, and then arriving at the Chickahominy, hotly pursued by Yankee cavalry led by none other than his own father-in-law, Brigadier General Philip St. George Cooke. Hastily constructing a makeshift bridge to ford the rising river, which was swelling with the rainfall that was occurring at this time, Stuart’s men made it across just ten minutes ahead of Cooke’s cavalry. Stuart quickly headed straight for Richmond, reaching there on the 15th, a hero who had performed the daring: a complete ride around McClellan’s army that had cost him only one man, but had yielded him 170 prisoners and 300 horses and mules.

 

The information he brought back was invaluable. McClellan’s right flank was not anchored on the ridge between the Chickahominy and the Totopotomy creek. Rather, it was “in the air” – in military lingo, this meant that it was not anchored on any strong natural terrain and was therefore vulnerable. In addition, Stuart reported that the roads behind the Federal lines were bad, which meant that McClellan would be delayed bringing up his siege artillery. McClellan’s supply base was at White House. With this information, Lee was poised to take the offensive. He met with Jefferson Davis and explained the plan that he had he already mentioned to him in previous letters: to divide his army, leaving a small force in the fortifications around Richmond to hold McClellan’s attention, while Lee moved to strike at McClellan’s right wing on the north bank of the Chickahominy in conjunction with Jackson. The risk was immense. The force Lee intended to leave behind, that under General Magruder, would have to hold his line with only 22,000 men to face 75,000 Federals. If McClellan mounted a direct attack, he could overrun Magruder and take Richmond. The risk was indeed high, for as Davis pointed out, what if McClellan did not behave like an engineer, and simply assaulted Magruder instead of besieging him? Lee had bristled at this since he had a background in the engineering corps like his adversary. Lee assured Davis that “if you will hold as long as you can at the entrenchments and then fall back on the detached works around the city, I will be on the enemy’s heels before he gets there.” Indeed, as Lee had predicted to Davis in a previous letter: “McClellan will make this a battle of posts. He will take position from position, under cover of his heavy guns and we cannot get at him without storming his works, which with our new troops is extremely hazardous.” Davis agreed to the plan cautiously.

 

Lee had already alerted Jackson to be ready to march to his assistance; now he gave Jackson the command to join him. And so, Jackson’s army started out, on the 16th, Jackson telling no one in his command where he was leading them, as was his custom. He had the army stop on the 22nd, a Sunday, for rest. Jackson always kept the Sabbath; he even loathed fighting on it, although he would do so if necessity demanded it. As he explained it to Robert Lewis Dabney, his chief of staff at the time, and a theological professor: “The Sabbath is written in the constitution of man and horses as really as in the Bible: I can march my men farther in a week, marching six days and resting the seventh, and get through with all my men and horses in better condition than if I marched them all seven days.”  He rode ahead to attend a conference with Lee.

 

On the 23rd of June, Jackson finally arrived at Lee’s headquarters, after a night ride of fifty-two miles and fourteen hours in the saddle. Needless to say, he was stiff and sore. Jackson joined Lee and his top generals for a council of war. Lee offered Jackson refreshments, and Jackson sipped some milk as Lee then spread out a crude map and went over his plan. General James Longstreet, General A.P. Hill and General D.H. Hill were all present. Lee explained that Richmond could not be held in a formal siege, and that therefore, it was necessary to go on the offense. A direct attack was not possible on the Federal positions due to their strength and the inexperience of Lee’s army; therefore, a flanking movement was necessitated. Jackson said little, quietly listening as Lee ran his mouth. McClellan’s right wing was much more vulnerable than his left, Lee explained. He intended to hold McClellan’s attention south of the Chickahominy with a small force. With the remainder he intended to march north of the Chickahominy and destroy the corps of Fitz-John Porter. With the corps destroyed, the way would be open to sever McClellan’s supply line to the James. When this was accomplished, McClellan would either be forced to retreat or to give battle on open ground. Jackson was to fall upon Porter’s right and rear, flushing him from his strong earthworks, and permitting the others to cross the Chickahominy via three bridges in echelon, and attack from the direction of Mechanicsville.   The entire plan thus hinged upon the arrival of Jackson’s army on the field of battle. Lee left his subordinates to work out the time schedule and discuss the plan among themselves, a practice uncharacteristic of Lee’s style of command.

 

Longstreet now addressed Jackson: “You have distance to overcome, and in all probability the enemy will try to halt you. Your move is the key. You set the hour when the troops can join.” “The morning of the twenty-fifth.” Jackson responded without hesitation. “I don’t know,” Longstreet answered. “The roads are bad. You had better take a little more time. We can adjust our movements to yours.” “All right.” Jackson agreed. “The morning of the twenty-sixth.” With the plan now complete, Jackson rode back to his men to get them moving. He would spend another night in the saddle.

 

Preparations for Battle

McClellan, meanwhile, had been idle. During this time, the downpours that had been falling during the first two weeks in June had turned the roads into quagmires, preventing him from moving up his artillery, and thus impeding his advance on Richmond, which was already being conducted with McClellan’s usual sluggishness. Now, however, the rain had finally ceased, and McClellan was at last beginning to move his juggernaut. Unbeknownst to Lee, McClellan was planning an attack of his own on a nearly identical schedule to Lee’s. The roads were drying, and more significantly, McClellan’s constant requests for reinforcements had at last been granted. Brigadier General George McCall’s division from McDowell’s corps was being transferred to Porter’s V Corps. McClellan had been asking for McDowell’s corps to join him, but with Jackson’s army present in the valley only McCall’s division could be spared.  He intended to move his army a mile west and take Old Tavern, thus bringing his siege artillery closer to Richmond. To cover this attack, McClellan moved his III Corps west from Seven Pines along the Williamsburg Road on the 25th. This was disputed by the Confederates of Major General Benjamin Huger’s division. After a sharp fight lasting three hours, Major General Samuel B. Heintzelman recalled his men. McClellan overruled him and the Northern men prevailed, advancing McClellan’s picket line forward a mile.

 

Lee watched this fight, a little apprehensively. McClellan’s advance seemed to indicate that he knew something was afoot. Lee considered the possibility that McClellan was going to advance straight into Richmond, and he instructed Magruder to hold on with all he had. But McClellan wasn’t going to attempt anything of the sort.  Jeb Stuart’s ride around McClellan’s army had thrown a scare into the cautious McClellan. He decided to shift his supply base from White House to a new base on the James, and to transfer the two corps north of the Chickahominy to the south. Franklin’s VI Corps moved on the 18th. Porter’s Corps remained where it was; it would be transferred south later. McCall’s division joined Porter. McClellan had another reason for transferring the two corps and his supply base: Jackson. Jackson was the most famous soldier in the Confederacy. His reputation had preceded him. He could seemingly appear out of nowhere; then disappear without a trace. And when he departed, he left Union defeats in his wake. Even a general far less cautious than McClellan would have been rattled by the news of the approach of the near mystical Jackson.  Reports had reached McClellan that Jackson was moving out of the valley to fall upon his right flank, and rear, thus threatening his supply line, and base at White House.  McClellan had Porter send out a small force to harass and slow Jackson and postponed his advance to Old Tavern. In addition, reports of Confederate manpower erroneously supplied by his informal intelligence department, made up of Pinkerton Detectives, stated that the Confederates had 200,000 men arrayed against him. The cautious McClellan swallowed these false reports whole.

 

McClellan, afraid of high casualties, and the suspension of his offensive, due to a fear of being scapegoated by Radical Republicans, was content to merely hold his own. He was not going to hazard his army or his command of it, on an unsuccessful attack on Richmond. He said as much in a scathing wire to Edwin Stanton:

 

“The rebel force is stated at 200,000 men…I regret my great inferiority of numbers but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of reinforcements; that this was the decisive point, and that all the available means of the Government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army that I have the honor to command, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of the action which will probably occur tomorrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown upon my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs.”

