The 1775 offensive of Quebec by the Americans during the war for Independence, was the first large scale offensive operation by the Continental Army and was a resounding failure. Almost unknown today, the battle nevertheless stands testament to American bravery, courage, and in some cases, cowardice and incompetence.
Background
The American War for Independence was a defensive war fought against British aggression, and thus at first glance it might seem odd that the Continental Congress approved a plan to invade Quebec and begin the trial by fire of the new Continental Army in an offensive operation through rugged wilderness, not an easy task for a new and inexperienced army. However, to the Continental Congress there seemed good reasons to allow the invasion, which was being urged by both Colonel Benedict Arnold and by Colonel Ethan Allen.
In the first place, by holding Montreal and Quebec, the British were furnished with an opportunity to advance southward along the Hudson River and the Lakes Champlain and George and threaten the New England colonies with invasion from the north. However, by attacking Montreal and Quebec and wresting these places from the hand of the British, such a potential threat could be neutralized. In the second place, the Canadians, lacking a representative government of their own, could perhaps be induced to join in the war on the American side. The American colonies, nearly wholly Protestant Christian, entertained no warm feeling for the Roman Catholic faith of the French Canadians. Indeed, the Quebec Act, which reestablished the Catholic church in that province, had alarmed the Americans, and helped start the war for Independence, for if the British could establish a state church there, they could just as easily establish the Anglican church as the official state church of all the colonies, and oppress the various Christian sects that had emigrated to America in search of liberty of conscience. But while the Americans harbored a fear of Roman Catholicism inherited from the persecutions suffered by their ancestors at the hands of popery, they were not averse to working with Catholics in a common cause, as they would ally themselves with the Roman Catholic French against the English later in the war.
The time seemed opportune for such an invasion. General Guy-Carleton, the governor general of Canada, had only 450 British regular soldiers under his command, and a quick assault such as that made by Ethan Allen upon Ticonderoga could secure Montreal and Quebec before Carleton could be reinforced from Britian. Generals Philip Schuyler was assigned to command an expedition against Montreal, and General Richard Montgomery appointed as his second in command. Schuyler, of Dutch descent and a New Yorker, was one of the wealthiest landowners of that state. 43 years old at the time, kind and intelligent. However, while singularly devoted to the patriot cause with plenty of zeal, he was not suited for the military command, and to make matters worse, was in poor health.[1] “The force to be employed consisted of three thousand New York and New England troops, which were ordered to rendezvous at Ticonderoga during the month of August.”[2] Montgomery would have better choice to command. He had military experience, having fought in the French and Indian War, married into wealth and high social station, and had the strength and activity to endure the toils and hardships of soldiering.[3] “Forceful in command, aggressive in action, patient in adversity, cool in judgment, never negligent of duty, never avoiding danger, he was the complete soldier.”[4] Ethan Allen wanted his Green Mountain Boys added to the army, but the men refused to join the Continental Army. They voted Allen out of his colonelcy, and elected Seth Warner, the lieutenant colonel in his place. Allen then joined Schuyler’s force as a volunteer.
In August 1775, a committee of the Continental Congress visited General George Washington at Cambridge, commanding the besiegers of Boston, and persuaded him to send a second expedition to attack Canada and to take the city of Quebec. Benedict Arnold, who had so tirelessly advocated such an expedition, and who had bought horses there, and knew the city, was given command of it. He had 1100 men. Ten companies of these were New England troops under the commands of Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Green, and Enos, and of majors Meigs, and Timothy Bigelow of Worcester, Massachusetts.[5] Arnold was also given three companies of riflemen, two from Pennsylvania, and one from Virginia, under the command of Captain Daniel Morgan. Their adversary Carleton “was an English aristocrat, a military man with all the qualities of the professional soldier of high rank. He was reserved, stern, remote from civilians, fearless and inflexible, but he was also high-minded, incorruptible, and, at bottom, magnanimous.”[6]
Expedition to Montreal
General Schuyler tirelessly worked to organize his army for the coming operation, despite his ill health. Arriving at Ticonderoga, he found the American garrison there in a profound state of unreadiness. Many of the men were sick, and there was a spirit of insubordination to the command structure. He was short on supplies to build boats and was short of ammunition. While Schuyler was navigating this issue, Major John Brown, “a discreet and brave officer,”[7] had visited Canada on an intelligence gathering mission. He reported that Carleton’s force numbered 700 men, and that the Canadian militia was lukewarm towards the British. Schuyler also worked to enlist the help of the Indians and met with certain tribes at Albany for this purpose. Awaiting further reinforcements, Schuyler lingered at Fort Ticonderoga for two months, spending his time building the bateaux he would need, and calling for supplies of all kinds to be sent to him.
