The Battle of Iwo Jima, fought from February 19^th to March 20^th, 1945, was the bloodiest battle in Marine Corps history, and one of the costliest of the Pacific War. Here it would be truly remarked, that among the American fighting men who took that island, “uncommon valor was a common virtue.” The Battle of Iwo Jima delivers to us no great examples of Providential intervention, as do many other engagements of World War II, for the outcome of the battle was never in doubt, and American victory was at all times assured. But it does give us stirring examples of sacrifice, leadership, and valor under some of the most trying situations that a man can find himself in, and furnishes many lessons for Christian leaders, reformers and rebuilders, today.

  Background

By late 1944, American armed forces had broken Japan’s inner ring of defenses in the Mariana Islands, providing airstrips from which strategic bombing of Japan was undertaken by the new B-29 “Superfortress” heavy bombers. Farther south, the Philippines had been invaded by Americans, and were in the process of being wrested from the Japanese. The Volcano-Bonin Islands now became the obvious next target to both sides, and of this island chain, Iwo Jima was the only practical objective.  Its value lay in its three airfields, two finished, and one under construction. Due to the distance from the Marianas, American P-51 Mustang fighters could not escort the B-29s to their targets and back, and the unescorted bombers were often pounced upon by fighters rising from Iwo Jima’s airfields. But if Iwo Jima were in American hands, not only would this threat be neutralized, but the airfields would be available as emergency landing strips for bombers crippled by fighters and anti-aircraft fire over Japan. That this was necessary was a reality tragically brought home by plane and crew losses during the round trip to Japan and back to the Marinas bases. Finally, Japan was using Iwo Jima’s airfields to launch air attacks on American air bases in the Marianas, and taking Iwo Jima would neutralize this threat as well. All these reasons were apparent to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander of the U.S. Pacific fleet, and his superiors, Admiral Ernest J. King, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who approved his plan, and marked January 20 as the date for the invasion. But Japanese resistance to MacArthur’s ground forces on Leyte, which proved heavier than anticipated, caused the date for the invasion of Iwo Jima to be moved up by a month. A shortage of shipping and logistical reasons meant that the two operations could not be undertaken simultaneously. Within days of the Joint Chiefs approval of the Iwo Jima plan, Nimitz’s staff began to plan the invasion itself.

Japanese Preparations for Defense

The island of Iwo Jima is located in the Nanpo Shoto, a chain of small islands extending 750 miles southward from Tokyo Bay, which comprised the Bonin and Volcano Island chains, to the latter of which Iwo Jima belonged. 660 miles from Tokyo, Iwo Jima lay 625 miles north of Saipan. In shape it resembled a pork chop, four and two thirds of a mile long, and two and half miles wide at its widest point. At the southern tip of the island, the extinct towering mass of Mount Suribachi, an extinct volcano, rose above 550 feet above the landscape. To the north, the island rose to a plateau, cut with ridges and gorges, while in the center of the island was a plain, covered like the beaches, and most of the rest of the island in brown volcanic ash and black sand. These aforementioned beaches were located at the southern end of the island, for otherwise, the coast was rocky, steep, and fronted by cliffs. Though Suribachi was extinct, there were still sulphur vents on the island that spewed forth steam and fumes. It was this sulphur that interested the Japanese prewar. Some 1100 Japanese had lived on Iwo Jima prior to 1944, dwelling in villages to the center and north, and whose livelihood came mainly from mining sulphur. But all were evacuated by 1944, when Japanese efforts to fortify the place began in earnest, and it would not do to have civilians around to complicate things.

Japanese military forces had been present in the Bonin-Volcano Islands area since 1914, and when the Pacific war broke out, there were 1400 troops on Chichi Jima, a nearby island to Iwo Jima. But when the Marshalls were invaded in February 1944, the Japanese high command realized that their “outer line” of defenses had been pierced, and that their inner line of defenses, which stretched along a line extending from the Carolines, Marianas, and Volcano-Bonins, needed to be beefed up. Accordingly, they began to take steps to accomplish this, organizing the 31rst Army to defend that inner line of defense. However, with the fall of Marianas, the 31rst Army passed out of existence, and instead responsibility was transferred to the 109^th Infantry division, whose headquarters was set up on Iwo Jima. Though Chichi Jima possessed a natural harbor which Iwo Jima lacked, the latter island’s terrain was more suitable for airfield construction, and so it took on greater importance than Chichi Jima, useful now only as a staging area for troops and supplies that were being sent to Iwo Jima.[1] And there was plenty of it, for steel, concrete, and other supplies earmarked originally for the now fallen Marianas were sent instead to Iwo Jima. The Japanese commander of the Iwo Jima garrison, Lieutenant General Tadamachi Kuribayashi, was to put it to good use.

Kuribayashi, a 53-year-old, fifth generation samurai, had served as cavalry officer since his graduation from the Military Academy in 1914. He had commanded a cavalry regiment in combat in Manchuria and a brigade in Northern China. Later he had served as chief of staff during the capture of Hong Kong. A favorite of Emperor Hirohito himself, he had returned from China to command the Imperial Guards division in Tokyo, and after the fall of Saipan, was assigned to command the defense of Iwo Jima. Kuribayashi had no combat experience against the Americans, but this did not mean he did not know his adversaries. To the contrary, Kuribayashi knew the Americans very well, for he had been attached to the Japanese embassies of the United States and Canada as a junior officer, for several years, and had even taken cavalry training at Fort Bliss in Texas, in the 1920s. Like the late Isoroku Yamamoto, Kuribayashi had acquired a great respect for the industrial capacity of the United States, and in 1931 had wrote his wife that “the United States is the last country in the world Japan should fight.”[2] Unfortunately for the Japanese, hotter and rasher minds than his had prevailed, and like it or not, Japan was indeed at war with the United States. Whatever respect he had for the Americans, Kuribayashi would not let that get in the way of his service to the emperor, regarded as a god by the Japanese people. Kuribayashi was aware that the Japanese navy had been largely exterminated in the battle of Leyte Gulf, and that no air and naval support for his men would be forthcoming. In light of this fact, he realized that the defense of Iwo Jima would be futile; there was simply no way for the defenders of the island to prevail in the long run. Indeed, the prudent thing to do would be blow up the whole island, a considerable feat that could be accomplished with enough explosives. This course of action was actually recommended by one of Kuribayashi’s officers. But Kuribayashi, if realistic about the futility of holding Iwo Jima, was far sighted enough to recognize that it still held strategic value. He intended to defend the island so as to shed as much American blood as possible; hopefully, such a fearful bloodletting would cause the Americans to rethink invading Japan itself. Iwo Jima would be more valuable if it served such a purpose than if it were on the bottom of the ocean from which it had arisen long ago.

