The Battle of Fisher’s Hill, fought September 21-22, 1864, as part of the Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1864, resulted in the Confederate Army of the Valley being driven from its superb defensive position atop Fisher’s Hill by the Union Army of the Shenandoah.
Background
General Robert E. Lee, commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, became concerned about Union advances and destruction being caused in the Shenandoah valley of Virginia, — the breadbasket of the Confederacy – and strategically a vital spot of Confederate territory. He sent the experienced general Jubal A. Early, whom Lee affectionally referred to as his “bald old man,” to drive the Yankees from the Valley and threaten Washington D.C. It was hoped that this action would ease up some of the pressure upon Lee’s army, being presently besieged in Petersburg, Virginia, by the Army of the Potomac, as it would force General Ulysses S. Grant, its commander, to siphon off troops from his command to deal with Early.
Lee’s strategy enjoyed stunning success. Early achieved several military victories, and successfully threatened Washington D.C. Fed up with Early’s dominance of the valley, Grant entrusted the task of dealing with him to his subordinate, Philip Sheridan, known as “Little Phil.”
Sheridan at first acted cautiously, wary of avoiding a disaster that would imperil President Lincoln’s reelection campaign. However, General Early was no so cautious, actively trying to bring about just such a disaster, and he attacked General Sheridan’s Army of the Shenandoah, with his Army of the Valley on September 19th, 1864. In the daylong battle, his army was struck on both flanks by Union cavalry and forced to retreat, pursued by General Sheridan and his Army of the Shenandoah.
Retreat to Fisher’s Hill
General John B. Gordon described the retreat:
“Drearily and silently, with burdened brains and aching hearts, leaving our dead, and many of our wounded behind us, we rode hour after hour, with our sore footed, suffering men doing their best to keep up, anxiously inquiring for their commands and eagerly listening for orders to halt and sleep.”
That order was finally given when the army had gotten made sufficient distance from the Union army. The troops collapsed and slept in weary thanksgiving, their arms at their sides. The next day, General Early resumed his retreat, and did not stop until he reached Fisher’s Hill, known as the Gibraltar of the Valley, a place where Early had stared down Sheridan before. Fisher’s Hill was a location of great natural, and thus tactical, strength. The topography of the Valley at this point, narrowed it to four miles in width, between the North fork of the Shenandoah River and Little North Mountain. Early anchored his flanks on the river and the mountain, and his position overlooked the Tumbling Run Stream from which Early could open a damaging fire upon the Federals from high ground as they crossed to attack him in front. If Early could hold the position in enough strength, it would be well nigh impregnable.
But there was the rub. Early’s army had taken quite a drubbing in the last battle, and it was down to 10,000 men, not near enough to man the four-mile defensive position adequately. Early deployed General Wharton’s division on the right, then General Gordon’s, then General Rodes, (now commanded by General Ramseur, as Rodes had been a casualty of the last battle). This was not enough infantry to occupy the defensive line, and Early knew it. To make up the difference, he dismounted General Lumsford S. Lomax’s cavalry and placed them on Ramseur’s left, to cover the left flank of the Confederate line to Little North Mountain. He sent General Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry up the Luay Valley to the narrow Millwood Pass to keep the Federals from advancing into his rear from that direction.
Arrival of the Army of the Shenandoah
On the afternoon of September 20th, Sheridan’s pursuing army was sighted on the banks of Cedar Creek, four miles from Fisher’s Hill. Sheridan had given orders for pursuing Early the night of the 19th. And his pursuit had gone into play the next morning. Sheridan ordered his VI Corps, commanded by General Horatio G. Wright, and XIX Corps, under General William H. Emory, to march abreast of the Valley Turnpike on the right and left, and General George Crook’s Army of West Virginia immediately behind them.