Schuyler’s expedition finally got underway on August 28th, 1775, and reached La Motte Isle on September 3rd, awaiting the arrival of General Schuyler, who joined them the next day. The expedition pushed on, but Schuyler was growing sick, being afflicted with a fever as well as rheumatism. Down the Richelieu River, on September 5th, the troops embarked again, with three days rations, and by three that afternoon were sight of the fort at St. Johns, two miles away. As a flanking party neared the fort, they were ambushed by a party of Indians, and fell back, losing eight killed and eight wounded. The Americans encamped a mile away, out of reach of the fort’s guns, which were throwing their mortar shells in their direction. That night, a messenger arrived at the American camp, with bad news. The fort at St. Johns, he reported, was strong and plentifully supplied with artillery, that the British ships under construction there were completed, and would be ready to sail in several days, and that no Indians would ally themselves with the American invaders. This information convinced Schuyler that the prudent thing to do was to retire. The Americans fell back to Isle aux Noix, and fortified the isle, awaiting further developments. The British heralded the little ambush as a great victory and far more fatal to American hopes than the sixteen casualties they sustained, was the effect it had on the French Canadians. They were effectually dissuaded from joining the Americans.[8] Schuyler mounted a second attempt to take Fort St. Johns, on the 10th. Nervous and jittery as they remembered the ambush, the 800 men were spooked by a single musket shot and ran pell-mell back to the boats that carried them close to the fort. General Montgomery rallied them and sent them in again. Half the force turned tail and fled when the British guns opened on them from the fort once more. The other half pressed on, exchanged a few shots, and retreated. Two attempts to take the fort had both failed, but Schuyler and Montgomery were not about to quit this easily, even if their naturally independent and rebellious men were. However, Schuyler was in worsening condition, and on September 16th, his illness necessitated Montgomery assuming the command. Montgomery found many of the men in little better condition than Schuyler. Six hundred of his men were on the sick roll, and the mood in the camp was ugly and bordering on mutiny. Indeed, so bad where things were getting that many of the officers were about to throw in the towel.[9] At this point, however, things got better for Montgomery received reinforcements from Fort Ticonderoga, hastened along by Schuyler. Montgomery’s force now numbered 2,000 men.
That was far more than General Carleton could muster to oppose him. Resolved to hold Fort St. Johns, Carleton had only 200 men at the fort, with some Indians and artillerymen. He reinforced their number to 500, and then to 725. But these were mostly British regulars and British settlers. He could get little reinforcements from either the Indians or the French Canadians, reluctant to join either side.
Thus far, lacking artillery, Montgomery had not the means to formally besiege Fort St. Johns. That changed when he sent Major John Brown with 140-man force to capture a supply train heading from Chambly to Fort St. Johns. Brown successfully captured the supply train, which yielded artillery and mortars. Now, Montgomery could formally begin the siege. Entrenchments were thrown up, the artillery was posted, and the approaches were held by the Americans. And so, the siege began.[10] For weeks it dragged on, with little gains made by the Americans. Much of this was due to the poor discipline of the troops. The New Yorkers and the New Englanders loathed each other, and the fierce independence of the troops required their officers to pander to them, obtaining their permission before things could get done. For example, Montgomery’s decision of where to place a battery was subjected to the approval of his officers, and not made independently by the general himself. Morale plummeted, as the weather grew uglier and colder. Heavy rains drenched men and materiel. Sickness raged through the camp, and morale fell lower when word of Ethan Allen’s capture reached them. That officer had been engaged in trying to recruit Canadian volunteers near Chambly. Believing he could take Montreal in a surprise assault as he had taken Ticonderoga, Colonel Allen led 150 to the bank of the St. Lawrence River and crossed three miles below Montreal. But the garrison of Montreal had been alerted, and after Allen’s men, had crossed, the defenders, some 250 in number, attacked, and overlapped his flanks, obliging Allen to fall back. In the running fight that followed, Allen was captured, with forty of his men. Colonel Allen’s scheme had been a daring one, but it had been also an impetuous one and foolhardy one, and it had failed.