All through the summer of 1944, troops and supplies poured in to the island, until he had a good 21,000 men at his disposal. These were comprised of Colonel Masuo Ikeda’s 145^th Infantry regiment, the 2^nd Mixed Brigade of Major General Sadusue Senda, the 3^rd Battalion of the 17^th Mixed Infantry regiment under Colonel Tamachi Fujjiwara, the 26^th Tank regiment of Lieutenant Colonel Takiechi Nishi, a dashing equestrian who had won the 1932 Olympic gold medal for horsemanship and who had in times past driven fancy cars and spent time in the company of Hollywood elite.[3] The naval forces on the island were commanded by Rear Admiral Toshinosuke Ichimaru, an airman of considerable renown. He organized all naval force other than coast defense and antiaircraft batteries into the “Naval Land Force” equipped and prepared to fight as infantry.

The artillery, supplies and manpower poured into Chichi Jima harbor, and was then ferried to Iwo Jima via transports and destroyers. The buildup was not an easy task, thanks to rough seas, the lack of a harbor on Iwo Jima, and the threat of American air and submarine attack.[4] But the Japanese slowly, but surely, built up their forces. Kuribayashi had the benefit of hindsight, and he was shrewd enough to learn the lessons of those that had gone before him in commanding Pacific Island garrisons. Japanese tactical doctrine was to repulse the invaders at the water’s edge, but that had failed every time it had been tried; with air and gunfire support available from the immense supporting naval forces offshore, the Japanese didn’t have a prayer. Taking a hint from the defense of Peleliu, Kuribayashi had an alternate plan. He would take advantage of Iwo Jima’s terrain to mount a defense in depth, making the Americans bleed for every inch of ground they gained. Maybe if he inflicted enough loss on them, they would give up and go home. It was a forlorn hope, but even if they didn’t, they might rethink invading Japan after the terrible bloodletting they had received on Iwo.

Such a plan as Kuribayashi conceived was tactically sound given his tactical situation, but it was represented a great break with Japanese tactical doctrine, and was bitterly opposed by some of his subordinate officers, including his chief of staff. Kuribayashi had to send that man, and some eighteen others back home, because they would not get on board with the program. Kuribayashi was known as stern disciplinarian, and he was not well liked by his troops, whom he set to digging in the volcanic ash, their efforts with pick and shovel aided by a force of Korean slave laborers. For months the work went on, expert mining engineers brought from Japan to plan the fortifications. By early 1945, the Japanese had built massive concrete blockhouses, pillboxes, bunkers, expertly camouflaged and buffered with earth heaped over and around them to absorb American bombs and gunfire. These were constructed in one major and one secondary defensive line stretching across the island. The main line of defense extended across the island from northwest to southeast, between airfields 1 and 2. The second line of defense, with fewer man made defensive fortifications, but utilizing plenty of natural caves to make up for it, ran between airfield no. 2 and the village of Motoyama. This network of pillboxes, bunkers, and blockhouses, and caves were all interconnected by a vast underground network of tunnels and underground structures. Most of these tunnels and underground structures, which included command posts, barracks, and hospitals, were provided with multiple entrances, and were well served with food, water, ammunition, and electrical power for radio and field telephones. Every cave had multiple outlets. Some of these positions housed only a few men; others hundreds. In every instance, the terrain was utilized to best advantage.

Mount Suribachi was transformed into a veritable fortress, with dug in gun positions with automatic weapons, machine guns, mortars and coast artillery, all interconnected by seven levels of tunnels within the mountain.  Kuribayashi predicted that Suribachi would be cut off during the early part of the battle, and designed this defensive position as a semi-independent one. Working some thirty feet below the ground, the heat and sulfur fumes were so intense that the Japanese could only work for limited periods, and then only while wearing gas masks. But with grit and tenacity, the work went on. Though it was hard work, the soft ground was easy to dig in with shovels and picks, and the sand mixed with cement to form excellent concrete, which the Japanese used with reinforcing rods to brace and strengthen the natural caves and reinforce their above and underground structures. From his own headquarters in a cave at Kitano Point on the northern end of the island, Kuribayashi would direct the defense. He intended this to be an essentially static one, but he was not opposed to using the tunnels to get bodies of troops into the rear of the Americans and attack them from behind or on the flanks.

Kuribayashi’s men dug anti-tank ditches and laid minefields to protect the airfields, but protecting them was not on Kuribayashi’s list of priorities, which ruffled the feathers of Admiral Ichimaru. Because Ichimaru was still wedded to the old plan of defending the beaches, Kuribayashi smoothed things over with a compromise; Ichimaru got enough concrete to build 150 pillboxes and some blockhouses near the beaches. Kuribayashi divided the island into five defense sectors, each garrisoned by the following units.