 

 

The Battle of Mechanicsville

On the morning of June 26th, Lee stood on a bluff looking north of the Chickahominy and waited for his attack to begin. Unfortunately, for Lee, his planned attack went terribly awry. The divisions of Longstreet and the two Hills had been waiting to attack for some time. But they could not move, until they heard Jackson’s signal guns. And they never did hear them. Lee received a message from Jackson at 9 am; which indicated that his troops would be six hours late, in arriving. The hours passed, and finally, tired of waiting, the high strung A.P. Hill decided to attack upon his own initiative, at 3 in the afternoon, unable to take the negative effect the waiting was having on his nerves any longer. He crossed the Chickahominy and attacked through the village of Mechanicsville against the Union positions on Beaver Dam Creek. Jackson, he reasoned, would arrive any moment, as it was now six hours since his 9 am message.  According to legend, Hill was motivated not only by military, but by personal reasons, as well, to get at McClellan. Both Hill and McClellan had previously courted the same woman, but McClellan had won her hand. Therefore, the story goes, Hill had never forgiven McClellan for this. Hill’s men drove back the Federal pickets, occupied the village of Mechanicsville, and launched the first of multiple piecemeal assaults on the Federals on the bluffs overlooking Beaver Dam Creek. The Union Position was impregnable, and the Yankees held their own, pouring rifle fire and canister into Hill’s ranks. He kept on his attack, believing that at any moment, Jackson’s men would appear and fall upon the Yankees from their rear. But time dragged on and still no Jackson.

 

Meanwhile, Hill’s men were being slaughtered like cattle. Longstreet and D.H. Hill’s divisions joined the assault but could not dislodge the Federals from their strong position in frontal assaults. Hill had not told Lee what he was doing, and Lee tried to recall the attack at 5 pm, unsuccessfully. Then seeing Jefferson Davis and his cabinet, with a group of staff officers, and congressmen, on the edge of the battlefield, Lee rode to them. “Mr., President.” Lee said, coldly, “who is this army, and what is it doing here?” “It is not my army, General.” Davis answered. “It is certainly not my army, Mr. President,” Lee replied, “and this is no place for it.” “Well, General” Davis then said, “if I withdraw, maybe they shall too.” He then wheeled his horse around and led his party away.  Unbeknownst to Lee, Davis and his party did not leave the battlefield, but merely hid themselves from Lee’s view. At 9 am, the fight was over, a genuine Confederate disaster. Lee had suffered over a thousand casualties, and his carefully orchestrated plan had fallen completely apart. The defeat was due to the delay and absence of Jackson, and the poor coordination of the other senior ranking Confederates. The defeat revealed that Lee’s army of Northern Virginia had a way to go before it would iron all the kinks out of itself and become the spectacular battle winning force it would become.

 

McClellan was elated at the victory; he considered it a great success to merely hold his ground. The unsuccessful Confederate attacks had also put the Confederate army in grave danger; if McClellan realized what was going on, he could either advance straight into Richmond, by overrunning Magruder’s lines, or he could move his other corps across the river and concentrate his whole army against Lee’s forces. Either way, Lee would lose the gamble. If McClellan decided on the former idea, the Confederacy would lose Richmond; if McClellan decided on the latter idea, the Confederacy would lose three fourths of Lee’s army. Providentially, however, for the Confederates, McClellan decided on another choice; he elected to withdraw instead.

 

The mystery of Jackson

Despite having two glorious and golden opportunities dropped into the palm of his hand, McClellan, in a decision that can only be described as another Providential instance of God intervening in the minds of men, decided to forego both of them. In so doing, he saved the Confederacy what could have been a disaster, that either way, would have resulted in a Yankee victory three years sooner. The thought that consumed the minds of the Confederates at this time was simple: what had happened to Jackson? Why hadn’t he arrived and provided the knockout flanking maneuver that would have won the day? Jackson’s behavior, not only at Mechanicsville, but at Gaines Mill, and at the other battles of the Seven Days, have baffled historians ever since. For during these battles, Jackson was sluggish, disoriented, confused, and lacked the daring, resolve, and quick thinking that characterized him during the Valley campaign and in later battles. In short, in the words of one of his men.  “Jackson was not really Jackson. He was under a spell.”

 

What had happened to him? The answer is actually quite simple. Jackson was physically and mentally exhausted from the Valley campaign, and so for that reason was not displaying his characteristic traits, traits that would distinguish as one of the world’s most brilliant military minds. During the two days that he had been absent from his army to attend Lee’s council of war, Robert L. Dabney, Jackson’s chief of staff, had been in virtual command of the army. Although Dabney was an excellent chief of staff, and he performed well in the post despite the criticism of those who maintained rightfully that he had no military experience, and for that reason had Jackson left him in command, the management of a tired army marching through unfamiliar country was beyond his abilities. Dabney was also suffering from an intestinal malady, further reducing his ability to exercise control over the army.

 

Jackson had even not informed anyone of where he was going, as he was devoted to absolute secrecy of his intentions, much to the exasperation of his subordinate General Richard Ewell. When Jackson had returned on the 24th, his men, guns and wagons were so disordered, and strung out, that Jackson had to call a halt for most of that day to tighten his formations. The entire march was conducted without a sense of haste or urgency, despite the fact that Jackson was supposed to be marching his army against the clock. On the 25th, his army covered 20 miles, six miles short of Ashland. Jackson decided to begin the next day’s march at 2:30 am rather than 3:00 am to make up.

 

That night, a scene which gives insight into Jackson’s Christian character has been recorded. Generals Whiting and Ewell, who had had their differences with Jackson, arrived at his tent and asked if they might continue the march on two roads, instead of one. Jackson replied that he would give his answer later. When out of earshot, Ewell turned to Whiting. “Don’t you know why ‘Old Jack’ would not decide at once? He is going to pray about it.” Sure enough, when Ewell returned to the tent to pick up his sword that he had accidentally left there, he found Jackson, just as he had expected, on his knees pouring out his heart in prayer. This particular request was a minor one; but Jackson even took minor matters to the Lord in prayer. His Christianity was no carnal one. This scene had such an impact on Ewell that it was a factor in the general’s later conversion to Christ, simply one of thousands of conversions that occurred in the Confederate Armies in a great revival during the War between the States.

 

Jackson’s army got started later than 2:30 am, and made poor time, falling behind schedule on roads leading through the tangled brush in unfamiliar country. Jackson himself was not familiar with the terrain; he had no topographical maps of the country, and his topographical engineer Jedidiah Hotchkiss was not with the army, an absence which didn’t do his march any favors. To make matters worse, Federal cavalry harassed his march, burned bridges, and felled trees across the roads he had to use. It was almost 5:00 pm, when Jackson finally reached his destination, after a sluggish march, that was completely uncharacteristic of his famed foot cavalry. To be fair to Jackson, the delays and hardships of the march were not his fault; he was simply mentally, and physically, exhausted, and such men can hardly be expected to give their usual performance. It was regrettable to the Confederate cause, however, for it spoiled Lee’s battle plan. When his men finally reached Hundley’s Corner, his destination, he ordered his men to make camp for the night, despite the fact that he could hear the sounds of the battle of Mechanicsville, raging three miles away! He did this without messaging Lee what he was doing. It was only on the 27th, that he finally joined Lee’s army.