The failure of the attack boosted British morale and correspondingly lowered that of the Americans. The siege of Fort St. Johns went on. Major Brown took the small fortress of Chambry, five miles above St. Johns, with a party of men, and nineteen artillery pieces and 120 barrels of gunpowder were thus supplied from this place to Montgomery’s army, enabling him to besiege the fort with greater success and vigor than before. The British now were bottled up. General Carleton now attempted to relieve the garrison’s defenders. With a force of 800 men, made up both regulars and unreliable local militia, he advanced to the St. Lawrance at Montreal and attempted to cross, but was repelled by the Americans. Meanwhile, Montgomery had placed a battery in a good tactical position and tossed his shells into the fort itself, wrecking it.
On November 3rd, the British defenders surrendered, and Montgomery captured the fort, and its defenders, taking nearly five hundred British soldiers prisoners, as well as some one hundred Canadians. By November 12th, Montgomery was in control of Montreal. General Carleton, however, managed to escape to Quebec. Montgomery’s force had faced many hardships, but at length it had been victorious. Yet the unwillingness of the Canadians to flock to the standard of the Americans and throw off the British yoke doomed the entire American operation. Montgomery had won, but his victory had been in vain.
Expedition to Quebec
While the siege of Fort St. Johns had been taking place, Colonel Benedict Arnold’s expedition to Quebec had been undergoing an arduous trek through the wilderness beset with difficulties. The expedition had gotten underway from Cambridge on the 11th of September and reached Newburyport by the 16th. Here eleven sloops and schooners had assembled to meet them. The soldiers embarked and were taken out into the ocean and steered east to the mouth of the Kennebec River, a journey of 100 miles undertaken in eleven hours. It was a most unpleasant journey for the soldiers, many of whom, unused to the water, became seasick.[11] By the 22nd of September, they had reached Gardinerstown, where smaller boats known as bateaux awaited them. Arnold had made arrangements to have these 200 boats awaiting their arrival. Loading their supplies and provisions aboard these boats, which to Arnold’s disappointment were found smaller than expected, constructed from inferior wood, and leaky, the expedition proceeded five miles up the river to Fort Western and from there to Fort Halifax, at the mouth of Sebasticook river. Here the real difficulties of the advance began, for the boats had to be unloaded, and all the supplies, provisions, and even the bateaux themselves carried by hand past Norridgewock Falls. It took seven days to cover this distance of a mile and a half. Both boats and provisions were damaged in this endeavor. The boats were then reloaded, and the advance continued. However, the journey grew more treacherous. The river was flowing swiftly now, and rocks on either side of the narrow banks, jutting above the water, hazardous to the rowing craft, made it necessary to lift or drag the boats along the shore past these obstacles. At night, the soldiers camped along the shore, huddling for warmth around great fires. But the night air was chilly, and in their soaked state, many soldiers fell ill. To make matters worse, much of the expedition’s flour had been spoiled. From Norridgewock, it took only thirteen miles to get to Devil’s Falls by October 11th. Here the falls rendered it necessary to carry the boats and provisions along the shore again for a twelve-mile stretch throughout what was dubbed “the great carrying place.” Carrington describes the march through this place:
The march of fifteen miles across to Dead river was one of severe trial. Three shallow ponds which were choked with fallen trees, many ravines, quagmires, and swamps, lay in the way; the mud was often knee deep – the water was up to the arm-pits; and even when oxen were used for hauling, the men were require to render aid and extricate the loaded boats from the mire.[12]
On October 11th, Colonel Arnold sent a sent a supposedly trustworthy messenger to deliver a message to those in Quebec known to be friendly to the American cause, letting him know the progress of his expedition, so that they might be ready to aid him when he arrived. It would prove a bad mistake, as we shall see. On October 15th, the boats were placed back into the Dead River, but the river was so broken by shallows and falls, that the men were obliged to carry the boats a total of seventeen times over 83 miles. The removal of the food and supplies from the boats and carrying them and the boats by hand took time and resulted in much of the provisions and food becoming lost or spoiled. To make matters worse, heavy rains were hampering the progress of the expedition. It rained heavily the night of the 14th, and on the 22nd and 23rd the rain came down in buckets. The heavy rains raised the Dead River nearly eight feet, and on the 23rd, seven of the bateaux overturned, and most of the remaining food supplies were washed away. Now rations remained for only twelve days. Arnold now called a council of war, on whether to proceed with the expedition or to abandon it. A narrow majority of his officers agreed with Arnold to go on, and the expedition continued its harrowing trek.