Sector	Troops
Mount Suribachi Sector	312th Ind. Inf. Bn. (Army), AA and CD Units (Navy).
Southern Sector	309th Ind. Inf. Bn. (Army), Naval Land Force Unit.
Western Sector	311th Ind. Inf. Bn. (Army), 1st Co., 26th Tank Regt. (Army), Naval Land Force Unit, AA and CD Units (Navy).
Eastern Sector	314th Ind. Inf. Bn. (Army), 3d Co., 26th Tank Regt. (Army), AA and CD Units (Navy).
Northern Sector	3d Bn., 17th Ind. Mixed Regt. (Army), 2d Co., 26th Tank Regt. (Army), Naval Land Force Unit, AA and CD Units (Navy).[5]

 

Intending to make the island as impregnable as possible, Kuribayashi’s men kept working right up until the time the marines hit the beaches. In a nutshell, his plan was to wait until the marines hit the beaches, wait until the beaches were jammed with troops and equipment, hit them with enfilading fire from both flanks, and chew them up badly. Then he would withdraw his artillery and heavy mortars from the vicinity of the lightly defended 1rst airfield, to the north where the main defenses were located. Here, the main defensive effort would be made, and the Americans would be bled as dry as possible.[6] This was impressed upon his men who were instructed to exact ten American lives for every fatality they suffered.

American Preparations for Assault

The American capture of Iwo Jima was codenamed “Operation Detachment.” Admiral Nimitz’s staff worked out a staff study, outlining the details

of the operation. None of the planners of Operation Detachment harbored any predictions that the operation would be a walkover. They knew from previous bitter experience it would not be. Accordingly, they entrusted the command of the assault to a highly experienced team of professionals who had done this sort of thing before. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, the commander of the U.S. 5^th fleet was named operation commander, while the command of the Joint Expeditionary Force was given to Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, an old hand at amphibious warfare.

His second in command was to be Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill.  In support of the of the operation would be Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher’s Fast Carrier Force (Task Force 58). These were the naval leaders. The troops to be put ashore were placed under the command of Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, who was made commanding general of the expeditionary troops. At his disposal were three marine divisions: the 3^rd, under Major General Graves B. Erskine, the 4^th, under Major General Clifton B. Cates, and the 5^th, under the command of Major General Keller E. Rockey. The 4^th and 5^th Divisions were allocated the task of storming the beaches and capturing the island. The 3^rd division would be held in reserve to support them if needed. The 3^rd and 4^th divisions were veteran units. Erskine’s 3^rd division had liberated Guam, on which they were currently stationed, the 4^th, at Maui, had recently returned there after participating in the Saipan and Tinian operations. Only the 5^th marine division, currently stationed at Hawaii, was new as a unit, but many of its men were veterans themselves, and those that weren’t had the advantage of realistic training that had prepared them well for this sort of operation. In any case, they would be storming the beaches next to experienced veterans who would show them the ropes. All in all, they were an extremely proficient amphibious force. Upon storming the beaches, the three divisions would become the V Amphibious corps under the command umbrella of Major General Harry Schmidt, who would have nearly 80,000 marines under his command, the largest force of them ever committed to a single battle.

Ever Since June 15^th, 1944, Iwo Jima had been undergoing daily raids by Marianas based B-24 Liberators of the Seventh Air Force. Damage to the Iwo Jima airfields forced Kuribayashi to siphon off men from his fortification efforts to repair the fields. Needless to say, Kuribayashi was quite annoyed by this, because it detracted from what he considered it his main mission. In his mind, the airfields were a liability. Their fortification efforts interfered with by the B-24 raids, the Japanese took to working at night, a fact that soon became known to the Seventh Air Force, which then switched to nocturnal raids. These raids did nothing to stop the fortification efforts, for the Japanese were largely working underground, and in any case, the Liberator crews were obstructed by heavy cloud cover which obscured the surface of Iwo Jima from their bombsights. The airfields were not put of action for even a day, and the 55 drum napalm cannisters dropped by the Liberators were as ineffective as their conventional bombing. As the clock ticked closer to the date of the invasion, these raids were stepped up, but with no better results. All it accomplished was to make the Japanese burrow deeper underground like moles.[7]

No more effective were the surface bombardments undertaken by the three heavy cruisers and six destroyers of Rear Admiral Allen E. Smith’s Cruiser Division 5 on December 8^th, December 24^th, December 27^th, 1944, and January 5^th, 1945. The next bombardment came in 20 days later, and this time, Smith had a battleship along. USS Indiana put 203 16-inch rounds on the island and Cruiser Division added 1,354 rounds of 8-inch shell.[8] But in hindsight the effort was to have been manifestly made in vain. Samuel Eliot Morison records:

Probably no island in World War II received as much preliminary pounding as did Iwo Jima.  For ten weeks, until 16 February when the intensive pre-landing bombardment began, the island was hit by land-based aircraft almost every day, and the total tonnage of bombs dropped was not far from 6800. In addition, 203 rounds of 16-inch, 6472 rounds of 8-inch, and 15,251 rounds of 5-inch shell were fired in the five naval bombardments. Under ordinary circumstances, so heavy and prolonged a bombardment would have been more than sufficient to pulverize everything on an island of that size. Yet the Japanese restored the airfields on Iwo Jima to operation a few hours after each attack, and continued to fortify the island.[9]

Intelligence on the enemy was sorely lacking, however. Aerial photography revealed some information of value, and submarine Spearfish, sent to snoop Iwo Jima at periscope depth, revealed some more. The Americans were thus able to piece together a generally accurate estimate of Japanese defenses aboveground, which, concerningly, appeared to be increasing. But such photographs could not reveal the miles of underground tunnels and cave defenses Kuribayashi had built. The intelligence staffs knew that Iwo Jima lacked fresh water, and observing the rainwater cisterns, on the island, knew roughly how much water they could collect. Then dividing this per man, they roughly calculated the garrison at Iwo Jima to around 13,000 men. But that was far short of the correct figure. Kuribayashi had put his men on half rations of water months before the battle began.[10] Admiral Nimitz and his staff knew the Japanese defense would be fierce, but they never anticipated how fierce. General Schmidt predicted that the marines would conquer the island in ten days, and others predicted a week. Such predictions would be sadly mistaken.

