The ordeal of the United States Navy under kamikaze attack during January 4^th, to 12^th, 1945, when the performance of the kamikazes was at their peak.

Background

American planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Pacific theater in late 1944 entailed an invasion of the Phillipines, an operation which General Douglas MacArthur had long pushed for, over against the wishes of the United States Navy, which wished to invade Formosa instead. But MacArthur’s views prevailed, and on October 20^th, 1944, United States troops hit the beaches of the Phillipine islands of Leyte. The Japanese Navy, still a tough if scrawny, foe committed everything it had to wiping out the shipping in Leyte Gulf, but suffered grievously in the process, losing a good portion of its remaining ships during the three-day battle. (October 23^rd– October 26^th, 1944). In the battle’s last stages, the Japanese Navy committed to action a new and terrifying weapon: the kamikaze, which sank the escort carrier St. Lo, and damaged several other ships.

The feared kamikazes, were bomb laden aircraft that were used as suicide weapons by their pilots, who would crash them into Allied ships.

The use of suicide aircraft was borne of desperation, the result of the overall poor performance by navy pilots operating in conventional roles due to lack of training. This had been compensated for by the kamikaze program, the brainchild of Pearl Harbor attack planner, Admiral Takijiro Onishi, which ensured a more accurate delivery system for the aerial bomb. It was much easier to fly a plane into a ship, than to drop a bomb accurately from 10,000 feet, or even harder, to make an accurate torpedo run. Tactically speaking, the kamikaze was a good investment, its payoff being generally greater than the loss of plane and pilot. Of course, from a Christian worldview, such tactics are morally off-limits. Acts of valor, even sacrificing one’s life for the sake of others, are well within the Christian just war tradition, but suicide bombing in this manner is not and bears more resemblance to Muslim suicide bombers than the Christian tradition of waging warfare.[1]

Ground resistance on Leyte to General MacArthur’s troops proved tougher than expected, and American planners were forced to postpone the landings on Luzon, the next island scheduled for invasion in the Philippine archipelago from December 20^th to January 9^th, 1945. The Japanese were not abiding by the neat little American timetable. To invade Luzon, the Americans assembled most of the ships which had participated in the Leyte operation, which were organized into Task Force 77, commanded by Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid. Task Force 77 was composed of multiple smaller naval groups. Vice Admiral J.B. Oldendorf, the victor of the battle of Surigao Strait commanded the fire support and bombardment force element of Task Force 77, Task Group 77.2, while the escort carrier group was commanded by Rear Admiral C.T. Durgin, among other naval groups. The transport groups, under the command of Vice Admiral Wilkinson were slower than the other naval vessels, and thus the American plan called for a three-day interval between the arrival of the bombardment and fire support group and the transport groups under Wilkinson, to permit plenty of time for shore bombardment and minesweeping operations. During that time, the American naval forces would be commanded by Vice Admiral Oldendorf. The American naval forces rendezvoused at Leyte Gulf, on New Year’s Day, and formed cruising disposition to pass through Surigao Strait into the Sulu Sea. Oldendorf’s force comprised 6 battleships, 6 cruisers, 19 destroyers, 12 escort carriers, 14 destroyers and 6 destroyer escorts, 72 minesweeping and hydrographic ships, 10 destroyer transports bearing underwater demolition teams, 2 fleet tugs, a seaplane tender, and 11 Landing Craft Infantry gunboats.[2]

Naturally, such a juicy target was too much for the Japanese to pass up. As Morison reports,

The Japanese still had plenty of planes. Their aircraft factories, undisturbed as yet by bombing, as the German works had been, lately replaced the heavy losses in the Leyte campaign.[3]

First Japanese resistance developed on the afternoon of January 2^nd, when three “Sally” bombers dropped bombs that missed, but reported the convoy’s position.[4] The next morning, at 7:28 am, a Val dove on oiler Cowansesque, inflicting slight damage, and killing but two men. “This crash,” Morison informs us, “was the first in a series of which made the kamikaze raids of the past two and a half months seem just a warming-up.[5] Passing through the Surigao Strait into the Sulu Sea, Oldendorf’s force “formed two groups around a nucleus of escort carriers.”[6] Fighter direction control from carriers Makin Island and Natoma Bay fielded 40 fighters, augmented by land-based planes.

Loss of the USS Ommaney Bay

The fighter cover kept most attackers at bay, and over the next two days, shot down between 15 and 20 Japanese planes. Though the Japanese had 120 planes based at Clark, Nichols and other Luzon and Mindanao airfields, they were hoarding most of these for air attacks on January 5^th and 6^th, and committed only a few on the 3^rd and 4^th, so that Task Force 77 was little troubled on the 3^rd and 4^th of January. At least until that evening.

Near darkness on January 4^th, found the escort carrier Ommaney Bay, one of six escort carriers comprising Task Unit 77.4.2, exiting the Sulu Sea. The sea was calm, visibility was excellent, and the wind light. Some 15 enemy planes were picked up on radar, 45 miles distant and closing from the west, but efforts by the C.A.P. to intercept were hampered by false radar contacts, and as a result, a land-based pair of P-47 Thunderbolts shot down one only one Japanese bomber. A lack of further radar signals now convinced the Americans that the Japanese had raid had turned back, but it was a faulty guess and a bad mistake. At 5:12 am, the Americans were thus taken completely by surprise when a twin engine “Frances” bomber dropped out of the sun dead ahead of the escort carrier Ommaney Bay, undetected both by radar and by the 17 lookouts that the escort carrier’s captain, Captain Young had placed on duty. The battleship New Mexico fired briefly at it, as it strafed the escort carrier and then crashed down into the after end of the open bridge, penetrating the starboard side of the flight deck, starting a fire among the fueled and armed planes on that deck, and finally came to rest on No. 1 sponson. The Frances had been carrying two bombs. The first detonated among the fully armed and gassed planes in the forward end of the hangar, and the second penetrated deep inside the ship to explode in either a storeroom or in two oil tanks. On the flight deck, parked aircraft, holed by the strafing from the Frances just before it crashed into the carrier, were leaking fuel, which now caught fire as ammunition and gasoline began to burn. Fire spread aft on the flight deck, and dense black smoke soon engulfed the entire starboard side of the ship aft.

The after part of the open bridge was destroyed, and the superstructure above collapsed onto the flight deck, just aft of the island. In the hangar, a large hole had been blown in the deck on the starboard side. The explosion of the bomb carried by the Frances here, had sprayed burning gasoline about the hangar deck, and destroyed the planes in the forward section of the hangar. Ammunition began to cook off, and projectiles ricocheted around the deck, penetrating bulkheads, and the Chief Petty Officer’s quarters. Some bulkheads collapsed, and others were buckled or blown in. The hangar deck at once filled with dense gray smoke, and soon afterward was filled by thick black smoke.

The crew of the Ommaney Bay were dining in the galley and the officers were being served in the wardroom when the Frances crashed their ship. General quarters sounded faintly in some parts of the ship at 5:12 pm, and lights, communications and power went out throughout the ship. Down below, in after engine room, communication to the bridge was disrupted, and dense smoke entered the compartment through the ruptured uptake. In the forward engine and boiler rooms, No.1 boiler, and steam lines from the forward boiler room were ruptured, and fires under two other boilers were snuffed out by the explosion of the second bomb. The fuel oil service pumps were knocked from their bases, and slathered the deck with fuel oil. On the hangar deck, fire main pressure failed forward, and the hangar gasoline fire rapidly spread aft. On the second deck, the fire main had been ruptured, which caused the water main pressure to fail, and the starboard side of sick bay had been demolished.