Nevertheless, it was necessary to make some concessions. The sick and infirm, 48 in number were sent back to Maine. The most pressing problem was lack of food. Lieutenant Colonel Green’s men, straggling behind, were starving now, and found it difficult to keep up. Lieutenant Colonel Enos took his division of three companies and returned to Maine, for he was so short of provisions that to go on would subject his men to starvation. It was an action for which he would be court-martialed, and acquitted. The troops left behind weren’t so forgiving. Captain Henry Dearborn, an officer commanding one of Meigs’ companies, wrote: “Our men made a general prayer, that Colonel Enos and all his men might die by the way, or meet with some disaster, equal to the cowardly, dastardly, and unfriendly spirit they discovered in running back without orders, in such manner as they had done.”[13] The expedition, down to fewer than 700 men now, pressed on. Rain and mud were bad enough, but the ugly weather turned uglier, and snow began to fall. The water in the streams had now frozen over, and by the 28th of October, it was necessary to crack the ice with musket butts to enable them to wade through the freezing water, for it was not thick enough to walk on. As for the boats, they were gradually all wrecked and could no longer be used. So overland, through the wilderness, the starving army of Colonel Arnold marched. Their troubles were severe, and they were indeed starving. Their clothing and flesh were torn by thorns and briars, and their clothes hung in rags on their persons. They were so starved for food that they killed and ate their dogs, and all their cattle. This helped, but not enough, and they were supplementing their starvation rations with roots, plants, and in some cases, even shoes and candle tallow, hardly edible food sources. What hunting could be done in the Canadian wilderness helped, however, and trout from the streams, and a moose killed by one of them, was a substantial godsend to the starving men. The starving condition rendered the men weak; to break a leg or twist an ankle meant death, for the men were too weak with hunger to carry each other.[14] Weak with hunger, they struggled on, through the three-inch snowdrifts, the muddy bogs, up and down steep hillsides, and through dense forest. Many men took sick; many were burning with fever. Yet all pressed on, for to remain behind meant a slow death in the wilderness.
“Marvelous was the endurance of those men; and as if in his element, Arnold’s courage never abated, his confidence in success never failed him. It was indeed a great ordeal, but a great triumph would compensate for the suffering, if it only secured the surprise of Quebec and the conquest of Canada.”[15]
The ordeal was hard enough for strapping young men, but there were two women with the party as well, one the wife of a sergeant named Grier, and the other the wife of a private. Charles Coffin writes:
There are women in the party. Mrs. Grier, wife of Sargeant Grier, a large athletic woman, has accompanied her husband to take care of him, should he be sick or wounded. She wades through the streams, carries her heavy pack, eats her gill of flour, lies down to eat in the snow, thus helping to secure liberty to the country. Everybody treats her with respect. Mrs. Warner wife of a soldier accompanies her husband. The soldier is weak and faint, and the wife shoulders his knapsack and trudges by his side. He staggers and falls – strength gone, hope gone, courage gone. He leans his head against a tree. He is ready to welcome death in any form. His wife urges him on, but he cannot stand upon his feet…but the expedition cannot halt for anyone. Others have dropped by the way, never to rise again. The ranks are growing thinner…The column moves on, leaving them there.[16]
Amazingly, Mrs. Warner reached Quebec that December. On October 27th, an inventory of the available supplies was taken, at Lake Magentic, and it was realized that only three days rations remained – and this was half rations at that. On that day, Arnold, knowing the perilous nature of the situation took some boats, and seventy men, and went to procure food from the nearest French settlements. He had a thousand dollars with him for the purchase of provisions and was confident that he would have little trouble in bringing back the necessary foodstuffs. In this he was correct, but getting there was another matter. Reaching the Chaudiere river, Arnold’s men tried to cross in their boats, but the fast-moving waters swept and dashed to pieces six of them, and what little food was on board was lost. Arnold and his men pressed on, though on the verge of starvation. At Lake Magentic, the army waited, many men too weak to move, many waiting for death. Shivering and starving, these gaunt haggard men waited for the return of Arnold’s rescue party. Reaching Sertigan, Arnold was received well, and he was able to purchase a herd of cattle and some flour and send this back to the army in the care of some Canadians and Frenchmen. The starving men could scarcely believe their eyes. Down to eating pine bark, they beheld the sight of a herd of cattle being driven into their camp. Instantly, the starving men set upon the bovines with knives; fires were at once kindled, and the famished bellies of the starving men were at last filled with meat. Morale skyrocketed, and the men broke into song. Despair vanished. On a pound of meat and some oatmeal the expedition pushed on, and on November 9th, Arnold’s army reached the St. Lawrence River and the village of St. Levi, opposite Quebec. The army, at last, had reached its destination after an arduous trek of forty-five days. Benedict Arnold summarized the courageous performance of the troops:
In about eight weeks we completed a march of near six hundred miles, not to be paralled in history; the men having with the greatest fortitude and perseverance hauled their bateaux up rapid streams, being obliged to wade almost the whole way, near 180 miles, carried them on their shoulders near forty miles, over hills, swamps, and bogs almost impenetrable, and up to their knees in mire, being often obliged to cross three or four times with their baggage. Short of provisions, part of the detachment disheartened and gone back; famine staring us in the face of all these obstacles, the officers and men inspired and fired with the love of liberty and their country, pushed on without a fortitude superior to every obstacle, and most of them had not one day’s provisions for a week.[17]
Arnold’s Arrival at Quebec
The British sentinels on the walls watched the army as it appeared at St. Levi, and the alarm was raised. They were not taken by surprise, however, for the British knew they were coming.
On October 23rd, Arnold had dispatched a messenger with to Quebec with a letter alerting some men there favorable to the American cause of Arnold’s plan and intentions. But this messenger was a traitor and promptly placed the letter in the hands of the British. Now forewarned, the British had taken immediate steps to counter Arnold’s movements. The outposts had been hastily repaired, and all the boats there that Arnold had planned to use to ferry his men across to attack the city had been seized. Arnold could not attack the city without boats, and he was forced to wait until they could be procured, for three days, in which time his army was lashed by storm and sleet. On November 12th, the garrison at Quebec was substantially reinforced by the Royal Scotch regiment of Colonel Allan McLean, who took command of the British garrison there under Carleton, and the crews of two British warships in the harbor, which furnished their marines and sailors for the defense. Arnold was unaware of the British reinforcement and used the time to procure thirty-six birch canoes. At night on the 13th, he rowed his army across to Wolfe’s cave, and ascending the plains of Abraham, the army gathered there. The coming of daylight revealed his movement to the British, and he was thus prevented from returning to Point Levi for his last batch of 150 troops, as well as the ladders with which he planned to attack the city. Arnold sent a demand for immediate surrender under a flag of truce. But it was ignored, and his second flag was fired upon.[18]
Arnold and his men had assumed that the city would throw its doors open to their liberators, and that the whole city would rise against the British occupiers, but this did not seem to be occurring. The presence of McLean’s Royal Scotch regiment served to quash any such notions of a rising from any anti-British element within the city. Arnold now learned that the British garrison had been reinforced, and learned as well that the garrison was in enough strength as to soon attempt a sortie. Arnold sent off an urgent message to General Montgomery for supplies and 2,000 reinforcements, and in the meantime, kept up a partial blockade of the city by land, preventing supplies of wood and meat from reaching the garrison but he could do nothing more.[19] On the nineteenth, Arnold withdrew to Point Aux Trembles, to await the arrival of Montgomery.[20] General Carleton entered Quebec on the nineteenth, and wasted no time getting started on defense preparations. He immediately issued an act that all persons who refused to aid in the defense of the city must leave it within four days, and thus removed any dangerous element from the city.[21]
The removal of any subversive element from Quebec meant that Arnold could expect no help from any Fifth column element within the city. If Carleton was concerned about a general rising, he needn’t have been; the French Canadians were more indifferent than supportive to the Americans. On December 2nd, General Montgomery arrived to join Arnold from Montreal, with 300 men. This small amount of manpower was due to the fact that Montgomery was forced to leave behind a garrison under General David Wooster at Montreal, and expiring enlistments. More importantly, he had brought an adequate supply of artillery, ammunition, provisions, and winter clothing. That winter clothing, long white hooded overcoats, would be especially useful to Arnold’s men in their rags, their clothing torn to shreds, in their arduous 350-mile journey to the gates of Quebec. And the artillery was imperative to the Americans. Without it they had no chance of taking the city. But the artillery that Montgomery brought with him was too small for a formal siege. Montgomery and Arnold now deployed their forces, the former placing his troops on the southern side of the city, and Arnold on the northern side. On the sixth of December, Montgomery demanded the surrender of the city from Carleton, but he refused to even read the surrender summons provided to him, and tossed the summons into a fireplace, explaining that he would not receive any communications from a rebel. As this summons was not responded to, Montgomery sent a second letter, this time greatly boasting of his supposed numerical strength, and that Quebec’s fall was a foregone conclusion. But Carleton paid no heed to this second summons, either.