Sheridan spent two days sniffing out Early’s position, and the results of that reconnaissance convinced him that it was too strong to attack it from the front, which was what Early expected him to do. At a council of war in Sheridan’s camp, General Crook suggested that a turning movement against Early’s left flank would be practicable, and it was seconded by Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes, a man who would go on to become President of the United States by one electoral vote, and would end Reconstruction in the South. Sheridan agreed to Crook’s plan. Employing it, was however, easier said than done, however, because the Confederates could see every Yankee movement from the signal station atop Shenandoah Peak in the daylight. To attain secrecy, Sheridan marched Crook’s forces during the night of the 20th “into some heavy timber north of Cedar Creek, where he lay concealed all day the 21rst.”[1] Sheridan then sent his cavalry general, Alfred Torbert, with two cavalry divisions to east around Massanutten Mountain to cross Early’s line of retreat at New Market Gap and cut if off.
That same day, the 21rst, Sheridan moved up Wright and Emory closer to the Confederate position, after “sharp skirmishing” as Early described it or as a “severe fight” as Sheridan did. The fighting resulted in the seizure of some high ground, which was in “plain view of the Confederate works and confronting a commanding point where much of Early’s artillery was massed.”[2] Riding along this line with Wright to the westward, and finding that the Confederates still held an elevated position farther to the Northern right, on the north side of the Tumbling Run stream, Sheridan directed this too be occupied.[3] Wright soon took the position, “which gave us an unobstructed view of the enemy’s works and offered good ground for our artillery,” wrote Sheridan. “It also enabled me to move the whole of the Sixth Corps to the front till its line was within seven hundred yards of the enemy’s works; the Nineteenth Corps, on the morning of the 22nd, covering the ground vacated by the Sixth, in moving to the front and extending to the right…”[4] Early mistakenly believed that Sheridan would be satisfied with the advantage he had gained thus far, and would not press an attack further, but by afternoon of the 22nd, Early began to realize that Sheridan indeed meant to fight him here. Crook’s corps hidden in the timber behind Hupp’s Hill till daylight of the 22nd, was now marched through the intervening woods and ravines until was he was beyond the Sixth Corps right. The noisy demonstrations of Emory and Wright led Early quite naturally to assume that the Union attack would come on his right-center. Early had meant make a show of force however, not to fight, and when it became certain that a fight was what he was going to get, Early began to realize that discretion was the better part of valor. It was time to pull up stakes and get out of there, to save his army to fight again another time. “Orders were given for my troops to retire, after dark, as I knew my force was not strong enough to resist a determined assault,” Early wrote.[5] But it was too late.
General Ricketts division of the Sixth Corps was pushed out to confront the Confederate right, while the rest of Sixth Corps extended from his left, to the Manassas Gap railroad, with the Nineteenth Corps posted between the Sixth, and the North Fork of the Shenandoah river. While Ricketts moved out on this new line, with General William H. Averell’s cavalry on his right, the Confederates prepared to meet a Union blow, should it fall, on Ricketts front, their right-center. But while Ricketts, Wright and Emory were occupying the Rebel attention, Crook was moving unobserved into the dense woods on the eastern face of Little North Mountain in two parallel columns until he arrived in the rear of the Confederate earthworks. Marching his division by the left flank, he led them east down the mountainside.