At 5:13 am, lighting was restored in the aft part of the ship, although thick black smoke pouring into the wardroom, after engine spaces, chief petty officer’s quarters and living spaces forward doubtless obscured visibility. Fire fighting parties found no water pressure in their fire hoses, and the hangar deck sprinkling system and water curtain, though turned on, would not function. Attempts were made to use CO2 bottles to extinguish the fires, but the fire spread aft, helped along by exploding ammunition from the parked planes in the hangar deck. Ammunition in the clipping rooms began to explode, and the sprinkling system wouldn’t work in those compartments either. Captain Young began to realize he was fighting a losing battle.

The situation only deteriorated. By 5:30 pm, destroyers were unable to come along amidships to pass fire hoses due to the intense heat of the fires raging on the hangar deck.  Six minutes later, the after-engine room was abandoned, due to the intense smoke. The crew made their way aft to the second deck and then to the fantail. Four minutes later, the process of lowering wounded crewmen over the side from the forecastle was begun. Though a destroyer, the Bell, came along the starboard bow, she was forced to back clear when the carrier drifted down and damaged her bridge. At 5:45 pm, preempting the captain, the gunnery officer ordered the officers and men to abandon the ship from the fantail, and Captain Young gave the order to abandon ship five minutes later, as he evidently realized the hopelessness of the situation, as there was no prospect of bringing the fires under control. At 6:12 pm, the evacuation was completed, for at that moment, Captain Young stepped off the ship, the last man off in accordance with maritime tradition. Six minutes later, nine torpedoes stowed in racks on the hangar deck exploded, blowing off the after part of the flight deck, and causing the ship slightly to starboard, fires raging throughout. Flying debris killed two members of the destroyer escort Eichenberger, picking up survivors. The fires did not die down, but burned intensely, practically gutting the hapless carrier during the next hour. At 7:40 am, Admiral Oldendorf ordered the destroyer Burns to scuttle the Ommaney Bay, and a torpedo amidships dispatched the carrier to ocean floor.

The loss in personnel was bad, but could have been worse: 93 men killed, and 65 wounded. Seven survivors would be subsequently killed by kamikaze attacks in the ships in which they were embarked.

There was only one other bit of excitement on that 4^th day of January. Just minutes after the Ommaney Bay had received her fatal blow, it appeared that escort carrier Lunga Point would receive hers. The battleship California and heavy cruiser Portland opened fire on the enemy plane, but could not hit it. Then at 4,500 yards, the Lunga Point’s gunner began to hammer the incoming plane, but still it came on, flashing into flames. Passing over the ship, it broke apart, a hundred feet off her stern.[7] Lunga Point escaped, if only barely. Providence had favored her that evening, but the Ommaney Bay did not receive any such favor.

Air Attacks on January 5^th.

The ordeal of Task Force 77 was not over by a long stretch. Indeed, it was just getting started. Search planes spotted Task Force 77 again the next day and convinced the Japanese that Lingayen Gulf, in Luzon was their destination. As the two American airfields on Mindoro were unable to conduct flight operations due to bad weather, the responsibility for defending Oldendorf’s ships from kamikaze attack fell to the escort carriers. At 7: 58 am, the Wildcat fighters of the American combat air patrol intercepted 15 to 20 Japanese planes 35 miles from the formation, downing nine and turning back the others. At noon, another Japanese raid, 15 kamikazes and 2 escorts which took off from Mabalacat, was intercepted 45 miles out. Four of their number were brought down, and the rest turned back. At 2:30 pm, a patrolling American plane sighted two Japanese destroyers trying to flee Manila to Formosa. Destroyer Bennion was sent to intercept; she engaged in an ineffective gun duel with the two Japanese vessels, which were more intent on getting to Manila than sinking an American counterpart. American aircraft roared in next, 19 Wildcats and 16 Avenger torpedo bombers from the escort carriers. They succeeded in torpedoing and sinking one of the destroyers, but the other made it to Formosa, and temporary safety.

The last air attack of January 5^th was the heaviest and most effective. It comprised sixteen kamikazes with four escorts, led by Lieutenant Shinichi Kanaya, which departed Mabalacat at 3:57 pm, and arrived over Oldendorf’s ships at 4:50 am.

At that moment, Manila Bay went to general quarters, and picked up speed to 15 knots. The carrier had also launched eight Wildcats to serve as a combat air patrol, and had prepared an airstrike of Avengers to attack a reported surface target. Therefore, arming and gassing of the 23 aircraft aboard was proceeding when two Zeroes selected the Manila Bay as their target, coming in from the port beam, close to the surface of the water out of the sun. Their high-speed approach was an excellent one. When the pilots closed to a thousand yards, they pulled into a sharp climbing turn, and then dived steeply on the ship from an altitude of 800 feet. Anti-aircraft guns barked upward at the diving planes, damaging both and interfering with the aim of the second plane.

That second Zero, the pilot’s aim put off, merely struck the flight deck a glancing blow, tearing off the starboard yardarm, and crashed into the water alongside the ship. The first Zero, however, had meanwhile, several seconds before, crashed through the flight deck at the base of the island, and penetrated to the radar transmitter room. Fires were at once started in that compartment, as well as on the flight deck. The bomb carried by this Zero detonated between the gallery and hangar decks, starting fires in the clipping rooms on the gallery deck, and riddling two Avengers parked on the portside of the hangar deck with shrapnel, setting the fully fueled aircraft afire.

Hangar deck sprinkler No.1 and hangar deck water curtain No.1 were both destroyed from the centerline to the starboard side, but the other hangar deck sprinklers and water curtains were still working and came on within 5 seconds after the Zero impacted the ship, inundating the hangar with water, and keeping the water down on exposed surfaces. However, fire underneath the planes spread rapidly toward the port side of the hangar, destroying one fire station and isolating another. To combat the fires, fire fighting parties, wearing rescue breathing apparatus and asbestos suits, from Repair II, a compartment that had been set afire, led hoses through the port door in the forward elevator pit and through another location to fight the blazing aircraft forward.

To quench the fires burning beneath the damaged and burning aircraft, foam was employed, but the water pouring down above broke up the foam. However, the abundance of water pouring from the sprinklers and water curtains soon broke up the fires, keeping down heat, and restricting air so that flarebacks and new fires could not form. The fire was confined to an area of the hangar deck forward of frame 90, and hoses from the hangar deck fire stations were also used to fight the small fires started in the spaces adjacent to the hangar that had caught fire when their bulkheads buckled or destroyed, and fire from the hangar deck spread there.

With open nozzle, fog and foam, fire fighters tackled the blaze on the flight deck, and flight deck hoses passed through the 16 foot in diameter bomb hole in the flight deck, aided in putting out fires in Radio II, the radar transmitter room, and a clipping room.

The two hits had interrupted steering control and cut all radio, radar, sound power telephones, the gyro compass circuit and other circuits, jammed the forward elevator and caused extensive fragment damage to the hangar deck as well as minor damage on the second deck, and causing heavy blast damage to bulkheads within the galley, upper decks, and hangar decks within 40 feet of the hit. The Manila Bay’s main propulsion plant was still intact, but problems with the engine order telegraph caused the ship’s throttles to close and to remain so for 15 minutes.