On December 9th, in a heavy snowstorm, work began on an American battery seven hundred yards from St. Johns Gate. As breastworks could not be built into the frozen soil, a bedding of snow turned to ice was used to mold gabions, and in this makeshift position, seven small artillery pieces and two mortars were placed. The Americans now began a very heavy fire upon the town, but it did little damage, Montgomery observed, and Carleton’s return fire shattered the American battery and killed several men. With the fire of their small artillery proving ineffective, Arnold and Montgomery decided that their only option was to attack Quebec and take it by storm. A siege was out of the question. Ward explains:
But a siege, without great battering guns to breach the walls, must needs be a slow, long drawn out affair, and of time Montgomery had little to spare. He could not dig trenches to approach the town in the classic manner. He had no engineer to plan them, and they could not be dug in frozen soil. The term of enlistment of all Arnold’s New England troops would expire with the year, and Montgomery had no hope of retaining them after that. It would be most difficult, if not impossible, to obtain fresh supplies of ammunition, and even of food, for Montgomery had no money except Continental paper, which would not pass in Canada. And by April, when the ice in the river broke up, British reinforcements could certainly come. A siege would not do.[22]
By now the weather was frighteningly cold. “…men could not handle their arms for more than a few minutes at a time.” Morale dropped, and the army, their enlistments rapidly nearing expiration, seemed ready to mutiny once more. Three of Arnold’s subordinate officers, who loathed him, were responsible for stirring up much of this rebellious spirit. Montgomery smoothed things over, for the time being. On Christmas Day, Montgomery and Arnold decided to take the city by storm. Bad weather and preparations for the assault meant that it could not be attempted until December 30th. The plan of Arnold and Montgomery was to attack by surprise, their movements shrouded by a snowstorm. Quebec is divided into parts, the upper town and the lower town, and it was decided to concentrate the assault against the lower town, because Carleton’s artillery covered the approach to the upper town. The attack on the lower town, the capture of which would force Carleton to surrender the upper town as well, reasoned the two generals, was to be made from two directions. Arnold would attack from the town’s north side, and Montgomery from the south. The two arms of this pincer movement would finally meet up at Mountain Street in Quebec. A diversion would be made by Majors Livingston and Brown with two hundred men, feinting attacks on Cape Diamond and the St. Johns gate. Arnold’s division comprised 500 men, and Montgomery’s 300. In total, the American assault would involve a little over a thousand men, but they were outnumbered by the 1800 defenders that Carleton and McLean, on the British side, could bring to bear against them. In artillery, too, they were extremely strong, with some two hundred cannons. Carleton was well aware that the Lower Town was more vulnerable than the upper town, and preparations were made to meet an attack on that section of the city. The removal of any subversive element from Quebec meant that Arnold could expect no help from any Fifth column element within the city. If Carleton was concerned about a general rising, he needn’t have been; the French Canadians were more indifferent than supportive to the Americans.