 

Porter’s Withdrawal to Gaines Mill

The aggressive, but futile Confederate attack had rattled McClellan. He ordered Porter to withdraw his men from the high bluffs at Beaver Dam Creek, ceding the battlefield to the Confederates. Although his men were performing well tactically, McClellan had elected upon a strategic withdrawal. McClellan knew that Jackson’s position on his flank threatened his supply base, and he wanted to change bases immediately. He ordered Porter to withdraw to the east to a second defensive position. McClellan and Porter were good friends, and both had backgrounds in the engineering corps. Due to his engineering background, McClellan knew how to choose a good defensive position, whatever his other faults.

 

This second position was along Boatswain’s Creek, another little slow running stream like Beaver Dam Creek four miles to the west. Its banks were steep and bordered by marsh and pine trees. The creek and the marsh that bordered it was styled Boatswain’s swamp by the native Virginians. On the east bank, the ground rose in a high crescent shaped plateau. On the plateau, Porter’s engineers did their job exceedingly well, constructing a triple layered defense in three tiers. Felled logs and stolen fence rails in three lines, each higher on the slope then the first, formed crude breastworks that protected Porter’s infantry, and on the crest of the ridge were deployed 80 cannons and artillery pieces. The position appeared to be impregnable. It certainly was even stronger than that along Beaver Dam Creek. On the right flank, the line was held by Brigadier General George Sykes, while on the left the line was held by the troops of Brigadier General George Morell. McCall’s division was in reserve.

 

Lee’s Improvised Plan

The next day, Lee attempted to organize his men for a double turning movement to force the Federals out of their strong position along Beaver Dam Creek. Before this could be accomplished, the rear guard left there withdrew; the smoke from burning stores giving witness to this. Lee and his subordinates now assumed that Porter’s men would make their next stand along Powhite Creek, the only nearby stream on which the Rebels believed the Federals could make a stand in which they would remain in contact with their troops south of the Chickahominy. This was a grave error, for it meant that Lee would be sending troops to attack a nonexistent Union position. The Yankees were not on Powhite Creek, but on Boatswain’s Creek. However, in the Confederate defense, it must be stressed that Lee and his subordinates had no idea that Boatswain’s swamp was an alternate Federal position. The terrain north of the Chickahominy did not appear on Confederate maps, and neither did Boatswain’s swamp. Calling them maps is actually being generous; they were so poor that they hardly qualified as such. The route that each division was to take was etched with a red line, which did not correspond to the roads through the unfamiliar country.

 

After 9:30, Lee rode to Walnut Grove Church for a meeting with Jackson.  This was about two miles east of Ellerson’s Mill, where the fiercest fighting of the previous day had taken place. Lee waited until Jackson had finished talking to A.P. Hill, who was present, and then sat down on a tree stump and spoke to Jackson when Hill had departed. The staff officers of the two stared at the men. Jackson’s wanted a glimpse of their new Commander in Chief; Lee’s a glimpse of the famed hero of the Shenandoah Valley campaign. Jackson undoubtedly explained to Lee the reasons for his delay in arriving. Lee made no comment except to instruct Jackson to hasten his march to Cold Harbor. His advance was to turn the Federal position on Powhite Creek; D.H. Hill would be attached to his command, so that half of Lee’s army on the north side of the Chickahominy would be under his command. If Jackson’s movement did not cause the Federals to retreat, attacks from A.P. Hill, in pursuit of the Union rear guard, and Longstreet’s division in support of him, would, and Jackson would be in position to either fall upon the Union rear, or their flank as they fled past him. Jackson nodded, mounted, and departed.

 

Battle of Gaines Mill: A.P. Hill’s Attack

By 11:00, the first skirmishes of the next day’s fighting were taking place. The lead brigade of A.P. Hill’s division was commanded by the forty-eight-year-old South Carolinian Maxcy Gregg, a fire-eating secessionist, who, in contrast to Jefferson Davis and his government, wished to reopen the slave trade. Gregg had received orders directly from General Lee. He now plunged ahead to bring the Yankees to battle. The Federal rear guard, comprising the 9th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment, and a regiment of sharpshooters, was encountered at a five-story gristmill called Gaines Mill, whose name would be given to the battle to be fought this day, though it did not take place at Gaines Mill properly. After a skirmish, the Yankees fell back. Gregg led his men across Powhite Creek, after repairing the bridge that spanned it, and led his men up the high ground on the opposite bank. Lee was puzzled; it seemed to be too easy. He had expected the Yankees to make a far stronger stand.

 

Gregg’s men then pushed on for a mile before they reached the New Cold Harbor Crossroads. One led southeast, the other south. Gregg took the one leading southeast. Both these roads, his skirmishers found out, led into Boatswain’s swamp at the base of Turkey Hill. Moving south, the Union skirmishers were chased off, and then suddenly a volley erupted from Turkey Hill. Gregg’s men fled as fast as their feet could take them. There was no doubt now as to where the Yankees were; they were on Boatswain’s creek, not on Powhite Creek, and they were there in strength. Gregg’s men came tearing out of the forest with terror filled eyes. “We must rally those men.” General Lee exclaimed to his staff, as he rode forward. Spurring his mount into the midst of the fleeing infantry, Lee managed to rally them. Gregg’s brigade halted now, as A.P. Hill brought up his other brigades. The volume of fire coming from the Union position on Turkey Hill convinced Lee that the majority of McClellan’s army was up there. As Jackson’s arrival on Porter’s flank would threaten to get between him and McClellan’s base at White House, Lee believed that Porter would extend his flank to block his approach, thus weakening his other flank, and permitting a hard punch there to break through his line. The plan was sound, but it was predicated on the assumption that McClellan had not changed his base, which, of course, he had.

 

Longstreet now came up on the right, and A.P. Hill prepared his assault on the Union center with his whole division. Hill was anxious, but the fight at Mechanicsville had tempered the wild excitement he had previously had to get into the fray. As his brigades drew up, Hill shook hands with private J. William Jones of the 13th Virginia, his old regiment. Dubbed the South’s “Fighting Parson”, Jones, the first President of the Southern Historical Society would be responsible for preserving much Southern history.

At 2:30 pm, Hill’s attack went in, covered by what artillery he could bring into action. A stream of gunfire poured into Hill’s ranks as they struggled across the open field and entered the forested swamp. Here all coordination between the brigades became lost, as the terrain forbade officers from seeing the other brigades. Each brigade was in effect fighting alone. They faced a horrific ordeal. The Federals stood behind their hastily constructed earthworks of felled logs and knapsacks packed with dirt and delivered a withering and prolonged fire down upon their foes, with the ease as if they had been in a shooting gallery. On the high ground, it was easy to pick off the Rebels as they struggled to attack the formidable Union position. General Porter rotated his regiments, those low on ammunition being withdrawn to procure more, while fresh regiments held in reserve were committed to the defense. The Union line poured a continuous hail of fire down onto the Confederates. Most of Hill’s men broke and ran under the devastating volleys. Only Gregg seemed to be making any progress. Gregg’s brigade managed to cross Boatswain’s creek despite the heavy storm of lead and clamber up the slope of Turkey Hill. Here they engaged the division of Union General Richard Sykes, a hard-bitten professional soldier. The 5th New York Zouaves, in their trademark baggy red trousers and red fezzes, mounted a counterattack against Gregg, hitting one of his regiments, the 1rst South Carolina Rifles, trying to take a Federal battery. The onslaught hurled the regiment back, inflicting the greatest Confederate regimental losses of the day. 76 men were killed, 221 wounded, and 58 missing.