Admiral Richmond K. Turner’s Joint Expeditionary Force, Task Force 51, was an enormous force, comprising 495 ships. As the ships assembled at Ulithi atoll and in the Marianas, they were snooped by prowling Japanese submarines that kept Imperial headquarters in Tokyo well appraised of the movements. A ruse by the Americans to delude the Japanese into thinking Formosa was the target was a failure, and the Japanese were not deterred from their conviction that Iwo Jima was the target.[11] By 15^th February, Task Force 51 was at sea, steaming toward Iwo Jima.[12]

Preliminary Operations

Forewarned, Kuribayashi “deployed one infantry battalion in the vicinity of the beaches and lower airfield, ordered the bulk of his garrison into its assigned fighting holes, and settled down to await the inevitable storm.”[13] Rear Admiral William H.P. Blandy’s combined task forces arrived in the vicinity at Iwo Jima at 6:00 am on February 16^th. Blandy had complete control over the pre-landing operations to be commenced. Described by Morison as “the sanguine Celtic type, with a humorous Irish mouth overhung by a large red nose…[with] quick mind, grasp of essentials and driving energy,” he had served during the first two years of the war as chief of naval ordinance, and had developed the 40 millimeter and 20-millimeter guns then in service on U.S. Navy ships. He had taken part in the operations to take Kwajalein, Saipan, and Peleliu. Blandy’s Task Force 54, which comprised six battleships, five cruisers, and sixteen destroyers, moved in for the final preinvasion bombardment. Cover for these surface warships was provided by warplanes flying from the U.S. escort carriers operating 50 miles south of the island. Intelligence had identified nearly 700 targets for the gun crews, pillboxes, blockhouses, and the like. The U.S. Navy had learned from bitter previous experience that area bombardment was ineffective and that the only to do it was by aiming at specific targets. Each of the specific targets would thus be destroyed, and checked off as they were on a master list on Blandy’s flagship.[14] There would be no air support from Task Force 58, which was off on launching air raids against Tokyo as a diversion. The Navy’s plan involved three days of shore bombardment by the heavy ships, which the marine commanders believed was not near enough time. They wanted ten days of such shelling before their boots hit the ground. But Spruance and Turner turned down their request, believing that three days were sufficient.

Their reasons involved the raids on Tokyo by Task Force 58, for if the shore bombardment commenced earlier than scheduled, and unforeseen circumstances forced Task Force 58 to cease operations against Tokyo after two days or less, the Japanese would be able to launch air attacks against the U.S. fleet off Iwo Jima. General Smith, known as “Howlin’ Mad” Smith, because of his terrible temper, lived up to his name and became enraged. He accused Admiral Spruance of allowing the carrier raid on Tokyo to take precedence over the invasion of Iwo Jima.[15] Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Weller, of the Marine Corps, argued persuasively that in shore bombardments, time was the key issue, not the weight of shells or the volume of gunfire. Destruction of heavily fortified targets could be achieved only by ships closing to close ranges and firing deliberate pinpoint salvoes against targets with results assessed by aerial observation. The 700 targets identified by intelligence on Iwo Jima would take a lot of time to knock out using that kind of a system.[16] But that system, the marines argued, was the only way, the objective could be achieved. But Spruance and Turner remained unshaken. They could not spare the time, for strategic, tactical, and logistical reasons. Steadfastly, they stuck to the original timeframe of three days bombardment.

U.S. minesweepers closed first, sweeping the approaches for mines, beginning at 6:45 am. At 7:07 am, February 16^th, D-3, the Admiral Blandy ordered the ships to open fire. Unfortunately, the observation planes from USS Wake Island were hindered in their efforts by low hanging clouds that obscured the vision of the target from above. Firing was reduced to conserve ammunition, and restricted firing to those times when the observation planes could see clearly enough to mark fall of shot, which wasn’t often enough. The day ended disappointingly, with only seventeen of the seven hundred targets checked off of Blandy’s checklist. D-2, the next day, February 17^th, dawned bright and clear. With better weather and visibility, there was much to do. The day’s agenda called for fighter sweeps against Chichi Jima, minesweeping, beach reconnaissance by underwater demolition teams to detect and destroy obstacles to the landing, supported by destroyers and Landing Craft Infantry gunboats.[17] The bombardment ships had all taken station at 7:00 am, and the minesweeping began. The Japanese had held off firing on them the day before, but now light machine guns opened up on them from Mount Suribachi. Undeterred, they completed their work, and retired without damage. USS Pensacola now opened up with her secondary battery and within five minutes had silenced the light Japanese weapons on Mount Suribachi. But the Japanese now began to unmask bigger weapons. A single 150-millimeter gun opened up on Pensacola, as she moved in to cover the minesweepers, and at 9:35 am, received six hits that killed 17 men and wounded 98, pierced her hull and set her on fire.  She withdrew temporarily to fight fires and repair damage, but was soon back on station. At 10:25 am, Blandy ordered the bombardment to cease in preparation for the underwater demolition team operations set for 11:00 am that morning.