The plan was a desperate one which Montgomery and Arnold had conceived, but they had little choice. The snow fell thick and fast the afternoon of the 31rst, and at 3:00 am, in the midst of a raging snowstorm, the Americans launched their attack as signal rockets were fired to signal the start of an attack. Unfortunately, for the Americans, the same signals that alerted the two American commands, alerted the British as well. In Quebec, bells rang, and officers dashed through the streets shouting the alarm. The city garrison rushed to their posts, ready to meet the invaders of Canada. Montgomery’s men moved along the narrow path under Cape Diamond to attack from the south side. Along the narrow cliff trail, which ran past the St. Lawrence River below, the men advanced, knowing that one false step would mean dropping into the St. Lawrence River below, and it was hard to watch one’s step when one’s vision was obscured by snow blowing into one’s face. Getting up that trail was treacherous enough, but Montgomery’s men had other obstacles to surmount. Charles Coffin writes:
It was a desperate undertaking which Montgomery had in hand. The stone walls surrounding the city only came to the edge of the bluff, but a post fence, fifteen feet high, ran the precipice to the river. The posts were spiked and bolted together. Beyond the fence was a block-house, fifty feet square, of solid timber walls, with loopholes for musketry, and four cannon loaded with grape-shot, pointing their muzzles to sweep the road. Montgomery must saw away the posts, rush up the cart-way, and take the block-house.[23]
General Montgomery and some sixty of his men reached the post-fence, before the rest of his men, still struggling up the narrow trail. Montgomery and others quickly sawed through it. “Come on!” Montgomery shouted, as he led the sixty men with him through, not pausing to wait for the rest of his men. But in the blockhouse, thirty-eight militia, a few sailors, and a ship captain, waited for the American attackers, with lighted matches in their hands, ready to light the touchholes of their cannons. Urged to hold their fire until the Americans got close, they did, and from the blockhouse, from the loopholes and gunports, muskets flashed fire, spitting musket balls into the freezing air. The cannon muzzles belched their ordnance. The volley of musket balls and grapeshot ripped the ranks of Montgomery’s men, and more such volleys followed. Montgomery went down, shot through the head. A dozen others fell with him. A few of his men managed to escape, including the soon to be famous Aaron Burr, but Montgomery’s attack upon Quebec had died just as surely as its leader had. The rest of his men retreated.
General Arnold’s attack had gone little better. Arnold led the van of his force, 25 strong, followed by Captain John Lamb and forty artillerymen pulling a 6-pounder gun on a sled. Behind them came Morgan’s riflemen, whose leader was in the van with Arnold. The rest of Arnold’s command followed. Along a narrow passage they advanced, snow blowing violently into their faces. Passing the palace gate, they rushed into a narrow street, which had been barricaded, and where two artillery pieces had been placed. At once were met at once by a terrible fire of musketry and grapeshot. Arnold collapsed, his right knee shattered by a musket ball. Another ball tore through Captain Lamb’s face. Other men fell, but still the column pressed on, and pressed up and over the barricade, led by the intrepid Captain Morgan. The startled British at the barricade surrendered at once. One American named George Morrison wrote of this incident:
Our advance party, consisting of thirty men, impetuously rush on and attack a battery on a a wharf. Captain Morgan, being in front, advances to their aid, followed by Captain Hendricks. We fire into the portholes with our rifles with such effect that the enemy cannot discharge a single cannon – save one on our approach that did not damage. Perhaps there is no similar instance in modern warfare of a battery being silenced by a few riflemen. Several discharges of musketry are now made upon us from the houses and other unexpected places. Colonel Arnold receives a bad wound in his leg, and is carried to the hospital. We now scale the battery with our ladders, led on by the intrepid Daniel Morgan, our brave captain. This bold act so confounds the guard that thirty of them instantly surrender and are immediately secured. This affair occupies us but about twenty minutes– one killed, and six or seven wounded.[24]
The way into the Lower Town was now open. Exultant, Morgan and his men swept ahead, believing the city was nearly won. But at the end of the street, they encountered another barrier, a platform with cannons mounted upon it and with musketeers ready to meet the attackers with small arms fire and the bayonet. Again and again, the Americans attempted to scale this barricade, but were galled by the grapeshot of the British cannons, which sprayed death and destruction through their ranks. A hail of bullets crashed down upon their heads from the upper windows of the houses lining the street, from which the British and the city militia were shooting. The bayonets of the British on the platform resisted any attempt to scale it by those that got through the charges of grapeshot being directed into the Americans packed in the narrow street. The Americans at last took the barricade by accurate gunfire, but rather than pressing his attack, and linking up with Montgomery’s contingent, Morgan halted his men, waiting for Montgomery to link up with him in accordance with orders. It was a fatal error. In the time that lapsed, the British recovered from their confusion, and a strong force moved down to oppose Morgan. Under a heavy fire, the Americans were forced to seek cover in the houses lining the street, exchanging fire with the British in houses opposite to them. For nearly four hours, the battle raged, Morgan not being one to give up easily, despite the fact that he was ignorant of the city. Some sixty of the men fell, and many others were wounded. The company of Captain Dearborn, which had trailing Arnold’s division, were supposed to come to their aid, but they never showed up. It turned out that Carleton had ordered a sortie to cut off the American retreat, and the British scooped up Dearborn’s company as prisoners of war. Without prospect of success, without support, low on ammunition, and with much of what they did have drenched by snow, knowing that Montgomery’s attack had been repulsed, Morgan had no choice but to surrender his command. And so the attack of Arnold failed as Montgomery’s had. The British captured 426 officers and men, half the American force. To his credit, General Carleton treated his American prisoners with dignity and respect. Besides the captured, American casualties numbered 160 killed and wounded. The British had suffered a mere handful of casualties, some 5 killed and 13 wounded. And so ended the American attack upon Quebec.