George Sykes

But the 1rst South Carolina Rifles were reinforced by other Rebel units forming in the woods to their right. Their volleys decimated the Zouaves, felling a third of the regiment. Brigadier General Lawrence O’ Bryan Branch’s brigade lost 401 men in their fruitless assault. Brigadier General J.R. Anderson made three assaults, all of them repulsed. Brigadier General Dorsey Pender made repeated attacks but could not penetrate the Union position.  Brigadier Generals James Archer and Charles Fields fared just as poorly, the latter brigade bogging down into the swamp and firing into their comrades. Not only did brigades became separated, but regiments too. If there was one thing that characterized the performance of the Confederate army at Gaines Mill, it would be poor coordination, and this occurred at all unit levels.

 

Just after 4 p.m., Hill ordered his brigades to pull back if they were able to, an action which cost them just as many casualties as the advance had cost them. Hill remarked that his “brave men had done all that any soldiers could do.” Although many of Hill’s men had turned tail and run, the remainder had adapted themselves to combat, taking what shelter they could and returning fire. This fire turned out to be surprisingly heavy. In general, Hill’s firepower had been heavy during his attack. The ranks of Hill’s battered brigades were gapped and holed; still his division continued to engage the Union center. Fitz-John Porter sent telegrams to McClellan of the battle’s progress. McClellan optimistically wired back “If the enemy are retiring and you are in a chasseur, pitch in.” He ordered Franklin’s VI Corps to cross the river and hit the Confederates in flank, only to be dismayed by the news that Franklin had destroyed the bridge in fear of attack. Brigadier General Edwin Sumner reported enemy activity in his front, however, which took all the fight out of McClellan. He ordered his headquarters packed and ready for instant departure. He still believed he faced overwhelming odds and was deathly afraid that Magruder might launch a full frontal attack against him that would overwhelm his corps south of the river. He was under the impression that Lee’s attack on V Corps north of the Chickahominy was simply a diversion.

The Battle of Gaines Mill: Longstreet’s Attack

George Pickett

Lee had intended to keep Hill in action until Jackson appeared on the field and turned the Union right, but Jackson had still not arrived. For the second time, the famed Valley soldier was late. Lee now realized that relieving the pressure on A.P. Hill was imperative, for his men had borne the brunt of the engagement of nearly two hours and his division would likely crack if the Yankees mounted a counterattack against him. Thus, Lee ordered Longstreet, who had moved up on Hill’s right, to make a diversionary attack on the Union position on his section of the line, so as to relieve the pressure on Hill. He sent out three brigades, but the heavy fire quickly convinced Longstreet that a diversion was not the answer, and that only a general assault would suffice. He elected on this course without communication with Lee and began to form up his men for that purpose. The position he had chosen to attack was the most formidable along the whole line. He sent four brigades forward, into the massed volleys of the Unionists.   Advancing over the piled corpses of their fellow soldiers who fell in front of them, the troops tried but could not break through the formidable Union position. One of his subordinates, General George Pickett, the namesake of the charge at Gettysburg that made him famous, was wounded. He was blasted off his horse by a federal gunshot. The ball ripped through his shoulder. Pickett continued to lead his brigade on foot, then crawled to a hollow, and called for the litter bearers, convinced his wound his serious. A staff officer reassured the general that his wound was not so serious after all. Still, Pickett would be out of the war for the next three months.  His brigade kept up their fire, however, against the entrenched Union defenders.

The Battle of Gaines Mill: Jackson’s Attack

And what had happened to Jackson? Where was he? Those questions weighed on Rebel minds. Once again, though no fault of his own, Jackson had failed Lee and ruined his carefully planned strategy. Stonewall Jackson was late because of a simple error of navigation. Not knowing the country, he had simply taken the wrong road. He had informed his local guide that he wished to go to Old Cold Harbor. His guide had led him down the shortest route, which led him to the woods that ran southward from Gaines Millpond, but this was unsuitable for Jackson’s purposes.  As Jackson reached Gaines Mill, he heard the sounds of battle. “Where is that firing?” He asked. The guide replied that it seemed to be come from the direction of Gaines Mill. “But I do not wish to go to Gaines Mill, I wish to go to Cold Harbor, leaving that place on the right.” “Then,” the guide answered, “the left-hand road was the one you should have taken; and had you let me know what you desired, I could have taken you aright at first.” Due to Jackson’s eccentric desire to bathe his intentions in the utmost secrecy, an obsession with the great general, he had not informed his guide as to the location he wished to take his army. He had been too general, and not specific enough with his instructions. There was nothing to do, now, but to countermarch. An hour would be lost now, but Jackson did not fret, but said “…Let us trust that the Providence of God will so overrule it, that no mischief shall result.”

 

His army countermarched for four miles, and then took the right road. D.H. Hill’s division had gone on ahead of Jackson and reached the battlefield before the rest of Jackson’s command. Encountering Federals and their artillery sighted along the only road he could use to bring up his artillery, Hill halted his men and waited for Jackson’s arrival. At 2 pm, the main body of Jackson’s army arrived on the field. General Ewell rode up and reported, stating that his division was right behind him, as was Whiting’s; so were Lawton’s Georgians. Jackson’s own division was coming up shortly. Lee had by now been forced to scrap his plan for Jackson’s flanking maneuver. He decided that the only way to break the virtually impregnable Union position was to launch an assault across his whole line. Lee directed Ewell to operate in support of A.P. Hill. He also directed him to send staff officers to hasten the advance of Whiting and Lawton. At the same time, that Ewell went in action, Longstreet did as well. As Ewell’s division filed past A.P. Hill’s men, they jeered the Valley campaign veterans. “You need not go in, we are whipped, you cannot do anything.” They were told. “Get out of our way.” Ewell’s men answered. “We will show you how to do it.” Ewell then led his men into the teeth of the Federal position on A.P. Hill’s left.

 

Although the ground here was not as steep as that farther to the right, General Sykes was not going to let the Confederates exploit that advantage. The concentrated blasts of Union rifle and artillery fire did their terrible job, causing great loss to Ewell’s troops. His lead brigade’s commander, Colonel Isaac Seymour was shot dead, and so was Major Roberdeau Wheat, the six-foot four-inch commander of the Louisiana Tigers Battalion, an outfit made up of rough characters from New Orleans. When he went down with a bullet through his head, the Louisiana Troops broke and ran. Also cut down was Brigadier General Arnold Elzey, shot through the face. Although he survived, every one of his staff officers was not so fortunate.  His brigade was forced to halt and take cover under the withering Yankee fire. Brigadier General Isaac Trimble only managed to get one of his regiments and part of a second into action. When the retreat of the Louisiana Brigade uncovered his flank, Trimble hurried back for the other regiments of his brigade. A Private named Frank Champion of the 15th Alabama Regiment distinguished himself well that day, mounting a horse and clutching a battle flag. He rode up and down the line, rallying the troops, who took him to be an officer. Trimble’s men held on.