The Rout
It was 4:00 pm, in the afternoon of September 22nd, when Crook’s men emerged from the timberline near the base of the mountain, and pitched into the Confederate left. The Rebels were taken completely by surprise. Despite the flanking movements Sheridan had employed in the battle of two days before, the Confederates acted as if they couldn’t be shocked to see Crook’s Yankees. Sheridan reported that as they advanced, they were “producing confusion and consternation at every step.”[6] Early held a very low opinion of Lomax’s cavalry, which is why he had put them on the left of the line where he did not expect an attack. His opinion of them certainly appeared to be justified, because they bolted and fled as Crook’s men slammed them without putting up much of a fight at all. Now the Unionists advanced against Ramseur’s left. The Confederate infantry generals attempted to defend themselves as beset they could. Ramseur tried to throw his brigades successively in line to the left, and Wharton’s division was sent for from the right flank, but it did not arrive. Pegram’s brigades were thrown into line in the same manner as Ramseur’s, but the maneuver caused some confusion, which the Yankees were quick to capitalize on. The Confederate movements were executed in full view of the Yankees and they did not give the Confederates time to complete their hasty defensive maneuvers, but instead advanced quickly, rolling up the Confederate left. Connecting Crook’s left with Ricketts, and then with the rest of Emory and Wright’s troops which swarmed over the front of the Confederate earthworks, the Federals crumbled unit after Confederate unit, as they hit them front and flank. The Confederate commands gave way one after the one another in a terrible rout. “The mischief could not be remedied,” wrote Early.[7] Fearful of being trapped in the pocket formed by the Tumbling Run stream and the north fork of the Shenandoah River, the gray and butternut clad soldiers fled rearward in much confusion. After only a very brief battle, the Army of the Valley retired in confusion through the fields and over the roads toward Woodstock, with Emory and Wright in pursuit. Early’s artillery gunners attempted to stem the blue tide and cover the flight of their comrades. Early praised their “great coolness, fighting to the very last.” He had to ride to some of the officers and order them to withdraw their artillery before they would do so. However, some of the crews had waited too long, and the Yankees captured eleven pieces of artillery.
One such stand was made by two pieces of artillery at some high ground between Fisher’s Hill and Woodstock, and a small squad of Rebels. But alas, this resistance was too little, and the guns were soon captured, and their gunners overwhelmed. Among those slain at this point, was Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S. “Sandie” Pendleton, one of the best loved officers in the Confederate army and chief of staff to the late Stonewall Jackson, as well as to Richard Ewell, and Jubal Early.
Vigorous pursuit, Early reported, of his army, was not made. But that was not from any fault of Sheridan, but rather of Averell and Torbert. Sheridan was not satisfied with kicking Early off of Fisher’s Hill, and defeating the Army of the Valley for the second time in a few days. He wanted to capture the whole Army of the Valley in one fell swoop. But when he needed them most, Averell and Torbert both failed him. When he arrived in Woodstock at dawn, nine miles from Fisher’s Hill, Sheridan thought that he had Early trapped between his army and Torbert’s cavalry, which should have entered New Market Gap by now in rear of Early. But then he received a very serious letdown. In Sheridan’s words:
I was astonished and chagrined to receive the intelligence that he had fallen back to Front Royal and Buckton ford. My disappointment was extreme, but there was now ho help for the situation save to renew and emphasize Torbert’s orders, and this was done at once, notwithstanding that…the delay had so much diminished the chances of his getting in the rear of Early as to make such result a very remote possibility…
“It turned out that Torbert had been bluffed out of the Luray Valley by a force of Confederate horsemen half his own size.”[8] “…it does not appear that he made any serious effort to dislodge the Confederate cavalry,” wrote Sheridan, “his impotent attempt not only chagrined me very much, but occasioned much unfavorable comment throughout the army.”[9] With Torbert having let Sheridan down, responsibility for shutting the trap around Early’s neck fell to Averell. Averell, however, let Sheridan down too. Rather than pursue the retiring Confederates, he had gone into camp, and let the infantry handle the work. It was noon on the 23rd before General Averell came up, and “hot words” were exchanged between him and Sheridan. In his words:
“But hoping that he would retrieve the mistake of the night before, I directed him to proceed to the front at once, and…close with the enemy. He reached Devin’s command at about 3’o clock in the afternoon, just as this officer was pushing the Confederates so energetically that they were abandoning Mount Jackson, yet Averell utterly failed to accomplish anything. Indeed, his indifferent attack was not at all worthy the excellent soldiers he commanded, and when I learned it was his intention to withdraw from the enemy’s front, on the indefinite report of a signal-officer that “brigade or division” of Confederates was turning his right flank, and that he had not seriously attempted to verify the information…”
Sheridan sent him a sharp message, in which he explained that he did want the Confederates bluffing him out of a fight. “I do not advise rashness, but I do desire resolution and actual fighting, with necessary casualties, before you retire. There must be no backing or filling by you without a superior force of the enemy actually engaging you.” But when Sheridan learned that after Averell had received the note, he had already withdrawn and gone into camp near Hawkinsburg, he relieved the cavalry officer of command.