By 5:55 pm, the fires in Radio II, the radar transmitter room, radar control, and on the flight deck had been extinguished, and by 6:02 pm, the fire in the hangar deck was under control. A minute later, all water curtains and sprinklers had been shut off. It was about time too, because the ship was now listing 4 degrees due to the fact that the sprinkling water had failed to drain off and the floor of the hangar deck was covered in ankle deep water. Doors and hatches were opened to drain off the water to other compartments where it was pumped out and drained. A fuel tank below was filled to trim the list, and by 6:15 pm, the Manila Bay was no longer listing. By 6:20 pm, all fires had been extinguished, and the ship was underway again, steering with the engines. Steering control was reestablished by 6:25 pm, and by 7:00 pm, Manila Bay resumed her position in formation. Further repairs were completed under way, and by 9^th of January, she was conducting a “fairly full schedule.” Compared to Ommaney Bay, Manila Bay had been much favored by divine Providence, to which she owed her salvation from a fate much like that ship had suffered the previous day. Her casualties were naturally lighter: 22 killed or missing, and 56 wounded.

The kamikazes did not neglect other ships. A single engine aircraft dove down towards the heavy cruiser Lousiville from dead ahead, impacted the faceplate of No.2 turret, killing one man, but wounding 59 others. Fires broke out, but were speedily brought under control. “Speedily” was still too late for Louisville’s captain, Captain Rex Hicks, who was badly burned, and forced to turn over command to the ship’s executive officer.

Another kamikaze attacked the HMAS Australia, vertically diving on the heavy cruiser to score a hit on the port side of the upper deck amidships at 5:35 pm, starting a fire that was quickly subdued. Some 25 men were killed and 30 wounded, including the whole crew of the port side no. 2 4-inch gun mount, 8 members of the port side no. 1 gun 4-inch gun mount, “members of No.2,3, 4, 5,6, and 10, Bofors; members of both port and starboard and multiple pom-poms, as well as most of the upper deck ammunition supply parties.”[8] Material damage was small, with port side no.2-gun mount put out of action along with two 40-millimeter Bofors anti-aircraft guns.

Another Australian ship, the destroyer HMAS Arunta, was narrowly missed by a kamikaze, which was one of two that were sighted on the port bow, heading straight toward the destroyer. Arunta immediately rang up speed to 25 knots, and opened fire with proximity fused ammunition set to explode at 3,000 feet distance. One of the planes veered off to the right, but the other, a Zero bearing a 250-pound bomb, headed directly towards the bridge. Arunta swung hard to starboard, and the thanks to her “extreme maneuvering” as her action report put it, she avoided being struck by the plane, which, in the words of her action report, “plunged into the sea alongside the gear room on the port side.” When plane and bomb exploded upon hitting the water, the blast “holed the ship’s side in several places and severed the electrical leads to both steering motors.”[9] Arunta continued to circle to starboard for five minutes, while Japanese aircraft continued to attack, but at 5:42 am, the destroyer was forced to stop to repair the damage caused by the near-miss bomb explosion. American destroyer Ingraham stood by, standing guard over the destroyer until her repairs were completed at 10:55 pm, and both ships proceeded at 25 knots for Lingayen Gulf.[10] Arunta lost only two men killed in the attack.

Escort carrier Savo Island received more Providential favor than either of the two escort carriers hit in the past two days. Indeed, she was not hit at all, though a Japanese plane lined up on her. Her quick thinking skipper put the rudder hard over to starboard, blinded the pilot with his ship’s searchlight during the last 1500 feet of his dive, all while his anti-aircraft gunners blasted the oncoming kamikaze during its final approach. Clipping the carrier’s radar antenna, the plane splashed into the sea.[11]

The destroyer escorts Goss, Stafford and Moore, guarding the escort carrier Tulagi spotted eight Zeroes coming in low and out of the sun. The three destroyer escorts opened fire from 8,000 yards with their anti-aircraft guns. Four of the attackers split off to the right, to attack other targets, but the remaining four bore in towards the destroyer escorts and the carrier they were guarding.  Goss, Stafford, Moore each brought down a Japanese attacker, but a fourth got through the formation and smashed into the Stafford’s starboard side, amidships, just abaft the stack, tearing a 12 foot by 16 foot hole into her side, and flooding two engine and fire rooms. With two killed and twelve wounded, Stafford rapidly lost way, and began to take on water. All the crew, save a skeleton crew, were placed on the Moore, and all topside depth charges, K guns, and loading machines were thrown overboard to improve the ship’s stability.[12] Stafford was forced to remain in the vicinity of Luzon for five days until she could join a convoy returning to Leyte, during which time she beat off numerous air attacks, and had many narrow escapes from being the victim of friendly fire.[13] The destroyer Helm fired her 5-inch batteries and other anti-aircraft guns at a kamikaze, identified as an “Oscar” fighter, which attempted to smash into the destroyer’s bridge. A 40-millimeter hit blew off the plane’s left wing and caused it to veer off course. The Oscar clipped the destroyer’s after mast and rammed the a searchlight, bouncing off to crash into the sea close aboard. Six men were wounded and the destroyer suffered but slight damage.

At 5:15 pm, Commander Loud’s Minesweeper Group came under attack from four kamikazes, and three of them crashed into the ocean near three of the minesweepers, not damaging any of them. A fourth however, struck LCI(G)-70, wrecking her primary 3-inch gun, killing two men, and wounding six more.

At 6:40 pm, the radar screens were finally clear of Japanese planes. It had been an extremely profitable raid for the Japanese, their most profitable of the day. And the next day promised to be even more profitable, as evidenced by the aerial snoopers that flew over the task groups at intervals during the night, gathering “useful data” for the kamikaze pilots to make use of in their attacks on the morrow.[14]

Air Attacks on January 6^th.

By 3:45 am, January 6^th, Oldendorf and Loud’s task groups had reached Cape Boliano. Now the American naval forces broke into smaller groups to execute the American naval operational plan. Admiral Durgin took his escort carriers to a designated area northwest of Lingayen Gulf, while the fire support groups steamed to San Fernando Point and off Santiago Island to prepare for their fire support bombardments. Four destroyers under Captain W.L. Freseman steamed ahead of Commander Loud’s minesweepers to provide them protection from shore batteries. Thus, by sunrise, four very important groups of ships had arrived at Lingayen Gulf, a little worse for wear, but all there except the late Ommaney Bay, presently keeping the fish company on the bottom of the Sulu Sea.[15]

After the sun rose that day, the fire support group ships commenced their bombardment, and minesweeping operations began in the gulf. For the Japanese Special Attack Forces, it was a big day. As Oldendorf’s Task Force 77 drew closer to the Japanese airfields on Luzon, the Japanese mounted bigger and more intense air attacks. Japanese aerial attacks on the 5^th had been heavier than on the 4^th, as closer proximity to the targets enabled the Japanese to launch more air attacks. And now on the 6^th, air attacks were heavier still. The first Japanese airstrike of the day comprised ten aircraft early in the morning. Five of them were shot down by the combat air patrol from the escort carriers, losing one plane in the process, and no ships were hit. It was a good opening for the Americans, but things promptly took a turn for the worse.