 

But the heavy fire from the Union center was simply too much for the Rebels; by the time Ewell had gotten all his regiments into action, his units were badly cut up. But the determined Confederate attacks were having some effect; each new attack managed to get a little higher up the steep hill before being repelled. At this moment, Ewell received some relief from Lawton’s brigade of 3500 men. Thanks to the poor Confederate coordination, Lawton had no idea where he was supposed to deploy, and he did so on his own initiative, forming behind Gregg’s brigade.  Lawton’s men were armed with new Enfield rifles and these managed to make the difference in reducing the pressure on Ewell. Elated at being reinforced, Ewell raised his sword and shouted in his high-pitched squeaky voice, “Hurrah for Georgia!”  Bareheaded, he moved back and forth along the length of his line of men, shouting orders, his sword in his hand.  Ewell’s men, though unable to advance, nevertheless kept up a bold fire up against the Federals from the tangled vegetation in the swamp, despite the canister and minie balls that tore all around them. In this they were aided immensely by Lawton’s brigade and their new rifles. Rather than Jackson forming up his whole force for an attack all across the line, he was still acting sluggishly and unlike himself. Ewell and Lawton had been committed piecemeal, and Jackson was not exercising proper hands-on command of his forces. Jackson did order the brigades of Winder and Whiting to quicken the pace; he intended to put them into line to plug the gap between Lawton and Ewell. He detached a staff officer, Major Harmon, to carry his orders to the men. But Harmon’s expertise was in wagon trains, not on passing on orders. When he encountered Whiting, he gave a muddled version of Jackson’s orders to Whiting, who was surly, and in no mood to take orders from Jackson, with whom he was still angry for an earlier petty slight. Whiting demanded Harmon to explain what Jackson wanted. Harmon did a lousy job. As it turned out, Whiting was left with the idea that Jackson wanted him to stop where he was, rather than hurrying to get into battle. For over an hour, two of Jackson’s divisions stopped motionless, while Ewell and Lawton were battling hard in the swamp. Thankfully, R.L. Dabney was looking after Jackson’s interests. Concerned with Harmon’s ability to pass on orders, Dabney went and found Whiting. “General, has Major Harmon delivered you General Jackson’s instructions?” He asked. “Yes” Whiting replied, in a tone that indicated his displeasure. “That man has been here with a farrago of which I could not understand.” “Did he tell you that it was the General’s wish that you should engage the enemy immediately?” Dabney then explained Jackson’s orders to Whiting. Whiting got his division moving, but he wasn’t happy about it.

 

On his own initiative, General John Bell Hood deployed his men; he also detached the Fifth Texas Regiment to Ewell’s support. The rest of Whiting’s division deployed on Lee’s order, on A.P. Hill’s right.  Winder was slow in getting into position, and he was thus told to hang back as a reserve. Jackson now rode to meet with Lee. It was now almost 5:00 pm. Jackson was finally becoming himself again.  As he rode toward Lee, sucking a lemon, his cadet cap pulled low over his weak eyes, Lee spoke: “Ah General, I am very glad to see you.” And then he added a gentle rebuke, “I had hoped to be with you sooner.” Jackson muttered a low reply that could not be heard due to the roar of battle. Lee then spoke again “That fire is very heavy. Do you think your men can stand it?” Jackson’s answer was confident, and he spoke loudly enough so that there was no mistaking his words. “They can stand anything. They can stand that!” Jackson then listened as Lee explained how he was organizing his army for a general assault all across the line. When he was sure that Jackson had understood the plan, he rode off. Jackson now passed the same order to all his subordinates “The issue must hang in suspense no longer; sweep the field with the bayonet!” He sounded just like himself.  Jackson’s eyes were now afire, and his face red. He was slowly becoming his old self once more. Realizing the changed situation, he hurled D.H. Hill’s division against the Union right. Driving east along the road from Old Cold Harbor, Hill’s men crossed the swampy waters of Boatswain’s Creek.

John Bell Hood

Several of his regiments made their way, fighting all the while, through the underbrush south of the swamp onto cleared ground. Here was a plain 400 yards wide on which was situated Union artillery, three batteries strong. As these guns were enfilading the Confederate line, and proving particularly annoying, Hill ordered them taken. The Confederates charged, not firing until 50 yards from the batteries. The 20th North Carolina Regiment then engaged the Union gunners hand to hand who fought back bravely with their swab poles, and pistols. The Confederates took the guns. The 16th New York regiment, part of reinforcements from Slocum’s corps, then charged the Rebels, and drove them back.   This regiment, however, wearing bright straw hats that were the envy of the other Federals because they were cooler then the felt caps otherwise worn, did so at immense cost: 201 men were lost including their colonel Joseph Howland, who was severely wounded. The Union guns were soon back in action and resumed their troublesome enfilading fire. Slocum’s division was a welcome relief to the Yankees. McCall’s division was committed to the Union center, and Slocum’s brigades sent to the areas of the line which needed them most. But helpful though these units were, they were all of Porter’s reserves, and when they were in line, there were no more fresh Union troops available in reserve to throw in.

 

Battle of Gaines Mill: The General Attack

Fitz-John Porter, resplendent in his bushy brown beard, and calm manner, conducted his defense with the greatest skill, in great contrast to the disjointed and uncoordinated attacks of his

Fitz John Porter

adversaries. The field in front of Sykes was visible from his headquarters at the Watt House, and here, Porter constantly sent out aides to gather messages and give orders to his commanders. These aides performed their duty valiantly, though often under fire. Thus, Porter was aware of all the happenings in his defense. The right flank was held by the troops of General Sykes, whose men particularly distinguished themselves. Wherever Porter inspected his men, he found them jubilant over the casualties they were inflicting on the Confederates and eager to keep it up as long as they had to. But Porter’s men would not have to hold their own much longer, for McClellan had sent him a message, even as the evening grew nigh: “I am ordering up more troops. Do your best to hold your position…until dark.” It must be remembered that Porter’s defense here was only a holding action. McClellan wanted him out by nightfall; he was to get his wish, too, only by means of a helpful nudge courtesy of Lee’s army.  Lee had finally succeeded in getting all his brigades, save two, into action across the whole of his front. Between 6 and 7 o clock, they had joined in line. No longer then, was this a fight of divisions thrown in piecemeal. The whole of Lee’s army had extended to present a continuous unbroken front. On the right, D.H. Hill’s men were keeping the Federals occupied there. On the left, Longstreet’s men were likewise pressuring the Union line.

General Sykes troops in action at Gaines Mill

Though unable to break through, they were having more results than they realized. Porter’s ammunition was becoming depleted, and the muskets of his men were becoming fouled from the continuous firing. The rate of the Union fire slackened. Worse, all Porter’s reserves had been committed, and his lines had grown thin. Shortly before 5:00 pm, he had requested reinforcements from McClellan, but the Union Commander was only sending him two brigades and they had not arrived yet.  Believing he faced overwhelming numbers in Magruder’s troops and that an assault from him was imminent, McClellan believed he could not detach any more troops than that. Lee now rode to Whiting’s division and inquired for General John Bell Hood, commander of the Texas Brigade. He and another brigade from Whiting’s division he would unleash against the Federal center, against which A.P. Hill’s men had tried so valiantly and failed. Lee had instructed Whiting that his task was to break the Federal center. He now addressed Hood. “This must be done.” Lee told him quietly. “Can you do it?” “I will try.” Hood replied, confidently. That was all Lee needed to hear. “May God be with you.” Lee told him, lifting his hat, as he turned to ride away.

 

Hood’s brigade, and that of Brigadier General Evander M. Law passed down the road and deployed. D.H. Hill’s men, meanwhile, had made progress. Although they had been unable to take the guns from the three batteries that were proving so troublesome in that sector, their silence while being occupied by the Rebels and then recaptured, had been taken advantage of by the Rebels. General Winder had advanced the Stonewall Brigade and had gathered other Confederate troops around him. These attacked the left in strength, as, at the same time, D. H. Hill’s subordinates, Generals Garland and Anderson, hit the Union left in its flank. The batteries were taken, and this time they stayed taken.  On the right, Longstreet had not been idle. He had taken a while to get his troops into position, but once he had done so, he handled them with the greatest skill. His men rapidly covered the quarter of a mile of open ground, though under fire from Federal guns, and entered the thickets bordering the swamp. Inside, they were not met with the same deadly hail of bullets and canister that the previous assaults had been. Though the Yankees were indeed shooting at them, their fire had slackened considerably. Troops that had been fallen had not been replaced by reserves, as none were now available; muskets had fouled; troops were tiring. The Union soldiers knew this was the last assault of the day. The question was, could they hold on? Perhaps they could have held off two assaults on both flanks, but the matter was settled by the Rebel thrust to the center.