At 10:45 am, the navy frogmen moved toward the beaches, under covering fire from LCI gunboats, firing rockets and 20- and 40-millimeter guns. While the underwater demolition team men or navy frogmen, went about their duties of checking the surf conditions, gathering soil samples from the beaches, and searching for beach obstacles to destroy, the LCI gunboats were subjected to a heavy fire from both flanks of the beaches. General Kuribayashi now committed his only tactical error of the battle. Erroneously, believing from the heavy rocket fire of the LCIs that the landing was about to commence, he unmasked heavy batteries intended to remain hidden until the landing was in progress, batteries that had so far remained hidden and unknown to the Americans during all the intensive preinvasion airstrikes and shore bombardments throughout the last seven months. All twelve of the LCI gunboats took a severe pummeling from Japanese mortars and artillery shells as large as 6-inch.  LCI (G) 474 was hit so badly she had to be scuttled, and the others all absorbed hits, but gallantly remained on station as long as possible to provide cover for the underwater demolition team. Eventually, their damage forced them to retire to offload wounded and conduct emergency repairs. LCI-449’s skipper, Rufus G. Herring, earned the first of 27 medals of honor during the Iwo Jima campaign for his conduct under fire. His citation read:

“For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Commanding Officer of LCI (G) 449 operating as a unit of LCI (G) Group Eight, during the pre-invasion attack on Iwo Jima on 17 February 1945. Boldly closing the strongly fortified shores under the devastating fire of Japanese coastal defense guns, Lieutenant (then Lieutenant Junior Grade) Herring directed shattering barrages of 40-mm and 20-mm gunfire against hostile beaches until struck down by the enemy’s savage counterfire which blasted the 449’s heavy guns and whipped her decks into sheets of flame. Regaining consciousness despite profuse bleeding he was again critically wounded when a Japanese mortar crashed the conning station, instantly killing or fatally wounding most of the officers and leaving the ship wallowing without navigational control. Upon recovering a second time, Lieutenant Herring resolutely climbed down to the pilot house and, fighting his own rapidly waning strength, took over the helm, established communication with the engine room and carried on valiantly until relief could be obtained. When no longer able to stand, he propped himself against empty shell cases and rallied his men to the aid of the wounded; he maintained position in the firing line with his 20-mm guns in action in the face of sustained enemy fire and conned his crippled ship to safety. His unwavering fortitude, aggressive perseverance and indomitable spirit against terrific odds reflect the highest credit upon Lieutenant Herring and uphold the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.”

The gunboats remained on station as long as possible and completed their mission, having suffered 51 killed and 148 wounded. They were soon to be avenged, for the Japanese fire betrayed the hitherto unknown Japanese gun positions to USS Nevada, and the venerable battleship blasted and knocked out the casemates and coast artillery located at the base of Mount Suribachi. Kuribayashi’s error, his only one of the battle, in unmasking these batteries turned out to be an immensely Providential one, for these batteries, had they remained masked, could have exacted a fearful price of marine blood during the landing itself. Kuribayashi remained convinced that he had repelled an invasion attempt, and Radio Tokyo reported that five U.S. warships, including a battleship, had been sunk by the coastal defenses.

The navy frogmen that had been recovered reported no underwater obstacles at the beaches and were able to produce maps of the approaches.[18]

Though hundreds of targets still remained, it was decided by the Americans to concentrate their bombardment on D-Day minus 1, February 18^th, exclusively on the beach areas, thus clearing the way for the Marines to land without being repelled at the water’s edge. The bombardment fleet, though hampered by poor visibility once again, closed to within 2500 yards, and began pounding with large caliber naval artillery. USS Tennessee and Idaho used their heavy guns with great effect, smashing beach pillboxes and bunkers, while Nevada and New York blasted the high ground beyond.

Reconnaissance photos showed that sixteen of the twenty blockhouses on the beach were destroyed, half of the pillboxes on the beach were obliterated, and seventeen of the coastal batteries had been destroyed. There still remained hundreds of guns and mortars which went unmolested and would have to wait either until the pre H-hour bombardment, or until the Marines landed.[19]

Admiral Blandy, concerned about the hundreds of targets that still remained, recommended another day’s bombardment, but Admiral Spruance stuck to the original plan. D-Day was on for February 19^th.

As for Kuribayashi, the activities of the Americans that day only served to vindicate the soundness of his defensive tactics, for he noted that “most of the positions the Imperial Navy insisted on building along the beach approaches had in fact been destroyed, as he had predicted. Yet his main defensive belts crisscrossing the Motoyama Plateau remained intact.”[20] A small enemy air raid that night damaged destroyer-minesweeper Gamble, and destroyer Blessman, the latter of which took a bomb hit in the troop spaces above the forward fireroom at 9:30 pm, killing two navy frogmen and wounding eight others, along with a number of her own crew. At 6:00 am, Admiral Turner arrived off Iwo Jima with the main body of the expeditionary force, and took command from Admiral Blandy.

D-Day at Iwo Jima

February 19^th at Iwo Jima dawned with weather ideal for an amphibious landing. The surf was low, and a light wind blew from the north. But before the marines could hit the beaches, there remained one last naval gun and aerial bombardment to be administered against the island’s defenses. Eight battleships, five heavy cruisers, three light cruisers and ten destroyers closed in to bombard, at 6:40 am, and did so until 8:03 am, when an airstrike from two naval task groups of Task Force 58, back from its raid on Japan, arrived. The fighters and bombers strafed and dropped bombs and napalm, and this was followed by an airstrike of B-24s from Saipan. But the results were disappointing; for one thing, the napalm cannisters were often duds.  At 8:25 am, the naval gun bombardment resumed, and continued for the next thirty minutes. The bombardment was terrific, and was delivered at close range, but it does not seem to have been very effective. Many of the Japanese positions were hard to see, and even harder to knock out, and were spared. As for the Japanese garrison, “…they cozily sat it out in their deep underground shelters,”[21] as Morison put it, then emerged when it lifted to once again man their weapons.