Aftermath
General Arnold withdrew three miles from the town, and erected breastworks of frozen snow, from which he besieged the city, while awaiting reinforcements. All he could do was to close the city off from supplies in the meantime. For months, things continued in this state of siege until General Wooster arrived with reinforcements from Montreal, but before Wooster and Arnold could take advantage of these reinforcements, reinforcements reached General Carleton at Quebec, and forced Wooster and Arnold to retreat. The 1775 Invasion of Canada was over. It had all been in vain. But though the strategic goals of the invasion were not met, the invasion did serve as the trial by fire of the Continental Army. Lessons were learned from the invasion, and many officers came through the trial by fire of the invasion to distinguish themselves and apply the lessons they had learned in future battles. If the invasion of Quebec was a costly and ghastly mistake (and it was), it was a mistake the Americans were to learn from in the future. And endurance and hardships, not to mention the stubborn tenacity and valor of the American fighting man, evidenced in this campaign, were to distinguish his performance in countless future battles and in countless future wars throughout American history up to the present day. For that reason, at least, may we never forget the 1775 invasion of Quebec.
[1] Christopher Ward The War of the Revolution (New York, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1952), p. 140
[2] Henry B. Carrington Battles of the American Revolution (New York, New York: Promontory Press, 1877) [Reprint] p. 121
[3] Christopher Ward The War of the Revolution (New York, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1952), p. 141
[4] Ibid
[5] Henry B. Carrington Battles of the American Revolution (New York, New York: Promontory Press, 1877) [Reprint] p. 121
[6] Christopher Ward The War of the Revolution (New York, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1952) p. 137
[7] Henry B. Carrington Battles of the American Revolution (New York, New York: Promontory Press, 1877) [Reprint] p.127
[8] Christopher Ward The War of the Revolution (New York, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1952) pp. 151-152
[9] Ibid pp. 154-155
[10] Ibid p. 156
[11] Ibid p. 168
[12] Henry B. Carrington Battles of the American Revolution (New York, New York: Promontory Press, 1877) [Reprint] p. 123
[13] Quoted in Rupert Furneaux Pictorial History of the American Revolution As Told By Eyewitnesses and Participants (Chicago, Illinois: J.G. Ferguson Publishing Company, Chicago, 1973) p. 80
[14] Christopher Ward The War of the Revolution (New York, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1952) p. 177
[15] Henry B. Carrington Battles of the American Revolution (New York, New York: Promontory Press, 1877) [Reprint] pp. 123-124
[16] Charles C. Coffin The Boys of 76: A History of the Battles of the Revolution (Gainesville, Florida: Marantha Publications, 1998) [1876 reprint] p. 62
[17] Rupert Furneaux Pictorial History of the American Revolution As Told By Eyewitnesses and Participants (Chicago, Illinois: J.G. Ferguson Publishing Company, Chicago, 1973) p. 82
[18] Henry B. Carrington Battles of the American Revolution (New York, New York: Promontory Press, 1877) [Reprint] p.131
[19] Ibid
[20] Ibid p. 132
[21] Ibid
[22] Christopher Ward The War of the Revolution (New York, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1952) p. 186
[23] Charles C. Coffin The Boys of 76: A History of the Battles of the Revolution (Gainesville, Florida: Marantha Publications, 1998) [1876 reprint] p. 66
[24] Quoted in Rupert Furneaux Pictorial History of the American Revolution As Told By Eyewitnesses and Participants (Chicago, Illinois: J.G. Ferguson Publishing Company, Chicago, 1973) pp. 84-85