 

Hood’s brigade comprised three Texas regiments, all in the center, a Georgia Regiment, on his right, and Hampton’s legion on his left. Law had two regiments from Georgia and one each from North Carolina and Alabama. At the double-quick, they advanced across the field, strewn with Confederate dead from A.P. Hill’s valiant fight. The Yankees in their tiered lines and manning the batteries on the crest responded to this grave threat with alarm, shooting as fast and as much as they could. Great gaps were torn in the Rebel ranks, but still they came on closing their ranks, and not stopping to fire; their rifles shouldered. As they advanced, Hood saw that a gap was present in the Rebel line between Law’s brigade, and Pickett’s, in action under Longstreet. Hood moved one of his regiments, the 4th Texas into the gap, in a flawlessly executed maneuver, conducted while under fire. The Union fire grew more rapid, as they approached, but Hood and Law did not fall back. They kept on, leaving the ground behind their advance, strewn with their dead and wounded. Passing a small rise where the survivors of A.P. Hill’s attack were holding on, they kept on toward Boatswain’s swamp under the Yankee fire. Still, the Confederates came on, reaching Boatswain’s Swamp. Hood displayed the ablest leadership of his brigade, personally leading his men with drawn sword, and having dismounted and personally led the 4th Texas maneuver under fire. Here, at the foot of Boatswain’s Swamp, they paused to dress their line and fix bayonets. They had left nearly a thousand of their comrades behind them on the ground, cut down by the Federal fire, horrific even slackened. The Rebels tore across the creek and up the other side rapidly, giving the Rebel yell. They advanced at the double-quick.  Still their rifles were shouldered. They remained so, as the range closed to twenty yards, and then to ten.

 

At this moment, the Union soldiers in the first line realized that there was no stopping the Confederates this time. They might get off a volley or two, but the Rebels would sweep over them no matter what. They were too many and too close. Terrified and panic stricken, the Federal troops vaulted from behind their earthworks and tried to scramble up the hillside toward the second line, where they would stand their ground. But the game was up. As they turned to run and thereby exposed themselves, the Confederates suddenly levelled their rifles and opened fire in a tremendous volley – from only ten yards! As might be expected, it did vast execution, every bullet hitting its mark at this range. As many Union soldiers were cut down by that one volley delivered at such close range, then had fallen in the battle thus far. The Union soldiers in the second line could not return fire, with the survivors of this volley in front of them; they too dropped their weapons and high-tailed it for safer places. The Yankees were in a complete rout. Tearing up the crest, and onto the plateau, the Rebels loosed their second volley directly into the artillery on the plateau that was attempting to limber up. It was too late, however. The Confederates, exultant, and wanting to avenge their high losses, simply swept all before them. They captured fourteen of the artillery pieces after a gallant defense. One badly wounded gunner managed to drag himself up off the ground to yank the lanyard to a cannon, discharging a load of double canister into the faces of the Confederates. An entire battery loosed the same ordnance against the Confederates and in the confusion wrought by this, managed to limber up and escape. Most of the remainder were not so fortunate.

Union cavalry charge Confederate Infantry in a desperate attempt to save imperiled artillery pieces

In a desperate attempt to save the guns, General Philip St. George Cooke, Stuart’s Father-in-Law, mentioned earlier, sent a squadron of cavalry against the Rebels. But if it was a shock effect he was after, he didn’t get it. Some troops might have panicked at the sight of horses and riders bearing down on them out of the fog, not the country boys in Hood and Law’s brigades. These men were as familiar as one could be with horses and they were not scared a minute. They stood their ground and fired; then thrusted with the bayonet when empty at the necks of the horses or at the riders who were firing with pistol and slashing with saber. Dozens of panicked horses turned and fled back into the artillery, desperately trying to limber up and escape. Due to the confusion the horses caused, the artillery was not able to limber up, and the Confederates, as already stated, took 14 of the cannons.

Advancing Confederates seize Union guns

Lee had achieved his breakthrough. He lost no time in exploiting it. His entire army, 57,000 men, advanced rapidly against the whole Yankee position, manned by only 34,000 men. The Federal line had already been broken through in the center, and it was now punched through on the right by General Pickett. Only the left held out, but they would be forced to fall back; the game was up. The entire Union position was broken and would collapse. In the center, two Pennsylvania and New Jersey Regiments surrendered to the Rebels, and eight more cannons were captured. Large numbers of other Federals surrendered to the Southern soldiers. The troops of General Sykes gave way stubbornly. His withdrawal was not a rout, but was conducted orderly, and he only did this, when attacked from both front and rear. The old professional soldier had performed admirably in his defensive capacity. Porter reacted to the breakthrough with cool clear thinking. Of immediate concern was the saving of his reserve artillery and the withdrawal of Morell and McCall, along with Slocum’s brigades. This was carried out successfully, thanks to the disorganization that the cavalry charge and the confusion brought on by the onset of darkness. In addition, the reinforcements from McClellan had at last arrived. The brigades of Generals Thomas F. Meagher and William H. French were too late to do anything but act as a rear guard, and in this they were successful. The Confederates were disorganized; some units had had all field officers lost and were in no position to exploit the breakthrough. Nightfall was coming on, and with it, the Confederate pursuit, and the battle, ended. Porter’s corps had been hurt, but it had not been destroyed, and it was saved from further loss by the advent of nightfall.

 

End of the Battle of Gaines Mill

That night, Porter withdrew his battered corps across the Chickahominy. He had saved all of his reserve artillery. Nevertheless, despite the successful Union escape, Lee had won his first victory, and it was a fruitful one. He captured 22 cannon, and thousands of rifles and supplies which the Confederates were three days collecting. Several early machine gun prototypes were among the spoils of war. Three thousand Union troops had been taken prisoner, and hundreds of others had been saved only by the arrival of darkness. Union casualties in dead and wounded were roughly 4,000. (894 dead, 3,107 wounded). Lee wrote Davis that he was “profoundly grateful to Almighty God” for the victory, his and the army’s first. But it had been a costly victory. The South had lost some 8,000 men. (1,483 killed, 6,402 wounded, and 108 missing or captured). Especially serious were the losses in the ranks of officers. Although Pickett would return to duty, Elzey’s wound effectively kept him out of the rest of the war. Especially staggering were the high casualties among the Brigadier Generals and Colonels; their loss would affect the Southern performance throughout the rest of the campaign. On the other hand, the Yankees lost no general officers killed, and only one brigade commander, captured while sleeping under a tree. They did however, lose many colonels. The highest proportion of Rebel casualties were taken by the brigades of Hood and Law: 25%.

 

Whiting made the mistake of criticizing the soldiers of A.P. Hill, accusing them of not following his men into the final attack. This was a considerable insult considering that they were exhausted and had been fighting all day while Whiting was lagging behind in Jackson’s column. Longstreet pointed out later that A.P. Hill was largely responsible for wearing down the Union troops and thus permitting the later Rebel breakthrough. Jackson did not distinguish himself in this action, arriving so late, as to disrupt Lee’s plans. Had he showed up earlier, the Confederates might have won a more spectacular victory. The real credit belongs to John Bell Hood who proved himself as an aggressive soldier, who would eventually earn independent command climbing steadily through the ranks to major general. The final attack likely would have failed if not for the aggressive leadership of Hood. Hood and his men had distinguished themselves well. They would henceforth become Lee’s favorite shock troops. When Jackson inspected the Northern position next day, and how formidable it had been, he remarked, concerning Hood’s Texans, “Those men are soldiers indeed!” He was absolutely right.