Between 11:22 am and 11:43 am, more kamikazes arrived and began to attack in greater strength and intensity. One kamikaze narrowly missed the destroyer Leary, brushing two of her 5-inch guns in the process, and splashed near the ship. Noon found the battleship New Mexico bombarding San Fernando, and the sky full of Japanese planes. As New Mexico was the flagship of the San Fabian Fire Support Group, her bridge was jammed with V.I.P.s, including Sir Bruce Fraser, Royal Navy observer, Lieutenant General Hubert Lumsdon, Winston Churchill’s personal liaison officer at General MacArthur’s headquarters, and a Time Magazine correspondent. A Japanese plane, which at first seemed to be diving toward Australia, increased height, buzzed the heavy cruiser Shropshire, another Australian ship, and streaked toward the New Mexico. Shropshire’s anti-aircraft gunners scored hits on the Japanese plane as it passed overhead, and shot its tail section off. Blazing, the plane streaked into the port side of the New Mexico’s bridge. Admiral Weyler and Admiral Fraser, on the starboard side of the bridge, escaped unhurt, but the kamikaze crash slaughtered those on the port side of the bridge to a man, killing Lieutenant General Lumsden, the liaison officer, Times Correspondent William Chickering, Captain R.W. Fleming, New Mexico’s commanding officer, his communications officer, and an aide to General Lumsden. Besides, 25 other men were killed, and 87 wounded, and serious damage was caused to the battleship’s superstructure.

At the same time, Commander Loud’s minesweepers and their escorting destroyers, Barton, Walke, Radford, and Leutze came under attack.

Four “Oscar” fighters attacked the Walke from her starboard side forward, flying low over the water. Walke’s anti-aircraft guns instantly opened fire, knocking down two of the attackers. The third fighter pressed home its attack, strafing as he came in, and through hit several times, did not stop until it crashed into Walke’s bridge on the port side, bursting into flames. Due to the close proximity of the Luzon airfields, the Japanese planes made it to their targets with plenty of fuel still sloshing around in their fuel tanks, and when the Oscar crashed, the fuel caught fire and erupted into a great fireball. The crash caused extensive damage to the bridge, and knocked out the destroyer’s communications, radars, gryo repeaters, and electricity throughout the superstructure. Serious damage was inflicted on the gun and torpedo directors.  The 250-pound bomb carried by the Oscar did not explode but passed clean through the ship near the combat information center. Captain George F. Davis, the Philippine born skipper of the Walke, was in the path of the plane when it hit, and was drenched by burning gasoline. The sailors smothered the flames, but not before Davis burned like a human torch. Refusing to leave the conn, Davis remained on his feet, despite his terrible burns, exhorting his officers and directing his guns in local control.[16]

Two minutes later, the fourth Oscar began his dive toward the destroyer. Walke’s 5-inch gun No.3, firing in local control, and the starboard side 40- and 20-millimeter guns blasted the attacker. The Oscar burst into flames and splashed into the sea close by. Control was soon after switched aft to secondary conn, and the Walke’s fires were under control within 15 minutes. As for Davis, when the fires were brought under control, he finally consented to be carried below, but his burns were too severe, for him to be saved, and he died within a few hours.[17]

Also, around noon, destroyer Allen B. Sumner was attacked by a trio of aircraft. One plane broke off its attack in the face of heavy anti-aircraft fire, but a second occupied the attention of the destroyer’s anti-aircraft gunners as a decoy, just out of range, as a third plane dove on the Allen B. Sumner. Strafing as he came in out of the sun, the plane dove down from the port bow, and crashed into the destroyer near her after stack and after torpedo mount, killing 14 men, wounding 19 more, and causing extensive damage. Her after magazine flooded, and the Sumner was forced to retire from the gulf. A few minutes after noon, two Zeroes, flying only 25 feet above the surface of the water, attacked the minesweeping group. Sighting both Zeroes heading for her, the destroyer Long increased speed to 25 knots, and commenced firing every gun that could be brought to bear. Unfortunately, this not deter the kamikaze, nor bring him down, and the Zero crashed into her port side below the bridge a foot above the waterline, causing fires and explosions amidships, and knocking out power and internal communications. Lieutenant Stanley Caplin, her skipper, fearing that the forward magazine would blow, gave permission for the men forward to abandon ship, but the crew aft misunderstood the order and thought it applied to them. Therefore, the entire ship was abandoned, and the crew were picked by the minesweeper USS Hovey. But the magazine didn’t blow, and the tug Apache put out the destroyer’s fires, so Captain Caplin gathered a salvage party and prepared to reboard his ship. However, late that afternoon, at 5:30 am, another plane attacked Long, and smashed into the ship in the same spot as the first one, this time breaking the back of the hapless destroyer. Captain Caplin and the salvage party went on board the next day, but could not save the ship, which capsized and went down. Hovey rescued the whole crew, but one man was killed, and another 35 were burned.

Around the same time, Long took her first hit, destroyer transport Brooks was struck on the port side, starting a fire amidships, and severing the main and auxiliary steam lines. The fire main was broken and the sea valve to the condenser was punctured, which caused the forward engine to flood. With three men killed and 11 wounded, burning fiercely amidships, the destroyer was in dire straits, unable to fight the fires and having no steam, but the Australian destroyer Waramunga came to her aid.[18] The Australian skipper took his ship alongside the Brooks lee side, and damage control parties commenced fighting to fires, while wounded men were transported from the American ship’s forecastle to the Australian one. In half an hour, despite difficulties caused by the wreckage of boats and davits that were fouling her port side, the fires were put out, including one beneath the superstructure threatening a 3-inch magazine. At 1:50 pm, the Warramunga, which had passed a towing line to Brooks, began to tow the American destroyer clear of the gulf.[19]

So far, it was a very bloody day for the U.S. Navy, and a very stressful one for all American sailors in Lingayen Gulf. It could have been even worse if not for the fact that Task Force 38, the fast carrier force, was taking some of the heat off Admiral Oldendorf’s forces by conducting fighter sweeps over the Luzon airfields. In addition, thick overcast acted as a double-edged sword. It shielded the approaching kamikazes from the American ships until they broke through, which gave them very little time to react, but on the other hand, the Japanese pilots had little time to choose targets once they broke through the overcast. The American fighter sweeps were largely ineffective, destroying only 14 Japanese aircraft in the air and another 18 on the ground, while losing 17 of their own aircraft. And by the end of the day, reconnaissance photos showed 272 Japanese planes on the ground, most of them heavily dispersed and camouflaged around Clark Field.[20]

Minesweeping continued on schedule the 6^th of January, while the two fire support groups bombarded Cape Boliano, Santiago Island, and the San Fernando area of Luzon.[21]  More airstrikes continued that afternoon. At 2:27 pm, two Zeroes dove out of the overcast toward destroyers O’Brien and Barton, as the former was in the process of relieving the latter in her minesweeper escort duty, O’Brien and Barton crossing on opposite courses close aboard of the minesweepers. One missed both ships and hit the water ten feet ahead of Barton, but the second crashed O’Brien’s fantail, “ripping off a section of her topside and flooding two compartments, yet inflicting neither casualties nor damage to her power plant.”[22]

A little later in the afternoon, the destroyer minesweeper Southard was crashed abaft her stacks. The plane’s engine lodged in the ship, while the fuselage bounced off her starboard side, ripping a trough six feet wide in her deck. Southard wasted no time in cutting loose her minesweeping gear and retiring to conduct emergency repairs which were completed within 14 hours, at the end of which time she was back sweeping mines.[23]