As for General Early and the Valley Army, the Confederates got away with their supply trains. Their loss in killed and wounded was slight, but “some prisoners” Early reported, were “taken by the enemy.” Sheridan made one last effort to check the Confederate retreat at New Market, by dangling the bait of two artillery pieces under his nose, but the old rebel was too wily for that, and Early left the Valley pike six miles south of New Market and took the road to Keezletown, which ran along Peaked Mountain and protected his right flank. Sheridan pursued until darkness overtook them, and both sides went into bivouac. On the next morning, Early was joined by several units of cavalry and fell back to the mouth of Brown’s Gap, and then into the Blue Ridge Mountains. To Sheridan’s chagrin, the main body of the Confederate army had disappeared entirely from his front, and he had to content himself with rounding up stragglers. The Battle of Fisher’s Hill was over. Early had been defeated, but he had made his escape, to trouble the Yankees once more. As for Sheridan, he had to content himself with the victory he had won, incomplete that it was.
He had seized sixteen pieces of artillery (four more during the retreat) in total, and a large amount of artillery horses and caissons, besides capturing 1,100 of Early’s men. In killed and wounded, Early’s casualties had been slight, as he had reported. In total, Early lost 1400 men. But Sheridan’s victory had not been a bloodless one. He had suffered 528 casualties.
Aftermath
Retreating into the Blue Ridge Mountains, Early began to receive reinforcements. Nevertheless, the Confederate defeats in the Valley had demoralized his men. Sheridan reported to Grant that “the Valley soldiers are hiding away and going to their homes.” Believing that they were licked, and that the war was irreparably lost, the soldiers of the Valley Army were beginning to suffer, not only from hunger, but from the efforts of terrible morale. Believing that they had chased Early clean out of the valley, and that his army was utterly routed, the Yankees let themselves be lulled into a false sense of security, one that Early was to exploit in the full, when he launched his last bid for victory in the battle of Cedar Creek, the next month, only to have it thrown back in his face. As for the Yankees, they spent the interim, burning and plundering the Shenandoah valley, earning Sheridan a name in the history books to rival that of Sherman.
When Grant heard of the victory Sheridan had won, he ordered a 100-gun salute given in his honor. “Keep on,” Grant would wire Sheridan, “and your good work will cause the fall of Richmond.” As for Lee, he would write Early:
“It will require the greatest watchfulness, the greatest promptness, and the most untiring energy on your part to arrest the progress of the enemy in the present tide of success. I have given you all I can.”
Early would give it one last try next month, but alas, it would in vain and would end the Valley campaign in Confederate defeat, once and for all.
[1] “Memoirs of General Philip Sheridan” https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4362/4362-h/4362-h.htm#linkch2b
[2] “Memoirs of General Philip Sheridan” https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4362/4362-h/4362-h.htm#linkch2b
[3] “Memoirs of General Philip Sheridan” https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4362/4362-h/4362-h.htm#linkch2b
[4] “Memoirs of General Philip Sheridan” https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4362/4362-h/4362-h.htm#linkch2b
[5] The memoirs of General Jubal A. Early (New York, New York, Konecky Associates, Inc. 1994 [Reprint]) p. 430
[6] “Memoirs of General Philip Sheridan” https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4362/4362-h/4362-h.htm#linkch2b
[7] The memoirs of General Jubal A. Early (New York, New York, Konecky Associates, Inc. 1994 [Reprint]) p. 430
[8] Thomas A. Lewis and the Editors of Time-Life Books The Shenandoah in Flames: The Valley Campaign of 1864 (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1987) p. 124
[9] “Memoirs of General Philip Sheridan” https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4362/4362-h/4362-h.htm#linkch2b