 

To Lee must also go considerable praise. It was his aggression and his perseverance despite high casualties, that resulted in his first victory, and the first victory of the Army of Northern Virginia. Never again would McClellan, or any other Federal Commander, ever suppose that he was “timid and irresolute in action, or “wanting in moral firmness when pressed by heavy responsibility.” And never again would any of his men refer to him as “Granny Lee.”  On the Union side, General Sykes must be credited for the excellent fight his soldiers put up, even when forced to retreat. Porter’s performance was also excellent. D.H. Hill, his opponent, stated, that he conducted his defense “with an ability unsurpassed on any field during the war.”

 

The Successful Ruse of “Prince John” Magruder

Although the army of Northern Virginia had won its first victory, some were not so sure it was one. General Whiting was afraid that during the time the Rebels were pushing Porter off Turkey Hill, McClellan was overwhelming Magruder south of the Chickahominy. In reality, however, McClellan had not done, and was not doing, anything of the sort. Although McClellan could have walked right over Magruder at any time and taken Richmond, albeit with heavy casualties, his forces south of the Chickahominy remained inactive, paralyzed by the false reports of Confederate manpower from McClellan’s Pinkerton Intelligence agents. Their wildly exaggerated reports of Confederate strength were swallowed whole by the Union Commander and his subordinates, and believing this erroneous information, McClellan failed to take advantage of the opportunity afforded him to decisively crush one part of Lee’s divided army, a failure that, in the final analysis, must be attributed to the Providence of God. Lee had bet that McClellan would not frontally assault Magruder, while the main body of his army was busy north of the Chickahominy, but Magruder did not have any such confidence. And his demeanor during the Battles of Gaines Mill was the opposite of Jackson’s; he was jittery, excited, and worked up. A former actor, he used his theatrical skills in a repeat of the performance that he had carried out at Yorktown.

John B. Magruder

The performance was simple. Magruder would make McClellan believe that he had far more than the 22,000 troops he actually had; he would do this by frequent noisy movements of units back and forth and by using slaves with drums to simulate the noise of marching columns. If successful, (and they had been at Yorktown, until McClellan brought up his heavy siege guns), McClellan would be fooled into thinking that he faced many more Rebels then he actually did and would refrain from attacking. As it turned out, McClellan already believed that the Rebels had him outnumbered. Magruder’s ruse only fixed this erroneous conviction more firmly in his mind. Far from intending to march on Richmond, McClellan was in fact worried about an attack from Magruder! The day of the battle of Gaines Mill, McClellan, providentially for the Confederates, did not roll over Magruder and enter Richmond; rather, he was completely taken in by Magruder’s theatrical performance. That day, Magruder had his units march back and forth noisily, and he used slaves with drums to simulate the sound of marching. Marching back and forth, making noisy demonstrations at one point along the Union front, and then retiring quickly to make a demonstration at another point, Magruder deceived the Yankees with his show of supposed force. This was also done while shooting at the Yankees. He also fired his batteries at the entrenched Union adversaries. As at Yorktown, this convinced McClellan that he was facing an enemy of great numerical strength, and that he needed to worry about an attack from them.

 

Several of McClellan’s subordinates urged him to attack Magruder, but McClellan stuck firm to his cautious behavior and refused to budge. This must be chalked up to the Providence of God, for an attack on Richmond would likely have sealed the doom of the Confederacy, not to mention that portion of Lee’s army under Magruder.  Magruder’s ruse was also successful in another way. Believing that he faced overwhelming numbers south of the Chickahominy, McClellan failed to adequately reinforce Porter’s V Corps north of the river. In fact, when he had asked his corps commanders there, if they could spare troops to reinforce Porter, all four had denied sending reinforcements, believing that they could not be spared, as they were vastly outnumbered, and that an attack from Magruder was imminent. It turned out McClellan was not the only cautious general in the Army in the Potomac.  Lee had ordered Magruder on the afternoon of the 27th, not to advance or attack except when certain of success, or when acting in cooperation with him. A mile and a half from the fighting at Gaines Mill, which was visible at certain points, Magruder decided to mount another demonstration. He wanted to feel out the Federals and ascertain whether or not they were planning to attack him, a fear which plagued his mind. The demonstration was turned into a full-scale attack by Brigadier General Robert Toombs, the fiery Georgia Politician turned soldier who had vied with Jefferson Davis to become the Confederacy’s President. Toombs acted on his own initiative, and his impetuous assault against a particularly strong Federal position at Golding’s Farm, was a failure that left 400 of his men sprawled on the ground.

 

The night of the 27th was an anxious one for Magruder. Believing that Toombs’ reckless assault had only betrayed the weakness of the Confederate defenders, Magruder was tortured by the thought that at any moment, he would hear the marching columns of McClellan’s army marching directly against him. Though his subordinate, General D.R. Jones, had reassured him that New Bridge had been rebuilt and connections thereby established with the rest of Lee’s army north of the river, Magruder believed that this had been to no avail because the bridge was under the guns of Federal artillery and would be useless until those pieces were neutralized or taken. He believed that the whole of the Union army was concentrating on his front and he was right, though they had no thoughts of attacking him. Magruder’s anxiety was further increased by another waste of lives on the 28th, again caused by the fiery Toombs. Acting on his own initiative, Jones, under the impression that the Federals were withdrawing had brought up artillery to test the Yankee position at Golding’s Farm. If the reply to his fire was strong, he would leave well enough alone, but if it was successful, he ordered Toombs brigade to attack. The Union return fire was heavy enough to dissuade Jones, but not Toombs. On his own initiative, he decided to attack, and ordered Anderson to do so as well, promising to support him in action. Toombs, the politician turned soldier, harbored a deep-seated contempt for professional soldiers, especially those from West Point, and believed he knew better then they how to fight. Jones informed Magruder of what was going on at 11 am, on the 28th. Jones asked if Magruder had ordered Toombs attack, since by taking command of Anderson’s brigade, he was clearly acting independently of Jones. Magruder responded in the negative. At this moment, a courier arrived from General Lee, reaffirming the general’s instructions to avoid an attack, unless in co-operation with him and when success was assured. Magruder quickly sent an order to Toombs and Anderson to halt the attack they were beginning, since it was in direct violation of Lee’s orders.

 

While that courier was riding to deliver the message, another arrived with the news that the attack, which had already begun, had taken the rifle pits at the front of the Federal line. Magruder changed his mind at once. He could now report a successful attack to Lee, instead of an admission of a violation of his orders. He hurriedly sent off a staff officer to carry the news. As he rode to the front, he met the staff officer, who informed him that the previous report had not been completely correct. The rifle pits had been taken, yes, but the attack had fizzled out after this.  To make matters worse, Anderson received the order to withdraw, and had done so, leaving Toombs to attack unsupported, and unsuccessfully. Toombs had taken more casualties and had been forced back. The entire affair was a fiasco, and Magruder had the embarrassing duty of reporting it to Lee, whose only reaction was to order Toombs to file a report explaining his reasons for attacking without orders. During the Battle of Gaines Mill and prior to it, however, Magruder had performed well in his role of deception. His theatrical performance had not only intimidated McClellan, but it had unnerved his subordinates as well. And Toombs attacks had not been in vain either, for they only confirmed, in McClellan’s mind, his conviction that the enemy planned to attack him.