At 5:20 pm, five kamikazes and one escort from Mabalacat approached a fire support column retiring from Lingayen gulf for the night, and headed for destroyer Newcomb, approaching from astern. Newcomb’s 20-millimeter guns splashed one the kamikazes, but the other flew by at deck level, using the destroyer itself as cover as it approached its intended target, the battleship California.  Two of Newcomb’s crew were wounded and fifteen wounded by “friendly” anti-aircraft fire. Banking sharply left, the kamikaze then crashed into Oldendorf’s flagship, the battleship California, at the base of her mainmast. “The plane’s impact sent steel fragments slicing into crewmen at their battle stations, smashed into splinter shields, and bit into the ship’s bell.” The engine of the kamikaze plane and a hail of debris fell overboard, but the plane’s gasoline started a fire. To make matters worse, a 5-inch shell from a nearby destroyer, desperately trying to shoot down the plane, struck the California’s No.4 5-inch gun and exploded inside the mount, starting another fire, and destroying the turret. The crew turned fire hoses onto the fires and extinguished the blazes within 12 minutes, cooling the hot bulkheads to enable gunners and topside watch standers trapped in the stricken area of the ship. Casualties were heavy, and the battle dressing station filled to overflowing as doctors and corpsmen worked unceasingly.[24] 45 men were killed and 151 wounded. The friendly fire incident prompted Oldendorf to issue the following warning:

“A day which was characterized by brilliant performance on the part of many ships was seriously marred by indiscriminate, promiscuous and uncontrolled shooting. Ammunition was wasted, death and injury to shipmates inflicted, and material damage caused to our ships. All hands are enjoined to make certain their guns are fired at the enemy and not at their shipmates.”

 

Light cruiser Columbia had been attacked by a Zero at 2:25 pm, which passed between her masts and sprayed her deck with gasoline, “which providentially did not ignite,” as Samuel Eliot Morison noted, “and splashed close aboard.”[25] But Columbia’s providence had run out, for three hours later, another heavier and intense kamikaze attack began. To make matters worse, the fire support groups were steaming into the channel of Lingayen Gulf, now cleared of mines, to carry out further bombardment and support further minesweeping. This significantly reduced their maneuverability, just as they came under persistent kamikaze attack. Speed had been reduced, and the fire support group was in column formation, when at 5:20 am, a “Val” dive bomber dived on Columbia. The Val was hit as it dived down, though it seemed no longer under the pilot’s control, it crashed into Columbia on the port quarter, on the main deck, on the port side of turret IV. The Val’s engine pierced the main deck, and the armor piercing bomb carried by the Val penetrated two decks and exploded near the aft ammunition magazines, which were promptly flooded, preventing a catastrophic explosion.

A major fire broke out nevertheless on the main and second decks, causing heavy damage and casualties. All power was lost, but her damage control was extremely efficient and they were aided by flooding in nine aft compartments which caused the ship to settle four feet by the stern, and helped to put out her fires. She lost 17 killed and 60 wounded, besides 20 missing, but remained on station to shoot down another kamikaze and continue shore bombardment with the two forward turrets.

At 5:34 am, a Val dive bomber dove on the Australia from the starboard quarter, and struck the ship on the starboard side forward. The fire started by the crashing plane was speedily put out, but the starboard anti-aircraft turret no. 2 was put of action, and its ammunition lockers were destroyed, with 14 killed and 26 wounded. This left only sufficient anti-aircraft crews to man one 4-inch gun mounting on each side.[26]

Louisville was now hit again, and it was more a serious blow than the one she had suffered the previous day. At 5:30 pm, a kamikaze hit the cruiser “…on the starboard side of the bridge structure, destroying the flag bridge, sky control, other key spaces, and a 40-mm gun mount in a massive fireball…”[27] The hit killed 32 men and wounded 56 more. Rear Admiral Theodore Chandler, was terribly burned as he stood on the flag bridge. Jumping to the signal bridge from the flag bridge, his burning clothes were doused by sailors, and he assisted other sailors, despite his wounds, in manning a fire hose. At last heeding appeals to seek medical aid, he insisted on waiting his turn in line instead of using his rank to secure first treatment. Unfortunately for the heroic Chandler, his lungs had been too badly scorched, and he died the next day. Louisville was so severely damaged, that she was unable to complete her bombardment mission, and her duties in this regard were taken over by California.

That night, when contemplating the events of the day, Admiral Oldendorf and other American high commanders were deeply concerned and quite alarmed. The Japanese air attacks, carried out by only 28 kamikazes and 15 fighter escorts had sunk one ship and damaged eleven more that day. Indeed, the success ratio of the kamikazes at this stage in the war, was one hit on a ship out of every four, a vastly more accurate toll than conventional airstrikes. The kamikaze also proved much harder to shoot down, due to travelling at greater speed than bombers in conventional attacks. The United States Navy too had not learned the lessons needed to defeat them; namely, that the 20-millimeter gun didn’t pack a powerful enough punch, and that greater numbers of fighters were needed to fend off the kamikazes. The lessons learned here in Lingayen Gulf and en route, would be implemented and would save many lives during the Okinawa campaign. During the Lingayen Gulf operations, the kamikaze pilots were at the top of their game. Never again would they score such successes proportionate to their numbers; the U.S. Navy would emerge from the fray smarter and wiser, and the quality of both the kamikaze pilots and their aircraft would decline in the coming months, as Japan’s crop of pilots, already low, was steadily used up. Despite the losses, more shocking because after the battle of Leyte Gulf, everyone assumed Japan was licked, Admiral Oldendorf did not seriously give thought to halting or postponing the Lingayen landings, for that would be to hand victory to the Japanese aviators. Rather, he pressed Admiral Halsey and General MacArthur to step up their efforts against the Japanese airfields on Luzon to put them out of action. He was no quitter. January 6^th represented the low point of U.S. Navy fortunes against the kamikaze. Starting the next day, the sun would slowly start to rise for them, but the kamikaze would continue to exact a fearful price throughout the remainder of the Pacific War.

Air Attacks of January 7^th

Part of that fearful price would be exacted over the next several days, and if the intensity of the kamikaze attacks died down, the attacks themselves did not let up. Even night offered no respite. Under the light of a brilliantly bright moon, a Japanese airstrike roared into Lingayen Gulf at 4:39 am, and caught the minesweepers. Destroyer-minesweeper Chandler, picked up two Japanese planes on her radar flying low, and spotted them visually as well in the moonlight. Chandler opened fire with her anti-aircraft guns, and destroyer-minesweeper Hovey joined in. That ship was packed with men rescued from the destroyers Long and Brooks. One Japanese plane burst into flames and went down, but not before it dropped a torpedo that speared through the gulf waters and crashed into Hovey’s starboard side against her after engine room. The minesweeper immediately lost lights and power. In the words of her entry in the Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships:

“The stern remained nearly level and slinking to the top of the after deck house, the bow listed 40 degrees to starboard and rose out of the water, the ship breaking in half. Two minutes later, the bow listed 90 degrees, rose vertically, and rapidly sank in 54 fathoms of water, suffering 24 men killed in addition to 24 men who were survivors from Long and Brooks.”[28]

Chandler rescued 229 survivors, including survivors from the previously stricken two ships. At 6:55 am, the fire support and bombardment ships re-entered Lingayen Gulf in two columns. All day, minesweeping went on, and naval bombardment began at 10:30 am against suspected Japanese coastal batteries and other positions. In the afternoon, underwater demolition teams went ashore to gather intelligence on surf conditions and the like. As for the kamikaze threat, the Japanese suicide aviators were mostly absent after putting Hovey on the bottom of the gulf. Those few enemy planes that did appear were shot down, before they cause any damage.[29]

However, at 6:35 pm, as the fire support ships were retiring out of the gulf for the night, another Japanese air attack roared in. As before, they picked on the minesweepers, because “they were usually isolated and had no good anti-aircraft support.”[30] Palmer had left formation to conduct repairs caused by a violent explosion aboard her at 3:45 pm, which knocked out her low pressure turbine. How, at 6:40 am, a Japanese twin engine bomber, of a type codenamed “Dinah” by the Allies, flew low overhead and dropped two bombs on her portside, starting an enormous fire that threatened her magazines and roared upwards to the sky. “The ship flooded abaft her forward engine room, the after engine room bulkhead gave way and she sank within six minutes,” wrote Morison.[31] Palmer sank within six minutes. Of her crew, two were killed, 26 missing and 38 wounded.