The amphibious task force now appeared on the horizon; the transport rails lined with watching marines, anxious to get their first real look at the barren clump of volcanic rock and sand that they were going to fight, and in many cases die, for. The arrival of the assault shipping, with its scores of transports and LSTs, increased the numerical strength of the U.S. fleet off Iwo Jima to over 450 vessels, an enormous armada superior in size and power to any thus far assembled in the Pacific War. Transports and LSTs now moved into assigned areas; yawning bow doors disgorged landing craft.  At 8:30 am, the first of numerous waves of landing craft began moving toward the shore, the second wave carrying the first troops; the first wave comprised 68 LVT (A)s, armed with stubby 75-millimeter guns to cover the troops as they went ashore. Ahead, gunboats poured in a final pre-landing barrage of rockets and 40-millimeter gunfire onto the Japanese ashore. From their respective ships, Generals Cates and Rockey of the 4^th and 5^th Marine Divisions watched as the amtracs moved toward the island, bursting with smoke and flame from the aerial and naval bombardment that morning. The seven beaches on which the marines were to land, were designated, from left to right, Green, Red, Yellow, and Blue. The 5^th Division would land its 28^th regiment on Green Beach, while the 27^th Marines would land on Red Beach. Abreast of the 27^th regiment on Red Beach, the 4^th Division would put ashore its 23^rd regiment on Yellow beach, and the 25^th Marines on Blue beach.

As the amtracs churned through the water toward the beaches, in successive lines 300 yards apart, the battleships fired over their heads onto the eastern beaches. As the amtracs reached them, the heavy ships shifted their fire further inland. It would not do to risk friendly fire. At 9:02 am, the LVT (A)s hit the beaches. Up till now everything had gone off without a hitch, but now the Americans encountered the first problem, and it wasn’t the Japanese. The LVT (A)s set down their tracks and began to move forward to provide fire support, but found their way blocked by the fifteen-foot-high terrace in front, and could gain little traction in the sand. Unable to give effective support on the beach, some of the amphibians backed out into the water and engaged inland targets from there. Three minutes later, the troop carrying LVTs of the second wave “waddled up out of the water, and as ramps were lowered all along the 3,500-yard strip of dark, repulsive looking beach, Marines of the 4^th and 5^th Divisions swarmed out of their vehicles and hit the volcanic sand at a run that slowed almost immediately to a laborious walk as their feet sank ankle deep into soft, loose volcanic ash.”[22] Struggling under the weight of their heavy packs, the marines inched up the first terrace as the third wave came ashore at 9:07 am, 1,200 strong, and was followed by the 1600 troops of the fourth wave five minutes later. But if the terrain was difficult, the landing was nearly unopposed. The troops optimism began to rise when, for the first few minutes, they encountered no enemy fire. Had the air strikes and naval bombardment killed them all? It was a comforting thought, but it was a forlorn one. Kuribayashi’s men were still very much alive, and only waiting to open fire at the opportune moment. Under cover of the naval bombardment, the American units reorganized and started to push inland. As they did so, they were preceded by a “rolling barrage” from the bombardment ships offshore.

Most of the beach fortifications had been already knocked out, so Japanese fire from the beach fortifications was desultory at best, and non-existent at worst. Hardly at LVT was lost to it, and the marines faced only scattered mortar, artillery, and small arms fire, and a few land-mines as well. This was much to the surprise of General Smith who had predicted “that every cook and baker will be on the beach with some kind of weapon.” But Kuribayashi had no intentions of holding the beachhead against the Americans as we have seen. As soon as the bombardment lifted, his troops, who had been hunkering in their underground tunnels, returned to their protected and covered gun positions. All along the line, they now began to open fire upon the advancing Americans, and as the light fire the Americans were taking began to grow in intensity, as from Mount Suribachi on the left, the rock quarry on the right, and the flat tableland beyond the beaches, Japanese fire began to pour down thick and hot. Kuribayashi was still holding back his heavy stuff, though, so the heavy fire the Americans were taking was mainly small arms fire and mortar shells. Enemy fire was heavier on the right, and the 28^th regiment pushed ahead to cut off Mount Suribachi and cross the 700 yards to the opposite beach. Corporal Tony Stein of the 28^th, armed with a makeshift machine gun, distinguished himself at this point, as he was the first man of the 28^th off the beach. Providing covering fire with his rapid-fire weapon, he courageously charged the Japanese pillboxes one by one, and single-handedly killed twenty of the enemy. Some elements of the regiments became bogged down, but other forged ahead, and continued westward, until by 10:35 am, the western beach was reached. Mount Suribachi had now been cut off. The other three regiments had difficulty even moving off the beaches toward the first airfield. Heavy mortar and machine gun fire fell among them. Casualties mounted, but the 27^th Marines “made good initial gains, reaching the southern and western edges of the airfield before noon.”[23] The 23^rd Marines got across two terraces and encountered two heavily fortified pillboxes that impeded their progress. Their Colonel Walter W. Wesinger called for tank support, and the regiment moved forwards only several hundred yards. The 25^th Marines faced heavy fire on their flank, and only moved forward three hundred yards. On the crowded breaches, congestion was mounting as many jeeps and trucks, besides LVTs, bogged down in the soft sand, and others were knocked out by mortar rounds and other enemy fire. But the Marines had seen nothing yet. With congestion on the beach mounting, Kuribayashi decided that the time had come to bring out the heavy stuff.  He had carefully waited for this moment, when the beaches would be packed with men and materiel. His gunners had heavy artillery, dual purpose anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns, as well as two new and nasty surprises for the marines: giant rockets, 8-inches and 16-inches in diameter, and giant mortars, 320 millimeters in size. His gun crews had the range and deflection down cold; on Kuribayashi’s signal, his gunners began to shoot heavy stuff at the marines. One Marine colonel recorded that “the Japanese were superb artillerymen…somebody was getting hit every time they fired.” Indeed, the beaches were so packed with men and materiel that the Japanese could hardly have missed even if they had been bad shots. The 8 and 16-inch rockets – dubbed “bubbly wubblies” by the marines – were not very accurate. More often than not, they tumbled end over end, and overshot the targets, landing in the water offshore. The giant Japanese mortars were a different story, however. Dubbed “flying ashcans” by the marines, they didn’t need to be accurate, they sprayed large fragments over a wide enough area to do plenty of damage, both to machinery and to human flesh and bone. Dozens of casualties were caused every time one of these hit the beach or the terraces. War Correspondent Robert Sherrod wrote:

“It was sickening to watch the Jap mortar shells crash into the men as they climbed. These huge explosive charges…would crash among the thin lines of marines or among the boats, throwing sand, water, and even pieces of human flesh 100 feet into the air. By noon, the assault battalions reported 20 to 25% fatalities.”