 

The Union Withdrawal

As early as June 26th, McClellan, rattled that the enemy was in his rear, had decided to abandon his base at White House and to withdraw south of the Chickahominy, where he would set up another base. Porter’s holding action at Gaines Mill was to cover the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from its positions north of the river. But the defeat at Gaines Mill unnerved McClellan. At night on the 27th, he called a meeting of his corps commanders and laid out his plans for withdrawal. McClellan was under the impression that the Confederate army possessed at least 200,000 men. Lee’s actions had seemed to confirm this. Having badly misjudged his adversary, McClellan could not understand Lee’s aggressiveness, nor he could he accept the fact that Lee had decided to divide his army in the face of a numerically superior enemy. To do so was in complete violation of standard military doctrine. In McClellan’s mind, Lee could only have troops in his rear, if he had equal numbers to McClellan’s army in the entrenchments around Richmond. He knew that the majority of Lee’s army was on the north side of the river. Thus, he reasoned, Lee must have at least eighty thousand men south, and perhaps 100 or 120,000 men, north of the Chickahominy. Against such odds, McClellan was obligated to fall back. This meant more than changing his base; it meant giving up, at least temporarily, the siege of Richmond, and withdrawing, or retreating, back to the James.

 

His corps commanders had no problem with shifting their base south of the Chickahominy. Once Porter’s corps withdrew, there would be nothing to stop Lee from severing the railroad supply line from White House Landing. It was only sound to change bases, as McClellan had decided to do after the Battle of Mechanicsville. But McClellan was wanting to do something besides merely changing bases. He wanted to move the entire army south to the James where they could be protected by Federal gunboats, and where McClellan hoped they would be reinforced. Although McClellan preferred to call this a “change of base” it was nothing more than a retreat. Before the Battle of Gaines Mill, McClellan had merely wanted to change his supply base, but proceed with his siege of Richmond; now, however, he was going to abandon the siege of Richmond, at least temporarily, thus ceding the Confederates the strategic victory, as well as the tactical victory they had won at Gaines Mill. McClellan had thus capitulated the Peninsula Campaign to the Confederates. They had succeeded in keeping him from taking Richmond. Two division commanders, from Heintzelman’s III corps, one of whom was future Army of the Potomac commander Joseph Hooker, argued with the Commanding General. But the scare thrown into McClellan by Lee’s army was too strong to be dislodged. He was convinced that the action north of the river was merely a diversion; Lee would hit him his main blow south of the river and would destroy him. And McClellan had no desire to let that happen.

 

Although McClellan’s plan to retreat down the James, instead of via the Peninsula, the way he had come, was indeed a retreat, and not simply a change of base, it was sound in that he could embark on his siege of Richmond at a later date. However, in doing so, and by abandoning his entrenchments around Richmond, he would lose all the gains he had made thus far in the Peninsula campaign. However, for McClellan it was vital that he could represent to his Government that he had merely changed his base. He was worried about being sacked by Stanton and the other radicals in Lincoln’s government, as he knew they loathed him for his aversion to their political goals. McClellan was aware that a defeat was all the excuse the Radicals would need to sack him. To prevent this, it was vital to label his retreat something other then what it was. After all, he could not be sacked for merely changing his supply base when it became threatened. McClellan fixed the blame for the defeat of Gaines Mill and the suspension of the offensive squarely on Lincoln and Stanton. In a telegraph to the latter, McClellan dished out his bitterest criticism: “Had I 20,000 or 10,000 fresh troops to use tomorrow, I could take Richmond,” he wired.

“If we have lost the day, we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle because my force was too small. I again repeat that I am not responsible for this, and I say with the earnestness of a general who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed today. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes, but to do this the government must view the matter in the same earnest light I do…As it is we have lost nothing but men, and those the best we have…I know that a few thousand men would have changed the battle from a defeat into a victory. As it is, the government can not and must not hold me responsible for the result…If I save the army now, I tell you plainly that owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.”

The last line was left out deliberately by the military supervisor of telegraphs in the copy that Stanton received, but he learned of the whole contents soon after.  McClellan made sure to emphasize his point that he was faced by overwhelming numbers and that all he needed to win a victory were reinforcements.  Disgusted with McClellan’s performance, Lincoln and Stanton began the groundwork on creating a new Army of Virginia, in effect a replacement of McClellan’s army, under the command of General John Pope, a man who had no aversion to total war, nor was at odds with abolitionist aims.

 

Early on the 28th, McClellan’s army began its retirement to the James. Two of his five corps were to move first to Malvern Hill to set up a defensive position. Three of the other corps would stay behind to slow the Rebel pursuit, then follow. The withdrawal began to be carried out, and it was not until the 29th that Lee learned the truth. The 28th was a time of perplexing confusion to the Confederates. Lee awoke that morning to find that the Yankees had completely pulled out. Since he expected McClellan to defend his base at White House, Lee believed that the Federals had retreated along the north bank of the Chickahominy. But when Lee sent Stuart’s cavalry and an infantry division to take the Richmond and York river railroad, they could not find a single Yankee soldier. Stuart cut the telegraph wires here, then rode hard to White House Landing. Here, he found that the supply depot had put to the torch by the Federals, who had already departed. In addition, reports of suspicious activity from south of the Chickahominy were coming in. Clouds of dust were seen collecting; clear evidence that the Yankees were on the march. Loud explosions could be heard as the Union troops destroyed their ammunition. It was now obvious that McClellan was moving; the only question was where was he going? He could be retreating back down to the Peninsula, changing base to the James, or lunging straight for Richmond.

 

All Lee knew was that McClellan was going south, and any of the above he could be evidenced by his southward march. Lee came to the correct conclusion that McClellan was falling back to the James. It was not until the 29th, that two of Longstreet’s engineers entered McClellan’s abandoned entrenchments and ascertained for a certainty that the Federals were gone. Lee was elated. He now knew that the Federals were not going to march on Richmond. They were in retreat, though in what direction he was yet unsure of, and Richmond was thus secure. The Confederates had won the campaign. Richmond was safe. All that remained was to try to and intercept and then destroy McClellan’s army as it retreated.

 

Aftermath

Lee made every attempt to intercept McClellan along his line of retreat, launching fierce and bloody attacks against him at Savage’s Station on June 29th, in the Battle of Glendale on the 30th, and on the 1rst, the Battle of Malvern Hill. In the last of these battles, Lee hurled his army in a series of attacks directly into the muzzles of Union artillery which took a fearful toll of lives. Though Lee’s attacks at Malvern Hill have sometimes been attributed to recklessness, it must be remembered that in Lee’s first battle, at Gaines Mill, his frontal attacks had succeeded at long last. This fact makes Lee’s fondness for bloody offensive tactics – as at Malvern Hill and Gettysburg, understandable. Lee had won his first victory by using such tactics, and he had no reason to doubt that they would not succeed again under similar circumstances. Jackson’s performance during the Battle of Gaines Mill and throughout the Seven days was pathetic, but Lee thankfully overlooked his performance to continue to rely on him, a good choice, because Jackson would go on to distinguish himself under Lee’s command in such battles as Second Manassas, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville, where he would meet his fate.

 

In all the battles of the Seven Days, Lee was unsuccessful in his intention to destroy the Army of the Potomac. McClellan managed to escape successfully. Nevertheless, the Confederacy had won a remarkable strategic victory for they had driven the largest army ever assembled on the continent from the gates of Richmond and forced it to retreat with smaller army. Richmond would remain safe for another three years. Washington, conversely, would not, as Jubal Early would successfully threaten the Union capitol in 1864. The Battle of Gaines Mill was the only clear-cut Confederate victory of the Seven days battles. It lifted the siege of Richmond and compelled McClellan to retreat. Yet the amazing Confederate victory at Gaines Mill could have easily been an unmitigated disaster. Lee gambled everything in the division of his army. McClellan had ample opportunities to roll over a third of Lee’s army and take Richmond, an action that would have won the war for the North. That McClellan did not take Richmond, and the Confederacy was to enjoy another three years of existence, is only due to the Providence of God toward Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.