Air Attacks of January 8^th

There were no night attacks the night of January 7^th-8^th, although four enemy aircraft approached the escort carriers during the night and were intercepted by Army fighters and two shot down. At 7:20 am, California lookouts reported five Japanese planes attacking the hapless HMAS Australia. The attack occurred as the Bombardment force to which she belonged was moving again into the gulf. Australia at once opened fire, and her gunners were aided four patrolling Wildcat fighters, which the other four aircraft reported as Japanese by the California. It turned out that the four Wildcats were chasing the lone Japanese plane. That plane, the only Japanese, went down a mere 20 yards from the ship –actually skidding into the ship’s side, but doing little damage.

Unfortunately, the friendly character of the Wildcats was not deduced until too late. One Wildcat, following the Japanese plane in, was hit by anti-aircraft fire, had its landing gear damaged, and the pilot was forced to bail out. The other three Wildcats, though hit, managed to return to their carriers.

At 7:39 am, a second plane, a Dinah, attacked from the same quarter as the first, and was knocked down just short of the ship by anti-aircraft fire. However, the Dinah nevertheless struck the ship at the waterline below the bridge, the bomb carried by the plane exploding against the side, or just short of it, blowing a 14 foot by 8 foot hole, which opened a provision room, and opened an oil tank to the sea. Australia began to list 5 degrees to port, and adjacent compartments began to flood in short order. “The list was corrected, flooding brought under control, and shoring up of bulkheads carried out. It was judged prudent to limit ship’s speed to 15 knots.”[32] Casualties as a result of this hit were light, “mostly shock,” reported her captain. Admiral Oldendorf offered to relieve the ship of further duties for the day, considering the beating she had been undergoing over the past several days, but her captain declined the offer.

The Lingayen Invasion Force Under Attack: January 2^nd-9^th

Meanwhile, the main Allied invasion forces were enroute to Lingayen Gulf. As they moved up, the Japanese did not neglect them. On the night of the 5^th, light cruiser Boise had a narrow escape from submarine launched torpedoes. Destroyer Taylor then sank Boise’s assailant, HA-82. Just before daybreak on the 7^th, as the invasion forces were passing through Mindoro Strait, a Japanese plane dropped a bomb that missed off the Boise’s port quarter. And on the night of the 7-8^th, the destroyer Hinoki trying to flee Manila, after repairing her torpedo damage, was sunk by three U.S. destroyers. The escort carriers represented juicy targets and were not neglected by the Japanese. Coming under continuous attack, the escort carriers fought back with their 5-inchers. At 7:49 am, on January 8^th, a kamikaze swept in toward the bridge of Kadashan Bay, nose-diving at the last moment to strike the ship just above the waterline at 7:51 am, despite repeated hits by anti-aircraft fire.

The hit blew a 9 by 17-foot hole, destroyed the junior officer’s quarters, sparked a gasoline fire, and rendered her gasoline system inoperative. The fire was quickly brought under control, although controlling the flooding took longer. Although no one was killed and only three wounded, the damage was bad enough that the ship had to withdraw to Leyte for temporary repairs, after transferring her aircraft to Marcus Island (CVE-77).[33]

Attack transport Callaway was hit next. The kamikaze plane broke through heavy anti-aircraft fire to crash into the starboard wing of the bridge at 7:55 am. The crew responded with “cool and skillful work against the resultant fires,” and “kept material damage to a minimum,” but 29 men were killed and 22 wounded by the crash.[34]

Just before sunset, on January 8^th, six kamikazes attacked the escort carriers supporting the Lingayen Invasion Force once more. Anti-aircraft fire barked upward from the destroyers and cruisers, and Wildcats jumped and shot down four of them. The remaining two flew toward the carriers, both “Oscar” fighters. Light cruisers Montpelier and Phoenix opened fire with anti-aircraft guns on the plane, blowing off parts of the plane, but the pilot continued its dive through the heavy anti-aircraft fire, and leveling off at 3,000 yards, crashed his machine through the port side of escort carrier Kitkun Bay amidships. The resulting explosion blew a 20 foot by 9-foot hole, started a large fire and caused a 13-degree list. Fire and engine rooms were partially flooded, and all controls, except steering, were lost. Within a few minutes the carrier had a 13-degree list to port. Seventeen men were killed and 36 wounded. The fires were brought under control by 7:10 pm, thanks to valiant damage control efforts, but the list only became worse, increasing to 17 degrees, despite the efforts of the engineers and repair parties to arrest it. The carrier’s captain ordered all but essential damage control crewmen to abandon ship and the escorting destroyers took aboard 724 men, leaving 200 aboard. Fleet tug Chowanac took the stricken carrier in tow, and despite the risk of an explosion aboard the Kitkun Bay, proceeded to Santiago Island while the engineers managed to get steam up in the engine room, and the damage control teams finally reduced the list to only four degrees. The next morning at ten knots, she was able to join Admiral Durgin’s escort carrier group off Lingayen Gulf.

Attacks on January 9^th and the Lingayen Landings

As the sun rose on January 9^th, 1945, American shipping filled Lingayen Gulf. At 7:00 am, the American warships began shelling supposed Japanese positions ashore, while the amphibious craft prepared to land their troops. Japanese opposition from the air was not slow in coming. One attacked the destroyer escort Hodges, but misjudging the target angle, splashed into sea without inflicting any casualties, though the plane did knock down her radio antennas and foremast. A second plane was driven off from American ship Mount Olympus by anti-aircraft fire, and a third took on the hapless Columbia, at a vulnerable moment when she was surrounded by landing craft 4,000 yards from the beach and unable to maneuver. The plane was a Nakajima Ki-44 single seat fighter, a type codenamed “Tojo” by the Allies. The Tojo crashed into Columbia’s main battery director, and although both plane and director which knocked overboard, the 250-kilogram bomb carried by the plane exploded on impact, starting a serious fire, as well as damage and heavy casualties around the forward superstructure. The forward fire control stations, and No.2 5-inch gun mount were demolished, and many of her gunnery and air defense officers were wounded. Columbia’s damage control parties quenched the fire aboard her within thirty minutes, and stood by to render fire support. Columbia lost 17 killed and 97 wounded, plus 6 missing, this day.[35]

At 9:30 am, the American troops began landing at Lingayen. The troops found the beaches bereft of Japanese opposition. The Japanese army commander, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, had resolved not to attempt to hold the beaches and instead resist the American advance from inland positions in the hill, knowing that it was futile to attempt to hold the beaches in the face of the immense fire support rendered by the United States Navy. The landings were thus virtually unopposed, and as it turned out, all the preinvasion bombardment conducted by Oldendorf’s fire support groups, unnecessary. This was a bitter fact to face due to the heavy losses suffered by Oldendorf’s fire support groups to the kamikazes. It had all been in vain. By January 16^th, the U.S. Army’s XIX Corps had advanced on the right flank 30 miles inland, taking eight prisoners and killing a hundred of the enemy, while taking only 30 fatalities of their own.  I Corps, on the left flank, suffered more heavily losing 220 killed and 660 wounded, but nearly all these were inflicted after the landings. The Japanese had nothing stronger than a few artillery pieces on the beaches. One of these scored a hit on the destroyer Jenkins that killed three men and wounded ten. Three LSMs and Three LSTs were hit by artillery fire, as well. But if the artillery resistance was light, the kamikaze resistance was considerably heavier.