Another witness observed:

“At the water’s edge amtracs, LCMs and LCVPs were hit, burned, broached, capsized, and otherwise mangled. The loose, black volcanic cinders, slid past the churning tires of wheeled vehicles, miring them axle-deep; the steep terraces blocked egress from the beach and extensive minefields took a heavy toll. Debris piled up everywhere. Wounded men were arriving on the beach by the dozen, where they were not much better off than they had been at the front. There was no cover to protect them and supplies of plasma and dressings ran low. The first two boats bringing in badly needed litters were blown out of the water. Casualties were being hit a second time as they lay helpless, under blankets, awaiting evacuation to ships.”

“Our losses of equipment were frightening,” General Smith would write, “the beach soon looked like a row of frame houses in a tornado.” There was no shelter from the flying bullets, shells, and shrapnel. The marines found it exceedingly hard to dig foxholes in the volcanic sand, and sent back calls for sandbags instead.

Alarming radio reports began to crackle back to the command ships:

 1036: (From 25th Marines) “Catching all hell from the quarry. Heavy mortar and machine gun fire.”

1039: (From 23d Marines) “Taking heavy casualties and can’t move for the moment. Mortars killing us.”

1042: (From 27th Marines) “All units pinned down by artillery and mortars. Casualties heavy. Need tank support fast to move anywhere.”

1046: (From 28th Marines) “Taking heavy fire and forward movement stopped. Machine gun and artillery fire heaviest ever seen.”[24]

Fourth Division Marines burrowed into the volcanic sand of Iwo Jima

Tank support was on its way, and it was an answer to marine prayers. Company C of the 4^th Tank Company, with sixteen vehicles, was the only tank unit to arrive on D-day. Coming ashore in three LSMs, the tanks proved ineffective. At least one stalled at the top of the ramp, not only blocking the other vehicles, but causing the LSM to flood from the rising surf. Other tanks bogged down in the loose volcanic sand, or if they made it over the terrace, were disabled by anti-tank mines, or from very accurate 47-millimeter anti-tank fire from the slopes of Mount Suribachi.[25]  The 75-millimeter guns of the tanks that remained took on the anti-tank weapons of the Captain Masao Hayuchi’s 12^th Independent Anti-Tank battalion, knocking them all out. With his guns all useless, Hayuauchi clutched a demolition charge and charged the remaining American tanks. Throwing himself against the flank of one of them, Hayauchi blew himself up, but failed to stop the tank.[26]

Mines were taking their toll, for as the marine tanks and other vehicles got off the beaches they ran into Japanese minefields.

Under Kuribayashi’s direction, Japanese engineers had planted irregular rows of antitank mines and the now familiar horned antiboat mines along all possible exits from both beaches. The Japanese supplemented these weapons by rigging enormous makeshift explosives from 500-pound aerial bombs, depth charges, and torpedo heads, each triggered by an accompanying pressure mine. Worse, Iwo’s soft sand retained enough metallic characteristics to render the standard mine detectors unreliable. The Marines were reduced to using their own engineers on their hands and knees in front of the tanks, probing for mines with bayonets and sticks.[27]

In light of the heavy casualties they were sustaining, it was no surprise therefore, that Generals Rockey and Cates called in their reserves: the 26^th Marines for Rockey, and the 3 battalions of the 24^th Marines for Cates. The reserve units too took heavy losses, because the Japanese fire was pouring down thick and heavy as they came ashore, and there was no cover.

Tanks were not the only wheeled equipment wanted by the marines that day; that also wanted artillery, in order to beat back the big Japanese counterattack expected that night. Getting the artillery pieces ashore was an enormous chore that took up much of the afternoon.  One DUKW sank after it was released from its LSM, taking with it, its precious cargo of one 105-millimeter howitzer. It was even harder to get them off the beach. The 105s bogged down in the soft sand, and it was nearly impossible to manhandle them over the terrace. Of better use were the 75-millimeter pack howitzers. Still, by nightfall, twelve of the howitzers had been moved into position to provide fire support by nightfall, a remarkable achievement only made possible because the DUKWs towed them there.

By 4:30 pm, the rock quarry which had been pouring fire into the American right flank all day was finally captured by the Americans of Lieutenant Colonel Justice M. Chambers 3^rd battalion of the 25^th regiment. It cost Chambers all but 150 of his 700 men, frightful losses indeed, but secured for himself a medal of honor. Besides this, one battalion suffered 50% casualties, and one company lost seven officers before night fell.

First Night on Iwo Jima

By the time that darkness fell, the marines had established a beachhead.

“From East Boat Basin it extended inland, to and along the southwest edge of No. 1 airfield, across its southwestern end to the west beaches, returning to the east beaches along the northern base of Suribachi.”[28]

Nightfall found 30,000 marines ashore on the beaches. They had suffered an appalling casualty rate of 2,240 of which 501 had been killed, 1,755 wounded, 18 missing and 47 of which were mortally wounded. Completing the figure were nearly a hundred cases of combat fatigue. The first night ashore was far from restful. The marines, used to the tropics, shivered in the cold night. Everybody stayed alert, expecting a big Japanese counterattack that night that never materialized. Kuribayashi was sticking to his new tactics. But if he wasn’t going to send his men down in a screaming banzai charge to overrun the enemy, he wasn’t going to let them alone, either. His mortars continued to drop shells into the marines’ foxholes, killing and horribly wounding them. War correspondent Robert Sherrod wrote of that first night ashore:

“The first night on Iwo Jima can only be described as a nightmare in hell. About the beach in the morning lay the dead. They died with the greatest possible violence. Nowhere in the Pacific have I seen such badly mangled bodies. Many were cut squarely in half. Legs and arms lay 50 feet away from any body. All through the bitter night, the Japs rained heavy mortars and rockets and artillery on the entire area between the beach and the airfield. Twice they hit casualty stations on the beach. Many men who had been only wounded were killed.”[29]

Among the dead was Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Haas, the commander of 1rst Battalion, 23^rd Marines, was killed when one mortar round landed directly in the hole he was occupying. Kuribayashi also tried infiltration tactics, sending small teams of men, dubbed “prowling wolves” by the Japanese, to probe the American lines, wearing American gear and carrying American weapons to confuse the marines, mostly to gather intelligence, but also to blow up American ammo dumps and depots. One team of infiltrators managed to penetrate American lines and blow up the 25^th Marines ammunition and fuel dump at 4:00 am. “Two full boatloads of 81mm mortar shells, gasoline, and flamethrower fuel exploded, caving in foxholes for yards around.”[30] A landing craft of 39 Japanese members of the Special Naval Landing force attempted to execute a counter landing on the west coast of Iwo Jima. Alert rifleman of the 1rst Battalion, 28^th Marines picked the Japanese naval infantry off one by one as they tried to get ashore, until they were all dead.

[1] Michael Russel Iwo Jima (New York, New York: Random House Inc, 1974) p. 12

[2] Keith Wheeler and the Editors of Time Life Books The Road to Tokyo [World War II Series] Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1979) p. 40

[3] Ibid p. 54

[4] “The number of ships damaged by any submarines and planes gradually increased after August 19444, especially in the area between Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima. Over 1,500 persons were killed and over 500 tons of supplies lost.” (Quoted in Lt. Colonel Whitman S. Bartley Iwo Jima: Amphibious Epic [Washington D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954] p. 7

 

[5] Lt. Colonel Whitman S. Bartley Iwo Jima: Amphibious Epic (Washington D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954) p. 9

[6] Michael Russel Iwo Jima (New York, New York: Random House Inc, 1974) p. 13

[7] Keith Wheeler and the Editors of Time Life Books The Road to Tokyo [World War II Series] Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1979) p. 32

[8] Samuel Eliot Morison History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Urbana and Chicago, Illinois: Universitiy of Chicago Press, 2001) [Reprint] 17:13

[9] Ibid pp. 12-13

[10] Lt. Colonel Whitman S. Bartley Iwo Jima: Amphibious Epic (Washington D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954) p. 4

[11] Ibid p. 30

[12] Ibid p. 39

[13] Colonel Joseph H. Alexander Closing In: Marines In the Seizure of Iwo Jima p. 6

[14] Keith Wheeler and the Editors of Time Life Books The Road to Tokyo [World War II Series] Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1979) p. 29

[15] Michael Russel Iwo Jima (New York, New York: Random House Inc, 1974) p. 24

[16] Colonel Joseph H. Alexander Closing In: Marines In the Seizure of Iwo Jima p. 7

[17] Samuel Eliot Morison History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Urbana and Chicago, Illinois: Universitiy of Chicago Press, 2001) [Reprint] 14:28

[18] Samuel Eliot Morison History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Urbana and Chicago, Illinois: Universitiy of Chicago Press, 2001) [Reprint] p. 30

[19] Michael Russel Iwo Jima (New York, New York: Random House Inc, 1974) p. 29

[20] Colonel Joseph H. Alexander Closing In: Marines In the Seizure of Iwo Jima p. 8

[21] Samuel Eliot Morison History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Urbana and Chicago, Illinois: Universitiy of Chicago Press, 2001) [Reprint] p. 35

[22] Lt. Colonel Whitman S. Bartley Iwo Jima: Amphibious Epic (Washington D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954) pp. 51-52

[23] Colonel Joseph H. Alexander Closing In: Marines In the Seizure of Iwo Jima p.  12

[24] Colonel Joseph H. Alexander Closing In: Marines In the Seizure of Iwo Jima p. 17

[25] Ibid

[26] Keith Wheeler and the Editors of Time Life Books The Road to Tokyo [World War II Series] Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1979) p. 47 Hayauchi posthumously received the Japanese equivalent of the Medal of Honor for his actions, special mention of his deeds to the Emperor. This special honor was awarded quite differently than the American medal, and carried religious significance to the pagan Japanese. As one historian explains: “The process included Kuribayashi documenting the soldier’s heroic acts and writing up a Kanjo. The Kanjo was sent to Emperor Hirohito, where it was read aloud to him. Once this happened, it became a jôbun and was reported in the newspapers. This carried more prestige than an American receiving a Medal of Honor because Hirohito, as a Shinto god, was giving his divine blessing on this soldier ensuring his place in the afterlife as a high-ranking spirit or even as a lower-level Shinto god. American leaders, when awarding a Medal of Honor to a brave Marine did not also give a promise that his name would be written also down in God’s “Book of Life,” which was what Hirohito accomplished by creating a jôbun for a brave warrior.” (https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/elevated-emperor-empire-suns-unique-equivalent-medal-honor-bryan-rigg) The Pacific War was in many respects, ultimately a war of worldviews between the Judeo-Christian worldview of the United States, and the pagan Shinto one of Japan. Yet these religious aspects of the war are usually ignored by writers and historians.

 

[27] Colonel Joseph H. Alexander Closing In: Marines In the Seizure of Iwo Jima p. 23

[28] Samuel Eliot Morison History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Urbana and Chicago, Illinois: Universitiy of Chicago Press, 2001) [Reprint] p. 44

[29] Quoted in George W. Garand and Truman R. Strobridge Western Pacific Operations: History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971) 4:527

[30] Ibid p. 526