Battleship Mississippi and the hapless Australia both became kamikaze targets as they stood by to render fire support to the landings. At 1:02 pm, two Vals headed for these ships, belonging to a noon flight of tour kamikazes and four escorts from Tuguegarao. Mississippi’s machine guns opened fire on the Val, but the pilot kept coming, “leveled off in a shallow glide, passed bridge level, continued in a straight line until he landed against an anti-aircraft gun and toppled over the port side.”[36] The blow killed 23 men and wounded 63 others, although only minor damage was sustained. As soon as the first Val struck the battleship, her anti-aircraft gun crews shifted fire to the second Val, which bored in toward the Australia. In a curving dive, he attempted to hit the bridge, but his aim was off, and diving under foreyard, he caught his wingtip on a mast strut, which swung the Japanese machine into the foremast funnel, and then over the side of the ship. Damage was light, only the top of the stack being sheared off, and damage to aerials. No casualties were taken.[37]

Just after sunset on the 9^th, four kamikazes made an attack run on the American ships, and in the confusion caused by this attack, a 5-inch shell from an American warship struck sky control, killing eighteen men and wounding 51 more. This hit to her only air defense station, this hit wiped out her key air defense men, and seriously comprised the ability of the battleship to defend herself from aerial attack.

But the battleship did not have to worry about kamikaze attack much longer. The Japanese were fast expending their aircraft, and transporting most of their remaining aircraft out of the Philippines.

On the night of March 9^th to 10^th, the Japanese employed a new weapon, the suicide boat. These floating kamikazes were 18-foot-long plywood boats fitted with two 260-pound depth charges each, and crewed by two or three men armed with a light machine gun and a few hand grenades. The Japanese had as many as seventy concealed in the southwest anchorage of Lingayen Gulf, and they had not been destroyed by the three-day bombardment. All seventy of these boats went out to attack the U.S. ships that night. The destroyer Philip picked up some of them on radar, and sent out an alarm at 2:00 am. One boat turned to attack the destroyer, but exploded 20 yards short. Philip engaged another at 3:20 am, hit it with 20-millimeter gunfire and watched it blow up. Destroyer Leutze destroyed two around 4:40 am, and was still fighting them fifteen minutes later. The suicide boats concentrated on the U.S. transports, attacking some ten ships in all. Morison writes:

The midgets approached from astern, and when nearly alongside heaved a depth charge with a shallow setting over the stern and attempted a quick getaway. These simple tactics were effective, because if a boat succeeded in approaching undetected it was so close to its intended victim that no guns could be brought to bear.[38]

Transport War Hawk was crashed by a suicide boat which blew a 12 foot by 25-foot hole in her port side, flooding No.3 hold, and killing 61 men. Without power, the ship lay dead in the water, as the engine room flooded. Repair crews working below decks in stifling heat with only dim emergency lights and little ventilation, if any, worked to restore power and to plug the hole in the ship’s side.[39]

LST-925, had a hole blown in her below the waterline. The explosion also knocked her starboard engine out. LST-1028 had her bottom stove in by an explosion, which flooded with her engine room. LCI-(G)-365 was severely damaged, and LCI (M)-974 was sunk. Two other LSTs were damaged, but the destruction was not nearly as great as reported by Radio Tokyo – which reported 20 to 30 ships sunk. Only four of the enemy craft were reported destroyed by gunfire, besides the one that struck War Hawk, but the Japanese lost many more boats than this, because they reported that their suicide boat flotilla was “incapable of further operations.”[40]

Air Attacks on January 10^th

Although by the 10^th of January, the Japanese didn’t have many planes left, they had enough to still cause the Americans trouble. At 7:11 am, one Val tried to crash the destroyer Dashiel, patrolling off Santiago Island, but was prevented by the destroyer’s high speed and evasive maneuvers.[41] Not quite as blessed was the destroyer escort LeRay Wilson on anti-submarine station northwest of Lingayen Gulf. At 7:10 am, with visibility low to the west, a twin-engine Japanese bomber streaked toward the ship. At last, it was spotted at 7:10 am, on the port beam 1000 yards away, 25 feet above the water surface. The ship’s gunners immediately opened fire with their anti-aircraft weapons, setting the engine and port wing afire 200 yards from the destroyer escort. Undaunted, the plane crashed through the port flag bag, past two 20-millimeter guns, striking the stack and two torpedo tubes, and shearing off two other 20 millimeter guns. Part of the plane fell overboard; the rest fell in pieces over Wilson’s superstructure and torpedo deck. The destroyer was damaged extensively and lost six men killed and seven wounded.[42]

At 2:00 pm, that day, the transport Du Page was crashed as it was taking its place in a convoy bound for Leyte. A Japanese Kawasaki Ki-45 Toryu fighter, codenamed “Nick” was spotted dead ahead, flying in at 800 feet. The pilot dropped altitude to 60 feet, then commenced a steep bank, and smashed into the port wing of the navigation bridge, causing serious damage. Burning gasoline started equally serious fires, and it took all night to put them out. Du Page lost 35 men killed and 136 wounded. 5 men blown overboard were picked by destroyers.

Air Attacks on January 12^th

The kamikazes returned the following day, targeting the destroyer escorts Gilligan and Seusens on anti-submarine patrol at Lingayen Gulf. Gilligan picked up a twin engine “Betty” bomber on radar 8 miles distant and when it was sighted visually 1,000 yards away, the destroyer escort changed course to put the approaching plane on the starboard beam and bring the maximum number of guns to bear.[43] In a rare instance of a sailor deserting his battle station, the range finder operator lost his nerve and jumped from his platform to the main battery director, throwing it off target, felling the operator, and preventing the 5-inch guns from getting off any more rounds. The Betty, though riddled by 40-millimeter shells, crashed directly into Gilligan’s No.2 40-millimeter gun, killing 12 men and wounding 12 more. A large explosion blew up, and the main deck was covered with burning wreckage. Raging fires were started, but excellent damage control kept the ship seaworthy and her fires were out by 7:15 am.[44]

Destroyer escort Seusens, searching for men blown overboard from Gilligan, picked up a Japanese plane on radar at 7:29 am. Seusens rang up emergency speed and put the rudder hard to the right, as the kamikaze dove down in a steep full power dive. The entire starboard battery, and the 20-millimeter guns on the port side all concentrated on the plane, killing the pilot, but the plane maintained its momentum, and skimming the after 40-millimeter gun, crashed into the sea, so close by, that the explosion wounded 11 sailors aboard the destroyer escort.[45]

Destroyer transport Belknap was attacked that morning in the gulf. At 7:48 am, four Japanese “Tony” fighters concentrated on her, all the while under anti-aircraft fire. One plane made a compete circle around the ship, dived and then began to strafe. Anti-aircraft fire shot one of its two bombs loose, and the weapon fell into the sea 200 yards short of the destroyer-transport. The Tony was now damaged, but momentum carried it forward to smash into Belknap’s No.2 stack, where its remaining bomb exploded, completely demolishing that stack, crippling her engines and killing 38 men and wounding 49 more. A second Tony was now diving on the ship from dead ahead. Belknap fired at it until a destroyer crossing her bows ahead fouled the range, but it was enough to bring down the attacker. Belknap was towed back to the States, but she would not be repaired before the conclusion of the war.

After this attack things were quiet in Lingayen Gulf for the rest of the day.

 

Air Attack on January 13^th

The last successful kamikaze attack in Philippine waters occurred at 8:58 am, on January 13^th. Admiral Durgin’s escort carrier group was again the target. As escort carrier Salamaua was waiting to refuel from a tanker, an unidentified Japanese aircraft toting a pair of 250-kilogram bomb conducted a nearly vertical dive on the carrier, out of dense overcast, and struck her before she could bring her guns to bear. The plane punched deeply into the ship, blowing a hole 16 feet by 30 feet in the flight deck, between frames 130 and 136, and penetrated to the tank top. One bomb failed to detonate and went out the starboard side of the ship at the waterline. The other, narrowly missing the carrier’s bomb storage area, exploded in the hold. Machinery in the after-engine room was shattered and the after-engine room subsequently flooded. Power, communications, and steering were immediately lost, and the ship began to list 8 degrees to starboard. The fire blazing on the flight deck was brought under control quickly using CO2 fire extinguishers, but the hangar deck fire, fueled by gasoline saturated debris carried down from the gallery deck bunk rooms, and “heaped on aircraft being made ready for a strike,” proved persistent. The fire fighters were further hampered by a lack of pressure in the fire mains aft. Fire hoses were led out from the forward fire mains, but combating the flames and removing bombs from burning aircraft was made very dangerous by exploding ammunition and by the presence of fuses on the hangar deck ready to be inserted into depth charges.

Immediately after the impact, the carrier had gone to general quarters, and shot down two more Japanese planes. One of these planes was blown apart by anti-aircraft fire as it approached astern, and the other fell into the sea close by her port quarter. Salamaua’s engine room fire was smothered by steam from broken lines or flooded out, and by noon the after-engine room compartment and hold were flooded to the waterline. The main pump in the after-engine room could not control this flooding because of badly damaged steam lines, and pumping was done using the six submersible pumps available, as well, as by bucket brigade, but these efforts were futile had to be abandoned. Salamua’s crew eventually put out the hangar deck fire, and saved their ship at the cost of 15 killed and 88 wounded, a small toll considering the hideous damage sustained. Salamaua then conducted temporary repairs and screened by two destroyers, retired to Leyte.[46]

Aftermath

And thus ended the last successful kamikaze attack in Philippine waters. By 15^th of January only ten Japanese aircraft were left on Luzon. Kamikazes would return again to threaten the American fleet, but never again with this level of success. At Lingayen Gulf, the U.S. fleet took the worst the Japanese could throw at them, and despite horrible losses and damage, held their own, conducting themselves valiantly against the odds, which were four to one that the kamikazes would get through to hit an American ship. And yet despite these odds, the Americans prevailed, and learned important lessons that would heed by the American Navy in later campaigns. May we never forget the courage and the sacrifice of the U.S. Navy during the Lingayen Gulf operations against the kamikazes. During those few days, Japanese fanaticism demonstrated that it was unable to prevail against the political liberty of the United States. May we be forever grateful for that.

[1] In the Japanese militaristic and nationalistic culture, dying for the emperor was considered the greatest honor one could attain. As the Japanese emperor was considered divine by the Japanese, dying in his service was akin to religious martyrdom. Like the suicide bombers of the Islamic world, there were religious aspects to the kamikaze missions. Kamikaze pilots believed that dying for the emperor would gain them eternal life.

[2] Samuel Eliot Morison History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001) [Reprint] 13:98

[3] Ibid

[4] Ibid

[5] Ibid

[6] Ibid p. 99

[7] William T. Y’Blood The Little Giants: U.S. Escort Carriers Against Japan (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Insitute Press, 1987) p. 456-457

[8]  Captain John M. Armstrong, HMAS Australia Action Report off Luzon, https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2022/october/action-report-hmas-australia-luzon

[9] Arunta Action Report, quoted in George Hermon Gill, The Royal Australian Navy, 1942-1945 (Adelaide, Australia, The Griffin Press), II:582

[10] Ibid

[11] Samuel Eliot Morison History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001) [Reprint] 13:103

[12] “Stafford” Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/s/stafford.html

[13] Samuel Eliot Morison History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001) 13:103

[14] Ibid p. 104

[15]  Samuel Eliot Morison History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001) [Reprint] 13:104-105

[16] “Walke” Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-040/h-040-3.html

[17] Ibid

[18] “Brooks” Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/b/brooks-i.html

[19] George Hermon Gill, The Royal Australian Navy, 1942-1945 (Adelaide, Australia, The Griffin Press), II:584

 

[20] Samuel Eliot Morison History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001) [Reprint] 13:106-107

[21] Ibid p. 107

[22] Ibid p. 109

[23] “Southard” Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/s/southard.html

[24] “California V” Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/c/california-v.html

[25] Samuel Eliot Morison History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001) [Reprint] 13:108

[26] HMAS Australia Action Report https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2022/october/action-report-hmas-australia-luzon#:~:text=During%20the%20Lingayen%20operation%20January,fighting%20efficiency%20was%20not%20impaired.

[27] Lingayen Gulf” Naval History and Heritage Command https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-040/h-040-3.html

[28] “Hovey” Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/h/hovey.html

[29] Samuel Eliot Morison History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001) [Reprint] 13:112

[30] Ibid p. 113

[31] Ibid

[32] HMAS Australia Action Report https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2022/october/action-report-hmas-australia-luzon

[33] https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-040/h-040-3.html

[34] “Callaway” Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships https://www.hazegray.org/danfs/amphib/apa35.htm

[35] “Columbia VI” https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/c/columbia-vi.html

[36] Samuel Eliot Morison History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001 [Reprint] 13:133

[37] HMAS Australia Action Report https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2022/october/action-report-hmas-australia-l

[38] Samuel Eliot Morison History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001 [Reprint] 13:138

[39] “War Hawk” https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/w/war-hawk.html

[40] Samuel Eliot Morison History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001 [Reprint] 13:140

[41] Ibid p. 141

[42] Ibid

[43] Ibid p. 146

[44] Ibid p. 147 and “Gilligan” Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/g/gilligan.html

[45] Ibid p. 147 and “Suesens” https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/r/richard-w-suesens.html

[46] Information for this section taken from “Salamaua” Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships https://web.archive.org/web/20171122185625/https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/s/salamaua.html and “Historical Narrative of USS Salamaua (CVE-96) https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/dafs/CVE/cve96-history.html